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Abstract
Machine learning is a subset of Artificial Intelligence which is utilised in a variety of different fields
to increase productivity, reduce overheads, and simplify the work process through training machines
to automatically perform a task. Machine learning has been implemented in many different fields such
as medical science, information technology, finance, and cyber security. Machine learning algorithms
build models which identify patterns within data, which when applied to new data, can map the input
to an output with a high degree of accuracy. To build the machine learning model, a dataset comprised
of appropriate examples is divided into training and testing sets. The training set is used by the
machine learning algorithm to identify patterns within the data, which are used to make predictions on
new data. The test set is used to evaluate the performance of the machine learning model.
These models are popular because they significantly improve the performance of technology through
automation of feature detection which previously required human input. However, machine learning
algorithms are susceptible to a variety of adversarial attacks, which allow an attacker to manipulate
the machine learning model into performing an unwanted action, such as misclassifying data into the
attackers desired class, or reducing the overall efficacy of the ML model. One current research area is
that of malware detection. Malware detection relies on machine learning to detect previously
unknown malware variants, without the need to manually reverse-engineer every suspicious file.
Detection of Zero-day malware plays an important role in protecting systems generally but is
particularly important in systems which manage critical infrastructure, as such systems often cannot
be shut down to apply patches and thus must rely on network defence. In this research, a targeted
adversarial poisoning attack was developed to allow Zero-day malware files, which were originally
classified as malicious, to bypass detection by being misclassified as benign files. An adversarial
poisoning attack occurs when an attacker can inject specifically-crafted samples into the training
dataset which alters the training process to the desired outcome of the attacker. The targeted
adversarial poisoning attack was performed by taking a random selection of the Zero-day file’s import
functions and injecting them into the benign training dataset. The targeted adversarial poisoning
attack succeeded for both Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) and Decision Tree models without reducing
the overall efficacy of the target model. A defensive strategy was developed for the targeted
adversarial poisoning attack for the MLP models by examining the activation weights of the
penultimate layer at test time. If the activation weights were outside the norm for the target (benign)
class, the file is quarantined for further examination. It was found to be possible to identify on average
80% of the target Zero-day files from the combined targeted poisoning attacks by examining the
activation weights of the neurons from the penultimate layer.
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1 Introduction
In 2015 the global cost of cybercrime was US$ 3 trillion which is estimated to grow to US$ 6 trillion
by 2021 (Cybersecurity Ventures & Herjavec Group, 2019). For large-sized Australian businesses, an
average of US$ 6.8 million was spent on cybercrime in 2018, up from US$ 5.4 million in 2017
(Accenture, 2017). Malware was the most common form of attack reported, with the cost of malware
attacks increasing by 11% between 2017-2018 (Accenture, 2019). Small to medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) are the most vulnerable group with respect to cyberattacks, as they lack the resources to put in
place appropriate security measures needed for protection. SMEs worldwide spend on average less
than US$ 4,000 per year on cyber security protection (Juniper, 2017).
Out of the $6.8 million dollars spent by larger Australian companies on mitigating cybercrime,
discovery and containment contribute the majority (60%) of the cost, with discovery comprising 36%
and containment 24% (Accenture, 2019). Mitigation comes at differing levels of cost and complexity,
from security intelligence systems to automation and machine learning (ML). The most commonly
used defensive systems are security intelligence systems (67%) and advanced identity and access
governance (63%), while ML is the third least commonly deployed security technology (38%) but
provides the second greatest cost savings of the aforementioned measures (Accenture, 2019).
The impact of cybercrime is not only focused on the financial aspects but also the operation of critical
infrastructure, which nations rely upon to function. Critical infrastructure systems may rely upon more
tailored and unique protection, due to the intricate nature of the systems. The complexity of the
systems exacerbates the damage caused by an incident which increases the cost required for
mitigation.
In cyber security, ML is seen as a promising tool with significant potential, but ML has some
drawbacks which can negate its value. If an attacker has knowledge of the ML algorithm in use or can
in some way gain access to the dataset being utilised to train the ML model, the attacker is then able
to attack the ML system itself.
A benefit of ML in the application of cyber security is in the use of malware detection. Traditional
malware detection applications rely upon signatures to identify if a software file is malicious. The
signature is generated after the malicious properties of a software file have been identified, either by
static or dynamic analysis and are then added to a repository of malicious signatures which antimalware applications use to identify malware by scanning the file and comparing the signature. The
drawback of the signature approach is that it can only identify malicious software which it already
knows about (known-knowns), and it is unable to detect malicious software which has not already
been identified (known-unknowns and unknown-unknowns). In the ML malware detection approach,
the ML model has been trained to identify patterns within software files which distinguish them as
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either malicious or benign. When the ML model is presented with a new software file, it can make a
classification based upon the patterns within. It is important to note that ML models are not perfect,
and false positives (a benign file being classified as malicious) and false negatives (a malicious file
being classified as benign) will appear on occasion.
Malware detection is an area of cyber security which can reap the benefit of ML. The ML models
generated for malware detection automate the process of determining if a file or network stream is of
a malicious nature. For the training of ML-based malware detection applications, an open training
model, where the datasets used are constantly being supplied with new files for further training, is
essential to keep pace with the ever-increasing rate of malware creation. For Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDSs), monitoring the flow of traffic and updating rule sets based on behaviour can help
reduce false positives being reported as the machine learning model has learnt from the new network
behaviour.
As malware detection relies on training with current malware data, a more complex problem occurs if
an attacker is able to influence the training process by exploiting the open training model. It is
possible that specifically-crafted adversarial malware could be created to infect and reduce the
efficacy of ML-based malware detection applications which can lead to an increase of false negatives.
There is a need to research different ML algorithms in relation to how these algorithms can be utilised
to detect Zero-day attacks and further, how adversarial attacks can reduce the efficacy of ML based
malware/intrusion

detection

applications.

For

known-known

malware

files,

detection is

straightforward as the files have already been identified as malicious and a signature has been
generated for future identification. Zero-day malware, which does not have a signature as the file has
not yet been identified as malicious, requires other means of identification. One of the methods to
identify Zero-day malware is through the use of ML trained malware detection models. The ML
model identifies malware by recognising patterns within both malicious and benign software files, and
classifies new files based upon the identified patterns in the new data.
When training ML models, the conventional approach is to assume that the data being used is
trustworthy and accurately represents the area being investigated (Pitropakis, Panaousis, Giannetsos,
Anastasiadis, & Loukas, 2019). In a malware detection ML application, one approach is to scan the
training data using a multitude of anti-malware applications and label the data according to the
majority of the results. In this approach, the researchers are trusting the output of the anti-malware
applications to produce an accurate label for the input data. It is not usually considered that the files
may have been modified by an attacker (without changing the functionality of the file) to influence
the training of the ML model for some other outcome e.g., certain malicious files bypass detection
while the overall classification rate is unchanged.
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It is proposed in this thesis that evaluating various attacks against different ML algorithms would
provide valuable insight in determining which algorithms are best suited for use in malware detection
and what preventative measures may be implemented to harden the selected ML algorithms against
adversarial attacks.

1.1

Background

Machine learning (ML) is a sub-field of Artificial Intelligence which has found application in many
different domains. Machine learning uses algorithms to generate models with the aim of accurately
classifying input or predicting the correct output from new input data received. Machine learning is
used in medicine (Gulshan et al., 2016), finance (Trafalis & Ince, 2000), and also for general purpose
applications such as Smart Personal Assistants, autonomous vehicles and map assistance.
Siri, Cortana, Alexa and Google Assistant are examples of Smart Personal Assistant (SPA)
applications which utilise ML (Marr, 2018; Rewari, 2020; Siri Team, 2017). SPAs perform tasks such
as organising dates and reminders, scheduling appointments (Google, 2018), performing Internet
searches, activating music and video players, creating to-do lists and purchasing items online.
Facebook uses an ML-based application, DeepFace, to automatically identify and tag users in images
(Taigman, Yang, Ranzato, & Wolf, 2014). Facebook DeepText is a deep learning based application
which was developed to understand the context of text messages (Abdulkader, Lakshmiratan, &
Zhang, 2016). Facebook also uses ML to offer friend suggestions based on mutual friends, and the
Newsfeed also utilises ML to suggest content the user may be interested in. Facebook’s ML
applications utilise “FBLearner Flow: Facebook’s AI backbone” (Dunn, 2016).
In the cyber security domain, ML is utilised in a multitude of varied applications. Cyber security
measures benefit greatly from the precision and speed of automation provided by ML-based
applications. The following is a non-exhaustive list of applications in cyber security which utilise ML:
•

Malware Detection (Oliver, Hou, Dia, Liang, & Rihn, 2013)

•

Vulnerability Signature Generation (Brumley, Newsome, Song, Wang, & Jha, 2008)

•

Intrusion Detection (Buczak & Guven, 2016)

•

IoT Security (Cañedo & Skjellum, 2016)

•

Spam Detection (Youn & McLeod, 2007)

Machine learning is not perfect and incidents of ML applications not operating as intended, either
through malicious or benign means, are not uncommon (Scharre, 2019). An example is the Tay
chatterbot developed by Microsoft's Technology and Research and Bing teams which was released to
Twitter on March 23, 2016 and then subsequently shut down 16 hours later. Tay was intended to be a
chatterbot aimed at the 18-24 year old demographic (Lee, 2016). Unfortunately for Microsoft, Tay
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was fed with data which caused her to send tweets which people found offensive. See Figure 1.1 for
an example.

Figure 1.1. - Tay Tweet after being fed an assortment of data. Adapted from (Nash, 2016)

According to Lee (2016), intensive testing and filtering was performed on many user studies to
provide a pleasant user experience of Tay with many different diverse groups. An oversight was made
in the specific form of attack which Tay succumbed to, resulting in the service being shut down.
Adversarial attacks are not a prerequisite for negative outcomes of a severe nature. In 2018, an Uber
autonomous vehicle hit and killed a pedestrian in Arizona (Griggs & Wakabayashi, 2018). In a report
produced by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), it was found in their investigation that
“the self-driving system software classified the pedestrian as an unknown object, as a vehicle, and
then as a bicycle” and at 1.3 seconds before impact, the self-driving software determined that the
brakes needed to be engaged to prevent a collision. Uber had disabled the emergency braking
manoeuvres while under computer control to reduce the possibility of erratic behaviour (NTSB,
2019). The Yavapai County Attorney's Office determined that there is no basis of criminal liability for
the Uber corporation (Randazzo, 2020b), while the backup driver has been charged with negligent
homicide (Randazzo, 2020a).
In 2016, a man was killed when a Tesla vehicle which was operating in auto-pilot mode, was hit by a
truck (Tesla, 2018). An investigation into the incident had shown that the operator ignored warnings
to take back control of the vehicle (Tesla, 2018). In March of 2018, another operator of a Tesla
vehicle died when the car crashed into a concrete lane highway divider. According to Tesla, the driver
was operating the vehicle in auto-pilot mode and was using adaptive cruise control, and as with the
previous incident, the driver had ignored warnings to take control of the steering wheel.
In 2015, Google was notified that the image recognition aspect of Google Photos was categorising
people of specific ethnic groups as Gorillas. Google addressed the issue by removing “gorilla,”
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“chimp,” “chimpanzee,” and “monkey” as potential labels (Simonite, 2018). Google did not address
the reason why the classifier was unable to distinguish between the two, nor have they commented on
whether their image recognition is now able to correctly distinguish between the categories.
The examples above show that machine learning-based applications require rigorous testing and
evaluation to prevent unwanted outcomes such as offensive content and loss of life. As the
applications utilising ML are expanding, the need for research which aims to reduce or prevent such
incidents from occurring is of the utmost importance. This is especially important for situations where
the use of ML may affect a person’s life, or the critical infrastructure of a state or nation. The
proposed research topic in this thesis aims to address the issue of adversaries intentionally performing
malicious attacks against ML-based malware detectors.

1.2

Significance

Machine learning is used to solve many distinct problems and the volume of applications which use
ML is increasing. However, ML algorithms are vulnerable to a multitude of adversarial attacks (Q.
Liu et al., 2018). If appropriate defensive strategies are not implemented, ML-based applications will
be vulnerable to exploitation
As an example domain area, critical infrastructure, which is defined by the Australian government as
Those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and communication
networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, would
significantly impact the social or economic wellbeing of the nation or affect Australia’s
ability to conduct national defence and ensure national security. (Critical Infrastructure
Centre, 2018)
relies upon computer systems and network connectivity for maintenance and control (Merabti,
Kennedy, & Hurst, 2011). In the past, the Industrial Control Systems (ICS) which control and monitor
the operations within critical infrastructure systems, were air-gapped from outside networks and
monitoring of the ICS was done onsite. Adoption of external network connectivity to ICSs to allow
for ease-of-use utilities such as remote access and real-time monitoring have opened ICSs up to
potential security threats (Ani, He, & Tiwari, 2017).
Network connectivity to critical infrastructure systems provides an attack vector for an attacker to
exploit. To prevent security breaches from occurring, sound network and systems security measures
are needed to be implemented. Security breaches to critical infrastructure can cause significant
financial and legal costs to remedy.
Critical infrastructure relies on sound security measures to prevent attacks from disrupting their
workflow, resulting in production setbacks (Ani et al., 2017). The hardware and software which
support critical infrastructure is in general, tailor-made for a specific application. As critical
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infrastructure is required to operate 24/7, applying patches and updating a system in ways which
require downtime (a loss of availability) are often not feasible (Cardenas et al., 2009). To prevent
software vulnerabilities within the systems from being exploited, network protection such as Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) and malware detection systems play a key role in preventing outside
adversaries from causing damage. IDS for critical infrastructure control systems differ from the
general IT IDS as they focus on anomalies within the physical system, in contrast to anomalies within
network transmission of an IT network (Cardenas et al., 2009).
By 2021 the global cost of cybercrime is estimated to reach 6 trillion USD (Cybersecurity Ventures &
Herjavec Group, 2019). While ML security measures are one of the least deployed enterprise-wide
defences, they provide one of the greatest returns on investment (Accenture, 2019), this may be
because the technology is new, and companies haven’t been persuaded to change their current
systems. Or maybe the implementation of ML security measures is done in the background of other
technology (like malware detection) and is not accurately covered in the report.
Investing in ML solutions as one of the main security measures should be of high interest to business.
Juniper Research believes that through the 2017-2022 period, US$8 trillion will be lost due to cybercrime (Juniper, 2017). With machine learning currently driving the future of technology, the overall
cyber-crime cost could be significantly reduced if ML-based security measures are utilised to their
full potential.

1.3

Purpose

The purpose of this research was to identify if it is possible to perform a targeted adversarial
poisoning attack which would allow for a an unknown-unknown malicious file, which was previously
correctly classified, to bypass detection by being misclassified as benign. Additionally, the research
identified a defensive strategy which was able to prevent the adversarial attack from succeeding at test
time and works under the assumption that any training set could have been unknowingly poisoned.
A number of defensive mechanisms to mitigate adversarial attacks have been proposed previously.
However, they have not been effective in preventing the majority of adversarial attacks. As ML is
utilised in a variety of different fields, it is paramount that effective defensive strategies are developed
to provide an adequate level of defence. Even though the field this research topic pertains to is
malware detection models, the research findings are expected to be applicable to other areas which
utilise ML algorithms.
The development of a defensive technique which increases the resilience of ML algorithms from
adversarial attacks in the context of a malware detection system, should provide an increased level of
security for all types of ML based security systems and, if utilised correctly, may reduce the total cost
of cyber-crime.
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1.4

Research Questions

The aim of the research was twofold. First, to develop a targeted adversarial poisoning attack which
allows for a certain Zero-day malware file to bypass detection, while not reducing the overall general
efficacy of the malware detection model. Second, to develop a defensive strategy to mitigate the
adversarial attack. The following research questions were proposed:
RQ1: Can adversarial attacks against machine learning based malware detectors increase the
likelihood of unknown-unknown (Zero-day) malware samples bypassing detection?
a. What adversarial features are required to perform a successful targeted black-box
poisoning attack?
b. What percentage of poisoning is required to reduce the overall availability of the model’s
performance?
c. What percentage of poisoning is required for a targeted attack to succeed?
RQ2: Can adversarial poisoning attacks against machine learning based malware detection be
prevented?
a. Can targeted adversarial poisoning attacks be detected at test time?

1.5

Outline of Thesis

In this section, a summary of the chapters are provided to form an outline of the thesis.
First, a literature review was undertaken to explore the area of adversarial machine learning attacks
and defences. As this thesis pertains to malware detection, an overview of malware types and the
detection methods used to defend against malware attacks was explored. Section 2 continues with an
explanation of the processes involved in the development and evaluation of ML algorithms. One
important factor in developing a well performing ML model is data curation. The amount of data
obtained, the quality of the data and the feature engineering performed play an important role in the
development of the ML. Various methods used to quantify the accuracy of a ML model are covered in
the model accuracy section.
Summaries of a selection of machine learning algorithms were written to highlight the different
approaches which can be utilised for solving ML problems. As this thesis is focused on the
application of security in ML models and not the development of ML algorithms, the summaries were
of a high-level and did not go into depth to discuss the mathematical foundations of the selected ML
algorithms.
A summary of adversarial machine learning attacks and defences was produced with a focus on
current attacks and defences for malware detection applications. The literature review found that there
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was a lack of research which focused on targeted adversarial poisoning attacks which aimed to allow
Zero-day malware files to bypass detection.
Second, the research methods and design section explored potential methods which could be
appropriate for this research. After evaluating the available options, it was found that the traditional
scientific approach of hypothesis development and experimentation was the most suitable method for
exploring and answering the research questions.
The next chapter covered the work that was performed to answer the research questions. The first
stage was to configure the work environment and the acquisition of the datasets. Two datasets were
used during the experimentation phases, the first being the Endgame Malware BEnchmark for
Research (EMBER) dataset. The EMBER dataset is a collection of extracted features from 1.1 Million
portable executable (PE) files (900,000 train and 200,000 test). EMBER was developed to serve as a
benchmark for machine learning malware research. The second dataset was obtained from VirusShare
and contained 2555 malicious Windows PE32 files which were used as the target Zero-day malware.
The VirusShare dataset was released in 2019, but the EMBER dataset only contained files dated up to
2017, therefore the VirusShare files were used to simulate Zero-day malware.
The first set of preliminary experiments were performed to identify if the import section of the
Windows PE32 files used to train the EMBER model would be a suitable candidate for the targeted
adversarial poisoning attack. The preliminary experiments aimed to reduce the overall general
efficacy of the EMBER model by injecting a selection of import functions into the benign training
data feature space. The attacks were performed at different injection percentages and used different
sets of import functions (manual and random selections from malicious files).
After performing the preliminary experiments, the targeted adversarial poisoning attacks were
performed on a selection of Zero-day malware files obtained from VirusShare. Each Zero-day
malware file was originally identified as malicious by the clean EMBER model and had a score over
0.9. The targeted adversarial poisoning attacks were performed on two ML algorithms, gradient
boosted decision trees and multi-layer perceptron.
A defensive strategy was implemented to identify suspicious files by analysing the activation weights
from the neurons at the last hidden layer of the MLP models. The defence used the Mean Absolute
Deviation (MAD) from the activation weights of the test dataset to identify anomalies in new data. If
a file was classified as benign but the activation weights were two MADs outside a majority of the
average activation weights of the benign class, then the file is quarantined for further examination.
The next chapter discusses the results obtained from the experiments in the previous chapter, the
preliminary experiments that explored reducing the general efficacy of the ML model, the different
targeted adversarial Zero-day poisoning attacks which were performed on both GBDT and MLP
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models, and finally the results obtained from the developed defensive technique to detect the Zero-day
malware file at test time.
The final two chapters are the discussion and conclusion. The discussion highlights the contribution to
knowledge of this thesis and examines the work compared to other adversarial poisoning attacks and
defences. The conclusion provides an overview of the research, a summary of the contributions to
knowledge and plans for future work.
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2 Literature Review
In this chapter, three main knowledge areas are discussed, namely, Malware, Machine Learning, and
Adversarial Machine Learning. In section 2.1 a brief overview of malware, the methods used to detect
malware, and different techniques utilised by malware authors to bypass detection. In section 2.2, a
discussion of the different approaches used for training ML models, followed by the methods for data
curation and feature engineering is presented. In section 2.4, an overview of a selection of measures
for evaluating the performance of ML models is explored. Section 2.5 provides a high-level overview
of selected ML algorithms, which have been identified as potential candidates for answering the
research questions. In section 2.6, a general overview of the different domains which utilise ML
applications are explored. Further, in section 2.7, Adversarial Machine Learning is discussed in terms
of the different categories of attacks which have been developed to target ML-based malware
detection applications, and the types of defences which have been developed to protect ML
applications. Finally, in section 2.9, a summary identifies how the current literature links to the
proposed research questions.

2.1

Malware

Malware is an umbrella term used to define the various software applications which have been
developed for malicious purposes. There are a variety of different malware types, such as Trojans,
Worms, Adware, Spyware, Ransomware, and Remote Access Tools.

2.1.1 Malware Types, Platforms and Families
As noted in the previous section, malware is divided into types which are defined by the overarching
behaviour of the malware file. Malware types are further categorised into malware families which are
determined by the common characteristics of that family of malware files, how they behave and the
target platform of the malware file e.g., an Android phone. For instance, a Worm is a malware type
and the W32.Downadup worm variant belongs to the Conficker family, which is a group of worms
that target Microsoft Windows machines to create a botnet.
According to the Malwarebytes (2020) State of Malware report, in 2019 Malwarebytes detected a
total of 50,510,960 malware files, a 1% increase from 50,170,502 detections in 2018. Malwarebytes
obviously does not represent the total amount of active malware infections in the world, but the report
provides a basis for examining trends across some common malware types and families which are
discussed in the following sections.
2.1.1.1

Virus

A computer virus is a malicious file which, when executed, tries to replicate itself by modifying the
code of another computer file. Computer virus is a general term which can be applied to different
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malware types such as the Trojan virus (described in 2.1.1.3) or the Ransomware virus (described in
2.1.1.7)
2.1.1.2

Worm

A worm is a malicious file which exhibits similar behaviour to a computer virus (i.e., modifying code
of other files) but has the distinct difference in its ability to self-propagate in contrast to a virus. A
famous example of a computer worm is the Morris worm which was launched on November 2, 1988.
The Morris worm estimated to have caused between US$100,000-10,000,000 in damage from the cost
it took to remove the worm from all the infected machines. The Morris worm caused such a
significant amount of damage due to an unintended denial-of-service attack performed as the worm
would infect machines multiple times, using up the computer’s resources and causing the machine to
crash.
Malwarebytes (2020) recorded 28% fewer consumer worm infections in 2019 from 2018, coming in
at number ten on the top ten list of both the consumer and business threat rankings. Seeing a decrease
in the amount of worm infections does, on the surface, appear to be positive, but it should be noted
that the threat of unknown-unknown worms cannot be quantified due to their nature.
2.1.1.3

Trojan

A Trojan virus is a malicious file which appears to perform some benign function but in actuality is
performing a malicious action in the background. The Trojan virus is named after the Trojan horse
attack used by the Greeks to gain access to the city of Troy. A common use of a Trojan virus is a
keylogger, which is malicious software that records input from the keyboard to steal user credentials
or to otherwise spy on a user. One of the earliest Trojan viruses was the AIDS Trojan, which was also
the first example of Ransomware (see section 2.1.1.7). The AIDS trojan was distributed physically on
floppy disks which claimed to contain a database of the AIDS virus. The AIDS Trojan stayed dormant
until ninety boot cycles of the infected machine had been performed, then encrypted the filenames of
the boot drive, rendering the machine inoperable and requests a payment to be sent to a Panama PO
box in exchange for removing the encryption (ESET, 2020).
2.1.1.4

HackTool

A HackTool is a program which assists an attacker in their hacking endeavours, such as cracking
software licences or snooping passwords from network traffic. HackTools are in some instances
designed to aid in modifying software code to perform functions outside of its intended design. An
example of a HackTool is AutoKMS, which is a tool designed to enable the use of Microsoft products
such as the Windows operating system and the Office suite without appropriately licensing the
software.
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2.1.1.5

Spyware, Adware and Hijackers

Spyware is malicious software which aims to invade the privacy of the target user by gathering
personal information. Spyware attacks are commonly used to gather information for creating targeted
advertisements used in Adware.
Adware is malicious software which produces revenue for attackers by infecting machines with
unwanted advertisements. Adware often collects user information to generate target advertisements.
Adware is typically spread through freeware and shareware applications and by drive-by downloads
from infected websites. A drive-by download occurs when, in the act of visiting a website, a script is
run in the user’s browser, which downloads some type of malware.
A Hijacker is malicious software which modifies the web browser settings of an infected computer
without the owner’s permission. Hijackers usually redirect users to fraudulent websites or inject
advertisements into the browser. Hijackers can contain both Adware and Spyware which are used to
generate revenue for cybercriminals. Hijackers can be installed on a user’s computer from
downloading malicious software, visiting infected websites and through downloading and executing
malicious email attachments.
2.1.1.6

Rootkit

Rootkits are a suite of software tools which are designed to provide privileged access to a computer.
The term Rootkit is derived from the name of the root account on the Unix operating systems.
Rootkits modify an infected machine to hide their existence, which makes detection of rootkits quite
difficult. One example is the FU rootkit, which is a kernel-mode rootkit that hides its presence by
hiding processes and direct kernel object manipulation. Another example is the ZeroAccess rootkit,
which is spread via drive-by downloads and exploit packs. ZeroAccess is a kernel-mode rootkit which
turns the infected machine into a bot to carry out sending spam and performing click fraud for the
attacker (Wyke, 2012). Click fraud is the process of generating fraudulent financial gain by utilising
bot computers to simulate clicking on pay-per-click website advertisements.
2.1.1.7

Ransomware

Ransomware describes malicious software which encrypts files on an infected machine and hold the
encrypted contents for ransom. Ransomware will generally ask for a payment in a crypto currency, for
example, to be sent to a Bitcoin wallet address. In return, the victim will receive a decryption key to
remove the ransomware and restore access to the previously encrypted files. Ransomware attacks
often target businesses or companies which represent critical infrastructure such as banks and
hospitals as the attacker is able to extort larger sums of money compared to an individual’s personal
computer and are more likely to pay the ransom (IBM, 2016). In 2017, the WannaCry ransomware
attack infected an estimated 200,000 computer systems in 150 countries (Reuters, 2017). According to
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Malwarebytes (2020), ransomware infections were ranked number eight in business threats of 2019,
down 6% from 2018 and did not make the top ten for consumer threats.
2.1.1.8

Cryptominer

Cryptominers are malicious software which uses the resources of the infected machine to mine for
crypto currencies such as Bitcoin or Ethereum. Bitcoin uses a distributed ledger to verify the
authenticity of transactions on the Bitcoin blockchain. The Bitcoin blockchain is a ledger which
contains information about every transaction made on the Bitcoin network. When a Bitcoin
transaction is made, every copy of the ledger is updated with the new transaction, which is verified by
a process called cryptomining.
Cryptomining is the process of solving mathematical problems to verify the authenticity of
cryptocurrency transactions. Cryptominers are rewarded with cryptocurrency in exchange for using
their processing power to mine cryptocurrencies. Cybercriminals infect users’ machines to syphon
their processing power to use for mining crypto currencies, which reduces the performance of the
infected machine, possibly rendering it unusable. In 2018, cybercriminals infected YouTube ads with
the cryptocurrency mining service Coinhive, which when installed on a website, uses the processing
power of the website’s visitors to mine cryptocurrency (Kan, 2018).

2.1.2 Malware Detection
Different detection methods have been developed to protect computers from being infected by
malware. The conventional malware detection methods are signature- and behaviour-based detection.
Signature- and behaviour-based detection are utilised in the commercial real-time protection
applications offered by anti-malware vendors (Carlin, Cowan, O’Kane, & Sezer, 2017). Newer
methods for the detection of malware utilise machine learning to generate predictive classification
models for determining if a file or network stream is malicious (Ucci, Aniello, & Baldoni, 2017). A
survey of the different ML approaches used for malware detection was undertaken by Ucci et al.
(2017). Their survey covered a variety of research papers which utilise ML algorithms in training
malware detection applications. The key findings of the survey were:
•

Malicious feature criteria are not adequately explained in the majority of papers; and

•

There is a need for a benchmark to compare the efficacy of the different approaches.

2.1.2.1

Signature-Based Detection

Signature-based malware detection is a technique used to identify known malware samples by
comparing a file’s digital signature to those stored in a database of known malicious signatures
(O’Kane, Sezer, & McLaughlin, 2011). Signature detection is utilised by the real-time protection
software offered by commercial anti-malware vendors. Repositories of known malicious signatures
are maintained by anti-malware companies. When a new malicious file is identified, the file’s
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signature is added to the signature database (O’Kane et al., 2011). Signature detection is effective for
identifying known malware files and preventing them from infecting a machine. However, the
obfuscation measures employed by malware authors (described in section 2.1.3) generate new
signatures which can bypass detection if they have not already been identified (O’Kane et al., 2011).
2.1.2.2

Behaviour-Based Detection

Behaviour-based malware detection is a technique which identifies malware based on the nature of
the file’s actions. If the behaviour of a file is analysed and some form of suspicious behaviour is
identified, such as unauthorised changing of permissions or deactivating security settings, the file is
then quarantined. This dynamic analysis of files can be performed by real-time protection software, or
can also be used in sandbox environments to analyse and determine the nature of a file (O’Kane et al.,
2011).
Cuckoo Sandbox is an open source dynamic malware analysis tool which supports Microsoft
Windows, Linux and OSX operating systems for malware analysis ("Cuckoo Sandbox,"). Cuckoo
operates by deploying a snapshot of the desired operating system, feeding malware into the virtual
machine, monitoring the behaviour of the suspected malicious file, and providing a report to the end
user detailing the file’s behaviour.
2.1.2.3

Commercial ML Solutions

A TrendMicro patent illustrated the use of ML for detection of Zero-day malware files (Oliver et al.,
2013). Common substrings from malicious files are extracted and used to populate the labels of a
decision tree. When a client machine identifies a file as suspicious, the file is sent to an enterprise
server. The enterprise server analyses the file through a decision tree model. The decision tree
approach was selected for performance, as fewer CPU cycles are used compared to sandbox
behaviour-based analysis. Quick determination of suspected substrings and extracting and examining
substrings from suspected files preserves user privacy, as the server does not examine the entire
contents of the file.
Symantec (2018) have developed an Advanced Machine Learning (AML) engine which analyses and
determines the nature of a computer file, identifying the file as either malicious or benign. Symantec’s
AML engine obtains data from a global system of client machines using Symantec’s anti-malware
software. Sophos (2017) utilises Deep Learning in their endpoint security platform Intercept X
(Sophos, 2017). Machine learning is also utilised by anti-malware vendors CrowdStrike and Cylance,
to train their malware detection software (CrowdStrike, 2017; Cylance).
2.1.2.4

Browser Protection

Another form of malware protection is employed within Internet browsers to prevent users from
accessing malicious websites. Browser-based protection prevents users from visiting malicious
websites through the use of blacklists. Browser-based protection is available from Google’s Safe
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Browsing API, McAfee’s Site Advisor, Symantec’s Safe Web, and other cyber security vendors.
Google have also developed a protection solution to prevent malicious downloads from occurring
where blacklists may fail. Browser based protection is another layer of security which can be utilised
in conjunction with other anti-malware software to increase the protection of a computer system.
Content Agnostic Malware Protection (CAMP) is a Google Chrome browser-based malware detection
solution which identifies malicious files without examining the content of the file (Rajab Abu,
Ballard, Lutz, Mavrommatis, & Provos, 2013). CAMP uses a client/server architecture. When a file is
downloaded, the browser performs a local check using Google’s Safe Browsing API to determine if
the downloaded file is already known as either malicious or benign. If a local result is unable to be
determined, the browser extracts content-agnostic features from the file and sends them to one of
Google’s reputation servers to perform a server-side reputation profile check. If the file is identified as
malicious, a warning is shown in the browser, which provides the user with an option to continue the
download or to discard the file. In comparison to virtual machine-based dynamic analysis, CAMP
achieved a relative accuracy rate of 99%, without the need to execute the file within a sandboxed
container. CAMP was able to identify an additional 5 million malicious download files per month that
were not detected by other anti-malware solutions.
Browser-based protection is not directly related to the theme of ML malware detection in this
research, but it was covered to provide some background information about the different types of
malware prevention techniques which are utilised to protect computer systems.

2.1.3 Malware Obfuscation
Malware is ever evolving, and malware authors typically employ obfuscation techniques to prevent
their malware files from being detected, particularly by signature-based detection methods.
Obfuscation techniques can be categorised in three groups: packing, polymorphism and
metamorphism (O’Kane et al., 2011).
Packers are tools used to compress or otherwise obfuscate malware to avoid detection from signaturebased anti-malware applications (F. Guo, Ferrie, & Chiueh, 2008). According to (McAfee, 2017),
80% of malware files analysed are obfuscated through packing. Packers were originally developed to
reduce size of files to save space, not hide malicious code. Packers operate by either partially or
completely compressing/encrypting a file. Malware authors can use packers to pack their files
multiple times, increasing the amount of encrypted malware and reducing the probability of the
malware being detected by signature detection (F. Guo et al., 2008).
Polymorphic malware employs encryption techniques to modify the static binary code of a malware
file to avoid detection. When a polymorphic malware file is executed, the opcode, which is written to
memory and executed, is re-encrypted creating a malware file with a new digital signature, this
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process is performed to evade signature-based detection (Alam, Horspool, & Traore, 2014).
Metamorphic malware does not use encryption as polymorphic malware does, instead, metamorphic
malware generates a new sequence of opcodes each time the file is executed (Alam et al., 2014). The
generation of new sequences of opcodes is also known as dynamic code obfuscation. Polymorphic
and metamorphic malware both create copies of themselves to evade detection, the difference
between polymorphic and metamorphic malware is that polymorphic malware uses encryption to
create malware copies which appears different from the original, while metamorphic malware rewrites
the opcode in each copy to appear different.
Packing, metamorphic, and polymorphic obfuscation techniques can be applied to any type of
malware file which alter the infected system in a variety of ways. An example of different malware
and their behaviour is given in the next sub-section.

2.2

Machine Learning Algorithms

The purpose of Machine Learning (ML), as described by Samuel (1959), is to eliminate the need to
explicitly write a program to perform a function, which instead could be learned through experience
“Programming computers to learn from experience should eventually eliminate the need for much of
this detailed programming effort.”(Samuel, 1959). ML algorithms are used to develop models, which
aim to accurately predict an output from a given input based on the context of the problem and the
way the model was trained. ML-based applications utilise different learning methods when training
the ML model. These approaches are Supervised, Unsupervised, and Reinforcement-based learning.
Following a discussion of these approaches, other aspects pertinent to the successful implementation
of ML algorithms will be discussed, including training approaches and data curation.

Figure 2.1 - ML Process Adapted from Géron (2019)
Refer to )LJXUH0DFKLQH
Géron, A. (2019). Hands-On Machine Learning with Scikit-Learn, Keras, and TensorFlow (2nd ed.).
Sebastopol, California: O'Reilly Media, Inc.
https://www.oreilly.com/library/view/hands-on-machine-learning/9781491962282/ch01.html
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2.2.1 Learning Approaches
Different learning approaches are utilised in ML depending on the type of feedback mechanism
implemented in the learning process. The three types of learning approaches discussed in the
following subsections are supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement learning. Selecting the
appropriate learning approach is determined by the type of ML problem to be solved and the level of
information known about the dataset.
2.2.1.1

Supervised Learning

In a supervised learning approach, the link between the input and the output is already known. The
training data is correctly labelled beforehand and the ML algorithm is run to develop a model which
accurately determines the pattern between the input and the output (Bishop, 2006). When new input
data is fed into the ML model, it is expected that the model will classify the new input correctly, to an
adequate level of accuracy. Supervised learning algorithms can be split into two groups based on the
type of problem they aim to solve, which are classification and regression problems (Rebala, Ravi, &
Churiwala, 2019). In classification, the model will classify the output into a category, such as “male”
or “female”. In regression, the model will make a prediction and produce an output of a real value,
such as numerical representations of “height” or “weight”.
A classic ML example which uses a supervised learning approach is the classification of Iris flowers
from the labelled Iris dataset. The Iris dataset consists of three species (Iris Setosa, Iris Versicolor, and
Iris Virginica), with fifty samples of each. Each sample is labelled according to species and contains
the measurements of their sepal length, sepal width, petal length, and petal width, which are referred
to as features. A ML model is trained which identifies patterns within the data from the features to
distinguish the three iris species. When new unlabelled Iris data is introduced, the ML model makes a
prediction and classifies the Iris data into one of the three classes.
2.2.1.2

Unsupervised Learning

In unsupervised learning, the link between the input and output is not known, instead, the ML
algorithm determines the underlying characteristics/structure and creates the link itself (Bishop,
2006). Unsupervised learning algorithms can be split into two groups, clustering, and association. In
clustering, the aim is to discover clusters of similar data within the dataset (Rebala et al., 2019), for
instance, clusters of certain groups of people may have a certain nose shape or eye colour. In
association, the aim is to discover rules which cover large portions of the data (Géron, 2019), for
instance, groups with a certain nose shape also tend to have a certain face shape.
Using the Iris example from the previous section, in an unsupervised approach to classifying the
images the 150 data samples would not contain a label indicating their species. Instead, a clustering
algorithm, such as K-means, which is described in 2.5.6, would be used to identify underlying
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structures within the features of the Iris data, and group together common features into their own
class.
2.2.1.3

Reinforcement Learning

In reinforcement-based learning, an unsupervised approach is used where the ML algorithm discovers
different approaches to solve a problem through trial and error, while the learner also prioritises
approaches which have been tried before and have shown to be successful (Sutton & Barto, 1998).
Reinforcement learning is the approach used in the training of AlphaGo Zero, the ML-based
application for decision making in the strategy game GO (Silver et al., 2016).

2.2.2 Training Approaches
To determine which model is the most suitable for the proposed problem, a series of tests are carried
out to identify which ML algorithm and what underlying structure of the ML architecture would be
most appropriate. The tests are performed by randomly splitting the dataset into three parts: a training
set, a validation set, and a test set (Friedman, Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2017). The training set provides
the data which the ML algorithm uses to identify the patterns within and to fit the model. The
validation set is used to find which parameters minimise the model’s error, identifying the most
suitable model for testing. The test set is used by the best performing model found during the
validation phase to evaluate the general performance of the model, as the data in the test set has not
been seen by the model or used in any way to tune the parameters. The validation and testing sets are
often confused with one another, with researchers referring to the validation phase as the test phase
and vice versa.
2.2.2.1

Batch Learning

In a batch learning environment, the model is trained using all the available data that it is not able to
incrementally learn (Hackeling, 2017). Batch learning is also known as offline learning as the training
process is performed offline. Once the model has been trained, it is ready for use and no more
learning is required. If new data become available and an updated model is required, then the training
process needs to be performed again on the entire dataset (Géron, 2019).
2.2.2.2

Online Learning

In online learning, the learning process is performed by training mini-batches (mini-batch gradient
descent), or each single instance (stochastic gradient descent) of data as they arrive (Hackeling, 2017).
The online learning method allows for incremental updates to be performed as new data are obtained.
Online learning is the preferred method for training models which need to be considerate of fast
changing trends, such as trying to model trends in the stock market (Géron, 2019).
An important tuneable parameter of online learning is the learning rate. The learning rate determines
at what frequency should the incremental training phases be performed (Géron, 2019). A fast learning
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rate is ideal for applications which model fast changing trends, and do not require the learned
information from the earlier instances of training, such as changes in the stock market. A slower
learning rate is more applicable to applications which need to be updated over time, but do not have a
such a volatile change in trends (Géron, 2019). Online learning environments, especially live
networks, need to pay close attention to the new data being gathered for incremental changing. If bad
data is introduced, either innocuously or by an attacker, the quality of the model’s performance will
start to degrade over time (Géron, 2019).

2.2.3 Data Curation
Data curation is an important step in the development of training a ML model. The data curation stage
includes collecting data from various sources, organising the data into appropriate labels, and filtering
out poor quality data to ensure that the data collected is the best possible representation of the target
area. The following subsections discuss the different ways in which data can be acquired, the methods
for determining data quality and the types of problems which can occur from using a poor quality
dataset to train a ML model.
2.2.3.1

Data Acquisition

A crucial stage in the development of a machine learning model is acquiring the data to create the
training, test, and validation data sets (Rebala et al., 2019). Available datasets exist for a variety of
applications, such as image recognition, malware detection, and natural language processing. It is not
always preferable to use a pre-made dataset, and if the application of the machine learning model is in
a niche or novel area, it would be unlikely that a pre-made dataset exists. Datasets can be curated
through either offline or online methods, with the choice of method being dependent upon the area
and application of the model (Rebala et al., 2019). Online repositories for research datasets exist to
make data acquisition easier. The Google Dataset Search provides a platform for searching the web to
locate datasets via simple keyword search terms. Other open data portals include dataportals.org,
opendatamonitor.eu, quandl.com and online repositories UC Irvine Machine Learning Repository,
Kaggle Datasets, and Amazon’s AWS datasets also provide open access to ML datasets.
2.2.3.2

Data Quality

The quality of the data obtained plays a significant role in the overall effectiveness of the learned
model. If the acquired data suffers from sampling bias and does not accurately represent the target
field, the output quality of the model will not accurately reflect the general population. Banko and
Brill (2002) found that the choice of an ML algorithm was not as important as having a large dataset
when working on the problem of natural language disambiguation. The results from each ML
algorithm were close to identical when trained on a significantly large dataset (10^9 words). Other
factors contributing to poor-quality data include excessive noise (outliers), incomplete data objects
which have missing features, redundant features, and using a dataset which is too small. Preprocessing the data can minimise the damage which is caused from using a poor-quality dataset.
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Another issue which can arise from having a poor-quality dataset is overfitting. Overfitting is caused
by the output of the model not being generalisable but having a high level of accuracy on the training
data. Overfitting is caused due to a lack of diversity within the training dataset that does not represent
the real world. As an example, Raff et al. (2018), noted that their ML malware detection application
appeared to be working with a high level of accuracy in correctly classifying malicious and benign
Windows PE32 files, but in actuality, overfitting was occurring which resulted in each file that had
been digitally signed by Microsoft to be classified as benign, as all of the files in the benign dataset
were extracted from a clean Microsoft Windows installation. Underfitting is the opposite of
overfitting which occurs when there is insufficient data, or the ML algorithm was too simple to
identify and correctly model the problem, producing an output model which is overall inaccurate. An
example of underfitting, true fit, and overfitting is shown in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2 - Model Fitting Examples Adapted from - Scikit (2014)
Refer to Scikit (2014)
https://scikitlearn.org/stable/auto_examples/model_selection/plot_underfitting_overfitting.html

2.3

Data Labelling

In supervised ML architectures, labelled datasets are required for training the ML model
(Géron, 2019). In the case of unsupervised ML, the datasets are left unlabelled and the ML
algorithm identifies classes within the data, usually by clustering (Géron, 2019). Labelling can be
performed manually, which depending on the size of the dataset can be a tedious process,
which is why crowdsourcing is often utilised, as in the ImageNet dataset in which the labels
were manually generated using labour from Amazon Mechanical Turks (Deng et al., 2009). One
method for creating a labelled dataset to be used in a supervised learning approach is to use a
selection of already existing labels from a minority of the data, and use an automated process to
generate labels for the remainder of the dataset, which reduces the amount of time required to
label the entire dataset (Rebala et al., 2019). As in the unsupervised approach, the ML algorithm
identifies the classes within the dataset and automatically labels the unlabelled data to the identified
class (Rebala et al., 2019).

2.3.1 Feature Engineering
After the dataset has been acquired and if using a supervised approach correctly labelled, the
features from the data samples which will be used to train the model need to be identified. A
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variable which contains information describing an aspect of a data object. Feature engineering is the
process of identifying salient information within the data samples to provide the model with the
greatest chance of computing high learning accuracy. Feature engineering techniques are often
specific to the domain of interest, for instance, the features generated for speech recognition are
different from malware detection:
•

Feature Transformation: Generating new features from existing features, usually used to
generate a numerical representation of a categorical feature e.g., mapping certain eye colours
to a numerical value.

•

Feature Generation: The identification and generation of new features from a data object by
identifying patterns within.

•

Feature Selection and Analysis: Selecting a smaller set of features from a large set to reduce
computational cost, remove irrelevant features which do not contribute to the model’s
learning and to remove redundant features which were extracted from the data object. Some
methods for feature reduction include Factor Analysis, Principal Component Analysis, and
Independent Component Analysis.

2.4

Model Accuracy (Performance Measures)

Different measures exist as means for evaluating the accuracy of a ML model. In this section, an
overview is given for several different measures used in classification problems. To evaluate the
performance of a classification model, four output results are required, which are True Positive (TP),
True Negative (TN), False Positive (FP) and False Negative (FN). In the case of a malware detection
model where a score of 1 (positive) indicates a malicious file and a score of 0 (negative) indicates a
benign file, a TP occurs when an input (malicious binary file) was correctly classified as positive
(malicious). A False Positive occurs when the input (benign binary file) is misclassified as malicious.
A True Negative occurs when an input (benign binary file) is correctly classified as benign, and a
False Negative occurs when the input (malicious binary file) is misclassified as benign. The output
from an ML model’s test run is often represented in a confusion matrix, as shown in Table 1, where a
type I error is a False Positive (the null hypothesis is rejected when it is true) and a type II error is a
False Negative (the null hypothesis is being accepted when it is false).
Table 1 - Confusion Matrix Description Adapted from (Johnstone & Peacock, 2020)

Data

Reality

H0 True

H0 False

H0 True

TP

Type I Error

H0 False

Type II Error

TN
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2.4.1 Confusion matrix
A confusion matrix is a visual representation of the TP, TN, FP, and FN output predictions from
testing a model. A confusion matrix provides a simple way to quickly identify a desired output from
the model, such as the quantity of TPs or TNs. The confusion matrix is represented by the actual
output classes and the amount of predicted output classes from testing. An example of a confusion
matrix with an accuracy score is illustrated in Figure 2.3. Following the malware detection example
from section 2.4, where a score of 1 (positive) indicates a malicious file and a score of 0 (negative)
indicates a benign file. Out of the total 14 malicious files, 11 were correctly classified as malicious
(TP), while 3 files were misclassified as benign (FN). Out of the 14 total benign files, 13 were
correctly classified as benign (TN), while one file was incorrectly classified as malicious (FP). An
overall accuracy of 0.857% was achieved by the model.

Figure 2.3 - Confusion Matrix with Accuracy

2.4.2 Accuracy, Specificity, Precision and Recall
Accuracy is the measure of predicted TPs over actual TPs. Accuracy by itself is not the best measure
to use when gauging the precision of an ML model. For example, if testing to detect cancer in 1000
patients, the model’s output predicted that no patient had cancer, but in fact 50 patients did, the model
would have an accuracy of 95%. From the previous example, it illustrates how the accuracy metric
does not by itself provide a clear indication of performance as accuracy is not the only measure which
needs to be taken into consideration when evaluating the performance of a ML model.
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =

𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁

Specificity measures the proportion of predicted negatives which were true negatives. It evaluates the
total amount of TN over the total TN and FP. Specificity is measured between 0.0 for no specificity
and 1.0 for total specificity, with a higher value representing a greater percentage of predicted TN.
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Using the values from Figure 2.3 as an example, the model produced 13 TNs and 1 FP, which equates
to a specificity score of 0.928.
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 =

𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃

Precision is the number of TPs over the total TPs and FPs. It evaluates the total amount of TP over the
total TP and FP. Recall, same as specificity, is measured between 0.0 and 1.0. Using the same values
from Figure 2.3, the model produced 11 TPs and 1 FP, which equates to a precision score of 0.916.
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =

𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃

Recall is a method used in conjunction with precision to calculate the True Positive Rate (TPR) of a
model. Recall is also known as sensitivity. The TPR represents the percentage of actual positive
classifications. The TPR and False Positive Rate (FPR) will change depending on the threshold
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 =

𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁

Precision, recall, and accuracy have been used to determine the quality of models by many
researchers. As an example, Feroze, Baig, and Johnstone (2015) used precision, recall, and accuracy
to compare the quality of two-tiered and single-tiered spam detection models. Accuracy was also used
as the performance measure when comparing multilayer extreme learning machine and deep neural
network models for intrusion detection applications (Yang, Wang, & Johnstone, 2020). The quality of
the model is represented by the value produced from the chosen performance measure, which were
described in the previous sub-sections. When comparing different models, the model with a higher
value indicates greater performance than a lower value model.

2.4.3 Precision-Recall or PR Curve
A PR curve is a graph which plots the precision values on the y-axis and the recall values on the xaxis for different probability thresholds. The precision is related to the number of false positives and
the recall is related to the number of false negatives, with a high precision and recall value
representing a low number of false positives and false negatives. As illustrated in Figure 2.4, the
precision and recall values are shown at different thresholds on the orange line, compared to a no skill
model (50-50 chance of a TP) on the dotted blue line.

Page | 24

Figure 2.4 - PR Curve Example

A good ML model will aim to have both high precision and recall values, but it will usually sacrifice
one or the other to some degree. The quality of the PR curve is represented by the Area Under the
Curve (AUC) as shown in the multi-class example in Figure 2.5, with a higher value representing
better model performance.
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Figure 2.5 - Multi-class Precision-Recall Curve Example Adapted from Scikit
Refer to
https://scikit-learn.org/stable/auto_examples/model_selection/plot_precision_recall.html

In Figure 2.5 the dark blue class is the best performer (as it has the greatest area under the curve),
while the light blue class is the worst performer (as it has the least area under the curve). At perfect
recall, each class has a similar precision value, with the light blue class having the greatest value. At
zero recall, three of the classes have perfect precision, while the light blue class has zero precision. By
examining the PR curves, a judgement can be made about what trade-off between precision and recall
should be made to generate a model with the greatest TPR.

2.4.4 ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristics) Curve
The ROC curve plots the True Positive Rate (TPR) against the False Positive Rate (FPR). The FPR is
the ratio of incorrect positive classifications i.e., negative objects being incorrectly classified as
positive. The ROC curve is used to summarise the performance of a binary classification model.
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Figure 2.6 - ROC Curve Example
Refer to
ROC Curve Plot for a No Skill Classifier and a Logistic Regression Model
https://machinelearningmastery.com/roc-curves-and-precision-recall-curves-for-classification-in-python/

As it is illustrated in Figure 2.6, the dotted diagonal line represents a no skill model which produces a
50/50 chance of a true positive. The orange line representing a logistic model illustrates
the performance of the model at different at different TPR/FPR values.

2.4.5 F1 score
The F1 score is the harmonic mean calculated from the precision and recall which is used to
compare the performance of two or more classifier models. The harmonic mean treats low values
with more importance, compared to the normal mean which treats all values equally. For a model
to produce a high F1 score it needs to have a high level of both precision and recall.
2
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
TP
𝐹1 =
=2∗
=
1
1
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 TP + FN + FP
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
2
The F1 score is a popular performance measure used in ML malware detection. The F1 score was
used by Abhishek and Goswami (2017) in their Android malware detection research, by W.-C. Wu
and Hung (2014) in their Android malware detection, and by F. Xiao, Lin, Sun, and Ma (2019) in
their ML malware detection framework for IoT environments.
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2.4.6 Matthews Correlation Coefficient
Matthew Correlation Coefficient (MCC) is a measure for determining the quality of binary
classification models in ML. The MCC formula uses the TP, TN, FP, and FN values to calculate the
efficiency of the model. An MCC can be calculated from a confusion matrix by using the following
formula:
𝑀𝐶𝐶 =

(𝑇𝑃 ∗ 𝑇𝑁 − 𝐹𝑃 ∗ 𝐹𝑁)
√(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃)(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)(𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃)(𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁)

The MCC produces a value between -1 and +1. A value of +1 represents a perfect prediction, -1
represents a model which produces each output incorrectly, and a value of 0 indicates that the model
is no better than a random prediction of the classification.
According to Chicco and Jurman (2020), MCC is a more accurate measure for binary classification
ML models compared to the F1 score, even though the F1 score is currently a more popular choice. In
the domain of IoT botnets, Peacock (2019) found that MCC was a better metric overall, compared to
the previous metrics, when used for comparing models which were trained for detecting anomalous
network traffic generated by IoT botnets.

2.5

Algorithm Overview

Several ML algorithms which have been utilised in the cyber security domain are described in the
following subsections. As this research pertains to the effectiveness of ML applications in a specific
sub-domain (malware detection) and not the development of ML algorithms, the following subsections provide an overview of the principles of each candidate ML algorithm.

2.5.1 Artificial Neural Networks
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) are ML systems loosely based on how biological neural networks
(e.g., brains) learn via pattern recognition (Haykin, 2008). There are different types of ANN such as
the Feedforward Neural Network (FNN), Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), Recurrent Neural
Network (RNN), and Probabilistic Neural Network (PNN). ANNs can be used in either supervised,
unsupervised, or reinforcement scenarios. The underlying structure in each of the different variants of
ANNs is identical.
ANNs use a collection of nodes called artificial neurons which are information-processing units. The
neurons transmit weighted signals between each other through connecting links called synapses. The
weights of the signals are summed along with a bias value and are passed through an activation
function. The activation function determines the activation state of the neuron, if the neuron is
activated, it will transmit the data to neuron(s) in the next layer. In an ANN, a collection or set of
neurons are organised together to comprise a layer. In general, a neural network will be comprised of
an input layer, one or multiple hidden layers, and an output layer (Haykin, 2008).
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ANNs are a popular ML algorithm. They have been used for various visual recognition tasks (Y. Guo
et al., 2016), speech recognition (W. Liu et al., 2017), Google uses NNs in their language translation
software (Y. Wu et al., 2016), and the development of autonomous vehicles (Tian, Pei, Jana, & Ray,
2018).

Figure 2.7 - Diagram of a Feedforward ANN Adapted from ("Artificial neural network with layer coloring," 2013)
Retrieved from
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Colored_neural_network.svg
CC BY 3.0

2.5.2 Support Vector Machines
Support Vector Machines (SVMs) belong to the ANN category; they can be used in supervised
and un-supervised learning approaches for both classification and regression problems. For
classification problems, SVMs use a non-probabilistic linear model to classify data into binary
classes. Multiple binary classification models can be used to solve multi-class classification
problems (Bishop, 2006). SVMs can also be used to solve nonlinear regression problems using the
kernel method (Rogers & Girolami, 2016).
For solving a classification problem, an SVM, after receiving a set of labelled training data,
will generate an optimal hyperplane which classifies new input data into the correct binary class.
The optimal hyperplane is found by determining the greatest margin achievable to split the data
into the appropriate classes. The margin is calculated from the sum of the distance between the
closest data point from each side of the hyperplane. The data points used to generate the hyperplane
are known as the support vectors, as illustrated in Figure 2.8.
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Figure 2.8 - Optimal hyperplane of a linear SVM. Support vectors are coloured blue. Adapted from Haykin (2008)
Refer to Figure 6.1 Illustration of the idea of an optimal hyperplane for linearly separable patterns
Haykin, S. (2008). Neural Networks and Learning Machines (Third ed.). Upper Saddle River, New
Jersey: Pearson.

2.5.3 Decision Trees
Decision trees are a supervised learning method which are used in ML as a predictive model for
both classification and regression problems (Alpaydin, 2004). Decision trees are populated with
nodes, which contain questions. The questions relate to a feature of the input data, the answer to
which is connected to another node. Questions can be either binary or contain multiple variables.
For multiple variables, a weight is calculated to determine which answer is most accurate. Input
data fed into decision trees start at the root node, and progress through a path of nodes to
determine how the data should be labelled. The node path is obtained by answering the questions.
Multiple decision trees can be used together to achieve a more accurate result compared to the use of
one decision tree. Random Forest (RF) and Boosted Trees (BT) are two methods that use an ensemble
of decision trees to obtain a more accurate result, compared to single trees (Banfield, Hall, Bowyer, &
Kegelmeyer, 2007). In the RF approach, multiple decision trees are run in parallel to each other and
the final result is determined from the average result of each decision tree in the ensemble. In the BT
approach, a sequential stream of decision trees is trained using the results from the previous trees
to populate the nodes. The final result obtained through BT is the weighted average from each
decision tree in the ensemble.
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2.5.4 Regression Models
Regression is a technique developed for use in statistics to identify the relationship between
independent (predictor) and dependant (output) variables. Regression techniques can be used in a
supervised learning approach to solve continuous problems (Linear Regression) or discrete problems
(Logistic Regression) (Bishop, 2006). There are different types of linear regression techniques, such
as Simple Linear Regression when using a single independent variable, or multivariate regression
when using multiple independent variables.
Logistic Regression is a supervised classification approach which is used to solve binary classification
problems. Multiple logistic regression models can be used together to classify variable data from a
multiclass classification problem. To solve a multiclass problem, either a one-versus-the-rest (OvR) or
a one-versus-one (OvO) approach is used (Bishop, 2006). In an OvR approach, one classifier is
trained for each possible outcome in the multiclass problem. The classification is determined by
testing the input against each classifier and choosing the one which has the greatest classification
score. In an OvO approach, a classifier is trained for pairs of possible outcome classes. The OvO
approach reduces the number of classifiers that need to be trained and therefore the computational
power used.

2.5.5 Naïve Bayes
Naïve Bayes is a supervised probabilistic-classification ML algorithm. In a Naïve Bayes approach, the
probability of each feature is considered independent of each other feature. That is, when determining
which class a variable belongs to, the probability of a feature being true does not increase or decrease
the probability of another feature. Different probability algorithms can be used in Naïve Bayes, with
the Bayes Theorem being most common.
Naïve Bayes theorem calculates the probability of each factor independently, then selects the factor
with the highest probability of occurring. Naïve Bayes assumes each factor is independent from each
other.
𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) =

𝑃(𝐵|𝐴)𝑃(𝐴)
𝑃(𝐵)

Naïve Bayes is a popular algorithm for use in spam detection. It is used in SpamBayes,
SpamAssassin, and Bogfilter (Nelson et al., 2008). In a Naïve Bayes spam filter, features of an email
(e.g., headers and keywords) are assigned a probability value from the likelihood that the keyword
word appears in a spam email. The probability is determined through training of an ML model in a
supervised manner where spam and ham emails are pre-labelled, ham being email that is not spam,
i.e., legitimate email. Each feature’s probability score is determined independently from the other
features. The probability of an email being spam is determined by analysing each feature and
determining if the probability is greater than the spam threshold set by the application.
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2.5.6 K-means Clustering
K-means clustering is an unsupervised clustering algorithm which aims to determine groupings of
data from an unlabelled dataset (Chio & Freeman, 2018). The numbering of the groups is represented
by the variable K, and each group K is centred on the mean of a cluster of data points. The K-means
algorithm automatically determines the groupings through an iterative function (Chio & Freeman,
2018). First, a random selection of centroids are chosen for data points to aggregate around. Second,
the mean of the data points surrounding the centroid from each K group is determined, this mean point
is then selected as the new Kth group’s centroid point. The previous process is repeated until the
centroid position of each Kth group no longer changes, which produces the final output of the found
clusters from the input data (Chio & Freeman, 2018).
K-means clustering is popular in the business domain for grouping together clusters of purchases
made by consumers, which benefits businesses in determining which items to sell together or what
type of deals are more likely to be popular. In the cyber security domain, K-means clustering has been
used in general malware detection (Martin, Menéndez, & Camacho, 2016), Android malware
detection (D. J. Wu, Mao, Wei, Lee, & Wu, 2012), botnet detection (Dietrich et al., 2011), and
network intrusion detection (Jianliang, Haikun, & Ling, 2009).

2.6

Machine Learning Applications

Machine learning has been utilised in a variety of domains to automate processes and perform
complex data analysis, which would take a significantly longer time if being performed manually
(Obulesu, Mahendra, & ThrilokReddy, 2018). The following sub-sections provide a brief overview of
the types of domains which have utilised ML with some practical examples of ML in use.

2.6.1 Critical Infrastructure
Machine learning can be utilised to provide security for a nation’s critical infrastructure. The securing
of critical infrastructure is paramount for the wellbeing and day-to-day operation of any nation. In
2015, a malware attack targeted the SCADA systems of three utility companies in the Ukraine, which
left thousands of Ukrainian homes without power for several hours (Allianz, 2020). The utilisation of
ML to secure critical infrastructure and to maintain operation of the system can be utilise at both the
network and human level of operation (Zeadally, Adi, Baig, & Khan, 2020). The human element is
susceptible to phishing attacks which can allow for malware to be executed on critical infrastructure
systems. ML trained phishing detection applications can be utilised to prevent the phishing attacks
from succeeding. ML can be utilised at the network level to identify anomalies within the operation of
the critical infrastructure system, such as high load operation at odd times or low operation at peak
times.
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2.6.2 Computer Vision
Computer vision is a field of research in computer science which aims to provide computers with a
method of understanding digital images and videos in the same way that a human can. Computer
vision is used in a variety of applications in varying fields such as military, medical, and industrial
manufacturing. The following is a general list of applications which utilise computer vision in some
way:
•

Facial Recognition

•

Species Identification

•

Product Quality Examination

•

Autonomous Vehicles

•

Medical Image Processing

•

Missile Guidance

The method of computer vision is dependent on the type of application it is being utilised in but some
functions, such as image acquisition, data pre-processing, feature extraction, high-level processing
and decision making are generally used by the majority of computer vision applications (Janai,
Güney, Behl, & Geiger, 2020). In the case of an autonomous vehicle, computer vision may be utilised
in the following way. The image acquisition is obtained by a set of cameras attached to the vehicle
which are recording digital images/video. The acquired digital images are pre-processed to fit into
certain dimensions or to remove excess noise from the image. The feature in the image is identified by
using a trained ML model to classify the objects. A decision is made based on the objects identified in
the image e.g., the vehicle stops as it has identified a stop sign at the next intersection.

2.6.3 Natural Language Processing
Natural language processing (NLP), also known as computational linguistics, is a sub-field of
computer science, statistics and linguistics. Natural language processing is used to describe how the
problem of understanding the structure of human language in a computer-oriented view is solved
(Belinkov & Glass, 2019). NLP is used in many applications such as predictive text, automated
translation, speech recognition and sentiment analysis (Young, Hazarika, Poria, & Cambria, 2018).
Predictive text is used to predict the next word which could be used to complete a sentence being
typed based on the context of the previously typed words (Young et al., 2018).

2.6.4 Cyber Security
In the cyber security domain, ML is utilised in a multitude of various applications. Cyber security
measures benefit greatly from the precision and speed of automation provided by machine learningbased applications. The following is a general list of applications in cyber security which utilise
machine learning:

Page | 33

•

Malware Detection

•

Network Intrusion Prevention

•

Network Intrusion Detection

•

Biometric Authentication

•

Spam Detection

2.6.5 Finance
In the financial field, machine learning is utilised in the following areas:
•

Stock Prediction

•

Fraud Detection

•

Personal Finance Management (Budgeting)

•

Targeted Personalised Advertising

•

Financial Risk Analysis

•

Credit Analysis

Machine learning is used in finance to analyse large amounts of financial data and produce risk
analyses on portfolios, and potential earnings (Shen, Jiang, & Zhang, 2012). Machine learning is also
utilised for anomaly detection, which automates the process of detecting fraud (Perols, 2011).
Machine learning algorithms can build models on a user’s traditional purchasing patterns; alerting the
user when an anomalous pattern is detected (Raj & Portia, 2011). Fraud detection is utilised by
banking institutions to identify anomalous transactions within a customer’s purchase history which
may indicate that some type of fraudulent process had occurred. Fraud detection utilises anomaly
detection from ML to identify transactions which lie outside of the predicted purchasing pattern a
customer would generally follow.

2.6.6 Marketing
Marketing utilises ML to identify patterns within people’s behaviour which can be used to generate
advertisements, both general and targeted, and to optimise product placement to increase sales.
Personal advertisements created from online behaviour are tailored to a particular user to provide
them with an option to purchase an item/service which the advertisement company believes the user is
interested in based upon their browsing habits.

2.6.7 Healthcare
In the medical field, machine learning is utilised in the following areas:
•

Medical Diagnosis

•

Precision Medicine

•

Medical Data Collection
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•

Autonomous Surgery

•

Drug Development/Discovery

•

Disease Identification

IBM Watson Genomics, a partnership between IBM and Quest Diagnostics, aim to improve precision
medicine (PM) by utilising machine learning algorithms. PM is a tailored approach for providing
healthcare to individuals, mainly disease treatment and prevention, which is achieved by utilising the
information known about the individual’s genetic makeup, lifestyle, and environment. Machine
learning is also used for the general population, for instance, ML is used to analyse large datasets of
different publicly available data to predict the likelihood that an epidemic outbreak may occur.

2.6.8 Personal Assistants
Siri, Cortana, Alexa, Echo and Google Assistant are Smart Personal Assistant (SPA) applications
which utilise machine learning. SPAs perform tasks such as organising dates and reminders,
scheduling appointments (Google, 2018), performing Internet searches, activate music and video
players, creating to-do lists and even purchase items online. Netflix and other streaming services
utilise ML to identify which type of show a user may be interested in viewing based on their browsing
history and the history of other users with similar viewing habits.

2.7

Adversarial Machine Learning

Machine learning algorithms are susceptible to a range of adversarial attacks. Adversarial attacks aim
to, in some manner, reduce the efficacy of an ML based application. This is not a new idea, over a
decade ago, Barreno, Nelson, Sears, Joseph, and Tygar (2006) proposed a taxonomy of adversarial
ML which classifies adversarial attacks through a spectrum of three axes: influence, specificity, and
security violation. The taxonomy was expanded by Huang, Joseph, Nelson, Rubinstein, and Tygar
(2011), to include a framework for quantitatively evaluating security threats, which are shown in
Table 2.
The influence axis is divided into two categories: Causative and Exploratory (Huang et al., 2011). A
causative attack is when the attacker has a degree of influence over the training data, which is
leveraged to alter the training process to benefit the attacker (Huang et al., 2011). This type of attack
is also called a poisoning attack. An exploratory attack is when the attacker is not able to influence the
training process, and instead through an exploratory examination of the model (e.g., offline analysis)
aims to gather information on how the model operates, e.g., feature detection (Huang et al., 2011).
The specificity axis is divided into two categories, Targeted and Indiscriminate (Huang et al., 2011).
In a targeted attack model, the end goal of the attacker is focused on a known set of target points
(Huang et al., 2011). In an indiscriminate attack, the end goal is a general attack which reduces the
performance of the model overall (Huang et al., 2011).
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The security violation axis is divided into three categories, Integrity, Availability and Privacy (Huang
et al., 2011). An integrity-based attack aims to sabotage the integrity of the model, increasing the rate
of false-negative results (Huang et al., 2011). An availability attack expands upon the integrity attack,
where the attacker increases the rate of false negatives and false positives to such a degree, that the
model is rendered completely unusable (Huang et al., 2011). In a privacy-based attack, the attacker
wishes to gain information about a system’s users (Huang et al., 2011).
Table 2 - Adversarial Attack Spectrum. Adapted from Huang et al. (2011)
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Specificity

Targeted
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Integrity

Availability

Privacy

Allow a specific

Render specific
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application

information

unusable

Indiscriminate

Exploratory

Targeted

Allow an

Render application
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intrusion

unusable

information

Discover an

Locate a set of

intrusion vector

misclassification

from a list of

points

possible paths

Indiscriminate

Discover an
intrusion vector

The different levels of understanding an attacker can have about a target system, influence the type of
attacks which can be performed. The different attacks which can be performed are categorised under
three attack scenarios, white-box, grey-box, and black-box (Battista Biggio & Roli, 2018).
In a white-box attack scenario, the attacker has complete knowledge of the target system, this includes
the training model, the feature set and the training data (Battista Biggio & Roli, 2018). White-box
attacks represent worst-case scenarios and are unlikely to be performed in the real world. In a greybox attack scenario, the attacker has limited knowledge of the target system model (Battista Biggio &
Roli, 2018) For example, an attacker may know that a target system uses a decision tree algorithm for
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training but has either limited or no knowledge of the labels being used. An attacker can utilise his/her
limited knowledge to build a substitution model which more accurately represents the target system,
compared to a black-box attack. In a black-box attack scenario, the attacker has zero knowledge of the
target system model before developing an attack (Battista Biggio & Roli, 2018).
Frameworks for the development of attacks based upon the taxonomy of Huang et al. (2011) and the
level of knowledge an attacker has have been explored by H. Xiao et al. (2015) and Suciu, Marginean,
Kaya, Daume, and Dumitras (2018). Suciu et al. (2018) introduced the FAIL framework which
identifies four classes of knowledge an attacker may have, which are Feature knowledge, Algorithm
knowledge, Instance knowledge and Leverage. Feature knowledge refers to the features known to the
attacker. Algorithm refers to the algorithm utilised by the attacker to craft adversarial examples.
Instance refers to the labelled training data known to the attacker. Leverage refers to the subset of
features which can be modified by the attacker.
A survey of different adversarial ML attacks and defences was undertaken by Liu et al. (2018), which
categorised the papers according to the taxonomy developed by Huang et al. (2011). The attacks were
categorised as poisoning, evasion, impersonation, and inversion attacks.
A poisoning attack is a causative attack performed at the training stage, which aims to reduce the
classification accuracy of a target system by infecting the training dataset with malicious data. The
end result of a poisoning attack may be to allow for certain data to bypass identification at test time,
or to perform a denial of service attack, rendering the application inoperable (Huang et al., 2011).
Poisoning attacks are only feasible if an attacker is able to infect the training dataset with adversarial
examples. As malware detection applications which utilise ML need to be constantly retrained with
new data to keep up with the newly emerging malware variants (Gibert, Mateu, & Planes, 2020), this
provides an attack vector for poisoning attacks. Malware authors can detect features of anti-malware
software by modifying certain parameters of malware files, feeding the files to the anti-malware
software and analysing the results to determine which aspects of the modified malware file were
detected (Hu & Tan, 2017).
Evasion attacks aim to avoid detection by bypassing the feature detection of an ML system using
maliciously crafted data samples, known as adversarial examples. Evasion attacks have been
developed to bypass image recognition (Papernot et al., 2017), biometric authentication (B. Biggio,
Fumera, Russu, Didaci, & Roli, 2015) and malware detection (L. Chen, Ye, & Bourlai, 2017).
Impersonation attacks aim to craft adversarial examples which can be used to fool an ML classifier.
Impersonation attacks allow an attacker to bypass security mechanisms such as facial recognition
systems (Sharif, Bhagavatula, Bauer, & Reiter, 2016). Inversion attacks are an exploratory privacy
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attack, which aim to uncover private data, be it from the training data (e.g. medical data) or
information about the training algorithm used (Fredrikson, Jha, & Ristenpart, 2015).
The key findings discussed by Q. Liu et al. (2018) are:
•

New threats are constantly emerging and evolving

•

Defensive adversarial security measures are at the initial stage of development

•

Data privacy is key for protecting ML algorithms

•

Secure deep learning is of key interest for future research

•

Balance is required to achieve effective secure ML with little overhead

The following sub-sections cover different adversarial attacks which have been developed where the
target system was an ML-based malware detection application or a spam detector. Other adversarial
attacks which target ML systems that are not the focus of the research are not discussed.

2.7.1 Adversarial Attacks
The following sub-sections cover a variety of adversarial ML attacks for both poisoning and evasion,
with a focus on attacks which target ML trained malware detection applications. The attacks discussed
in this section cover a variety of ML algorithms and illustrate the different methods possible for
generating adversarial examples. Following the attack section, an overview of different defensive
strategies which have been developed to combat the variety of adversarial ML attacks is presented.
2.7.1.1

Adversarial Poisoning Attack (Spam)

The earliest research on poisoning attacks was produced by Wittel and Wu (2004). Their research
covered performing a poisoning attack to reduce the efficacy of statistical spam filters. Since then, an
assortment of different adversarial attacks have been developed for different ML-based applications
covering a variety of ML algorithms.
Nelson et al. (2008) developed two adversarial poisoning attacks against the ML-based spam detector,
SpamBayes. The two attacks developed were a dictionary attack and a focused attack. The goal of the
dictionary attack was to perform an indiscriminate Denial-of-Service attack, rendering the spam
detector unable to function at all. The goal of the focused attack was to perform a targeted integrity
attack, in which a certain spam email could bypass detection while the general detection capabilities
are left unaffected.
Both attacks were performed under the assumption that an attacker is able to introduce his/her
adversarial spam emails into the training dataset, which is used to retrain the classifier to be able to
detect new spam variants every week (Nelson et al., 2008). The attack was restricted in that email
headers of the attack emails were not to be modified and each attack email was to be trained as spam
(Nelson et al., 2008). The indiscriminate dictionary attack achieved a 36% misclassification rate, with
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1% of the training data being adversarial examples. The targeted attack altered the classification of
60% of the targeted emails (Nelson et al., 2008).
2.7.1.2

Adversarial Poisoning Attack (Malware)

The first poisoning attack for malware detectors was performed by Newsome, Karp, and Song (2006).
In their research, they proposed two types of poisoning attacks, the red herring attack and the
inseparability attack. The red herring attack involves adding fake features to malware files, which will
be removed by an attacker when performing an attack. The malware files containing fake features are
fed to the ML algorithm and are intended to cause the learner to build a classification model which
will identify files with fake features as malicious. When the attacker removes the fake features, the
new malware file should bypass the malware detection as the file does not now contain enough
features (or markers) to identify it as malware. The inseparability attack is a Denial-of-Service attack,
where the attacker incorporates features from the benign training data into the malicious data set,
which renders the classifier incapable of deducing at an acceptable accuracy, which files are malicious
or benign.
StingRay is a framework developed to generate adversarial examples for targeted poisoning attacks,
which was developed by Suciu et al. (2018). The aim of a StingRay attack is to induce either a false
positive or false negative classification of a targeted example, while retaining the general
classification of the ML model so as to not arouse suspicion that an attack has taken place. The attack
scenario assumes that periodic retraining of data is undertaken to update the ML classifier (e.g., spam
and malware detection), which is how the attacker introduces adversarial examples into the target
system.
The StingRay attack was evaluated from attacking four different classifiers: image classification,
Android malware detection, Twitter-based exploit prediction and data breach prediction. The ML
classifiers were trained using Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), linear Support Vector
Machines (SVMs) and Random Forest (RF). The Android malware detection application was trained
using a linear SVM and the Drebin Android dataset, which is comprised of 123,453 Android
applications, of which 5,560 are malicious. The Android attack performed was developed to induce a
false negative classifying a targeted malicious Android application as benign. For the attack, a
targeted malicious application which was correctly classified was selected and the identified
malicious activity was recorded (e.g., API calls, suspicious URL requests and unauthorised
permissions), the malicious features were introduced into benign applications which were fed to the
learning algorithm. The performance of the Stingray attack was calculated from the success rate and
Performance Drop Ratio (PDR) of each attack. The PDR is calculated by evaluating either the average
accuracy or F1 score on a separate testing set. The StingRay attack on the malware classifier had a
50% success rate and a performance drop ratio of 0.99. The results from the StingRay attacks and
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applied defensive strategies on the different ML applications is shown in Table 3, the
defensive strategies are discussed in 2.7.2.
Table 3 - StingRay Attack Results (Average Instances, Success Rate, and Performance Drop Rate) Adapted From (Suciu et
al., 2018) Refer to Table 6 Effectiveness of StingRay and of existing defenses againast it on all publications
https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.06975

2.7.1.3

DNN Evasion Attack

Grosse, Papernot, Manoharan, Backes, and McDaniel (2016) developed an adversarial evasion attack
against malware detection applications trained on feed-forward neural networks to detect static
features. The attack was based on the method used by Papernot et al. (2017), which generated
adversarial examples to bypass ANN trained image classification. The malware detection models
generated were trained using a variety of parameters including, number of neurons (10, 50, 100, 200,
and 300), number of layers (1- 4) and malware/clean application ratio (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5)
combinations using the DREBIN Android malware data set. The baseline used to compare to other
NN malware detectors were comprised of 2 layers of 200 neurons each. The baseline model achieved
a 97% accuracy, with 7% false negatives and 3.3% false positives. The adversarial attack performed
had varying degrees of misclassification depending on the size of the network and the malware ratio
used. The highest misclassification rate achieved was 81.89% on a model comprised of one 200
neuron layer trained with a malware ratio of 0.4, and the lowest misclassification rate was 60.02% on
a model comprised of two 50 neuron layers and a malware ratio of 0.4.
2.7.1.4

Malware Generative Adversarial Network (MalGAN) Attack

MalGAN is a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) attack developed by Hu and Tan (2017), which
generates adversarial examples for the purpose of bypassing ML-based malware detection models. A
GAN is comprised of a generative model and a discriminative model, which work together to generate
the optimal adversarial examples, an example is shown in Figure 2.9. The generative model creates
the adversarial examples and the discriminative model determines which adversarial examples would
be successful in an attack (Goodfellow et al., 2014).
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Figure 2.9 - The architecture of MalGAN adapted from Hu and Tan (2017)
Please refer to
Hu, W., & Tan, Y. (2017). Generating Adversarial Malware Examples for Black-Box Attacks Based
on GAN. ArXiv e-prints. Retrieved from https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.05983

The discrimination model in MalGAN is a substitution detector developed to imitate the target ML
malware detection application. The target ML malware detection application is a black-box system.
The attackers do not have access to the training dataset used or have any knowledge of the target
system’s structure. The only information obtained by the attackers is if a file is identified as benign or
malicious. The results from the target black-box are used to label the dataset on which the substitution
detector is trained. The MalGAN generative model generates the new adversarial examples which are
fed into the substitution model to determine what features changes are required to bypass detection.
The ML algorithms tested by Hu and Tan (2017) were random forest (RF), logistic regression (LR),
decision trees (DT), support vector machines (SVM), multi-layer perceptron (MLP), and a votingbased ensemble of each of these classifiers (VOTE). Hu and Tan (2017) claim that MalGAN can
reduce the detection rate to near zero for each model and will require retraining with knowledge of the
adversarial MalGAN examples.
The results from the MalGAN attacks on the different ML algorithms are shown in Error! Reference
s ource not found. and Table 5. Error! Reference source not found. contains the results from
the transferability version of the MalGAN attack, which was performed using adversarial examples
which were generated using training data from a different dataset. Table 5 contains the results
from the MalGAN attack which generated the adversarial examples from the same training dataset for
each ML model.
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Table 4 - MalGAN Adversarial Attack Results (Different Training Set) Adapted From -Hu and Tan (2017)

Table 5 - MalGAN Adversarial Attack Results 9Same Training Set) Adapted From -Hu and Tan (2017)

For Table 4 & 5 Refer to
Hu, W., & Tan, Y. (2017). Generating Adversarial Malware Examples for Black-Box Attacks Based on
GAN. ArXiv e-prints. Retrieved from https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.05983
2.7.1.5 Microsoft PE Evasion Attack
Anderson, Kharkar, Filar, and Roth (2017) produced a black-box based attack to bypass
static malware detection of malicious Windows PE files. The attack was developed under
three assumptions:
• No knowledge of the ML classifier architecture (features, structure,
parameters)
•

Can only receive a binary result from the classifier (malicious or benign)

• No use of an oracle to determine if generated PE retains original functionality
The assumptions were chosen to perform an attack in which the authors believed to be the most
difficult scenario an attacker may face.
A Deep Reinforcement learning approach was chosen as the basis of the attack. The attack performed
is based on a game scenario, where in each turn, a random modification is made, and a result is
collected from the classifier. If the classifier identifies the file as malicious, another round is played,
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up to a maximum 20, otherwise a successful attack is recorded if the file was identified as benign
before the round limit.
The modifications made to the malicious Windows PE file do not alter the original code execution or
break the PE file format (e.g., alter a name section, append bytes to end of sections and pack or
unpack the PE). The black-box attack achieved a successful evasion rate of 16%.
2.7.1.6

Adversarial API Call Evasion Attack

A black-box attack was developed by Rosenberg, Shabtai, Rokach, and Elovici (2018) to evade
detection from ML-based malware classifiers which have been trained to detect malware via
analysing API call sequences. The authors proposed a framework, GADGET (Generative API
aDversarial Generic Example by Transferability), which generates adversarial malware by adding new
API calls to malware files. No removal or modification of original API calls is made to ensure
original functionality of the malware is not altered.
The attack uses a white-box substitution model to craft effective adversarial examples which are
transferred to attack black-box models, as it has been shown that adversarial examples succeed when
transferred to attack ML models which have been trained on different datasets (Suciu et al., 2018;
Szegedy et al., 2014). The substitution model is developed as the attacker does not have any
knowledge of the ML algorithm or dataset used to train the target black-box malware detector. The
only information it is assumed the attacker knows, is the API calls used in the target malware which
will be modified into adversarial examples.
The Rosenberg, Shabtai, Rokach, et al. (2018) GADGET attack was performed against a variety of
malware detection models trained using different ML algorithms. The attack was shown to be
successful, with a 100% success rate against RNN and a majority of the attacks achieving over 90%
success. The least successful attack was against Logistic Regression at 69.73%.
Rosenberg, Shabtai, Elovici, and Rokach (2018) developed another black-box attack framework,
BADGER (Benign API aDversarial Generic Example by Random perturbation), which does not
require the training of a substitute model, as the previous attack required, or any knowledge of the
target ML malware detection model. The only assumption is that the attacker has knowledge of a
subset of the API call sequence in the target malware and the attacker either knows the confidence
score of the malware classifier or only the output label of the malware classifier. When the attacker
knows the confidence score, the success rate of the attacks was around 98% and when the attacker
only had the output label, the success rate of the attacks was 64%.
2.7.1.7

Subpopulation Data Poisoning Attacks

A form of poisoning attack which targets a sub-population inside of a large multi-class machine
learning model was developed by Jagielski, Severi, Harger, and Oprea (2020). The attack operates in a
black-box scenario, with the attacker not having knowledge of the exact model architecture or
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parameters. The attack only targets one of the model’s classes, the general efficacy of the other classes
is unaffected by the attack. The attack was tested against the UCI Adult dataset, CIFAR-10 for image
classification, UTKFace for face recognition, and IMDB reviews for sentiment analysis. The attacker
does not have access to the original training data but does have a substitute training set which is
generated from samples from the original set. The poisoning attack uses a label flipping approach with
the target subpopulation being chosen from using "FeatureMatch" and "ClusterMatch" selection
techniques. The FeatureMatch selection technique uses "fine-grained manual annotation" to identify
subpopulations within the dataset (e.g., race or age in images of people). The ClusterMatch selection
technique automates the manual annotation with clustering. By identifying clusters of subpopulations
within the dataset, the attacker can select which subpopulation they wish to attack.
2.7.1.8

Watermark Attack (Malware)

Severi, Meyer, Coull, and Oprea (2020) developed a targeted poisoning attack by injecting a
watermark into the benign training data, which influences the classification of the model to produce
false negatives of malicious files if at test time they contain the same watermark.
The watermark attacks were performed on both GBDT and ANN models which used the EMBER
dataset, which is a dataset of 800,000 Windows PE32 files. The watermark process does not impede
on the original functionality of the adversarial binary file. The attack only required 8 features, out of
2351, to be modified for a successful attack. After injecting 1% poisoned (adversarial) samples into
the training data, Severi et al. achieved a success rate of over 97%.
The watermark attacks were performed by identifying how the features contributed to the files
classification by calculating their SHapley Additive exPlanations (SHAP) values. SHAP values are
generated through a game theory approach where the feature vector values are replaced with other
values in the feature vector set to identify their contribution i.e., if value A is replaced with value B
and the classification shifts towards C or D, then value A had a positive contribution towards
whichever classification. This process is computed for every feature vector. As EMBER uses feature
hashing to compute the majority of its feature vectors (2,316 of 2,351), the watermark attack was
performed on feature vectors which were not generated from the feature hashing process. The features
modified for the watermark attack were evaluated on a set of malware files and benign software to
ensure that the functionality of the files was not compromised. It is not possible to check that the
modification would not break the files used to generate the EMBER dataset, as EMBER only contains
the extracted features, not the complete binary.
Both white-box and black-box watermark attacks were performed. In the white-box scenario, the
attacker had access to the original training data and model, which allowed for the attacker to generate
accurate SHAP values. In the black-box scenario, the attacker only new of the feature space the model
was trained on but did not have access to the model’s architecture. A transfer attack was performed,
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where the attacker trained their own model, using the same feature space, and calculated the SHAP
values of malware and benign software from that model. The calculated values were then used to
identify which features should be manipulated in the benign training data of the target model.
Value selection is performed in two ways, MinPopulation and CountSHAP. In MinPopulation, values
are selected from those which appear least frequently in the dataset. CountSHAP are the opposite to
MinPopulation and are comprised of SHAP values which have a high density within the benign
software.
Three mitigation measures (Spectral Signatures, HDBSCAN, and Isolation Forest) were evaluated
over the different models and attacks. The mitigation measures work under three assumptions, that the
defender has:
•

access to the poisoned training data

•

has access to a clean labelled dataset

•

believes that the attacker will attack the most relevant features of the model

All three mitigation measures are run on the training data to prevent an adversarial model from going
live.
The defensive strategies were evaluated using a reduced feature space obtained from the 32 most
important features from a clean portion (120,000 samples) of the training set. The values of the
reduced subspace were all normalised to [-1,1]. The Spectral Signature defence worked by calculating
the singular value decomposition of the benign samples in the new reduced feature space, then by
calculating the outlier score and finally filtering out the top 15%. The Hierarchical Density-Based
clustering (HDBSCAN) defence is influenced by the activation clustering defence by B. Chen et al.
(2018) mentioned previously. The HDBSCAN defence works on the assumption that the watermarked
samples generate a tight cluster of high density within the reduced feature space. The Isolation Forest
is an unsupervised anomaly detection algorithm for identifying the watermarked samples as outliers
with the reduced feature space. The results from the attack and defences are shown in Table 6.
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Table 6 - Watermark Attack and Defence Results Adapted From (Severi et al., 2020)
Refer to: Table 3 in Severi, G., Meyer, J., Coull, S., & Oprea, A. (2020). Exploring Backdoor Poisoning Attacks Against
Malware Classifiers. ArXiv e-prints. Retrieved from https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.01031
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2.7.2 Adversarial Defence Strategies
Having described the various adversarial attack strategies which were found to be successful in
influencing ML models, it is now appropriate to examine the defensive strategies which have been
developed to combat the growing threat of adversarial ML attacks. The defensive strategies discussed
cover a variety of ML algorithms and applications and do not solely concentrate on ML malware
detection applications.
The defensive strategies developed to protect ML algorithms from adversarial attacks can be split into
two categories determined by the underlying principle of the defensive strategy, which are the
identification and removal of adversarial examples at the training stage (e.g., data sanitisation), and
the development of robust algorithms which are resilient to adversarial attacks (e.g., adversarial
training) (Battista Biggio & Roli, 2018).
2.7.2.1

Data Sanitisation

Data sanitisation is a training stage protection method which aims to detect and remove adversarial
examples from a dataset to avoid poisoning the training algorithm. Data sanitisation is used in
applications which rely on an open training model, where the learning algorithm needs to be
periodically retrained to detect new emerging threats, such as spam detection and malware detection.
Reject on Negative Impact (RONI) is a data sanitisation defence developed by Nelson et al. (2008).
RONI was developed to defend ML-based spam detectors from poisoning attacks at the training stage.
The RONI defence evaluates the impact of new training data and discards the data if the impact is
considered significantly negative by reducing the classification rate by 0.05 or greater.
The RONI defence was trained on five sets of training and validation data. The training sets were
comprised of twenty independently selected emails from the Enron data set which was originally used
to train SpamBayes for the spam attack in Section 0. The validation set was comprised of 50 emails
and the query data was comprised of 120 random non-attack spam messages and 15 repetitions of
seven variants of the dictionary attack. The training sets were trained with and without each of the
query data samples. If the average impact across each validation set was severely negative then the
query data was discarded, otherwise it was used in the training set for the next round.
The threshold of significant negative impact was determined from analysing the results of the
adversarial dictionary attack, and the non-attack spam. The dictionary attack had an average negative
impact of 6.8 ham messages being misclassified as spam, while the non-attack spam caused at most a
4.8 misclassification rate. Results from the experiment had RONI to be 100% effective against
dictionary attacks, identifying and discarding each attack email and retaining each non-attack email
for training (Nelson et al., 2008), however, RONI did not as well for focused attacks where the
intention is to have a future targeted spam email bypass detection.
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2.7.2.2

Robust Algorithm Approach

A variety of different defensive strategies have been proposed with the aim of developing robust
algorithms which are resilient to the effects of adversarial attacks. Some of the methods proposed for
developing robust algorithms include Adversarial Training (Goodfellow, Shlens, & Szegedy, 2015),
the Ensemble Method (Tramèr et al., 2018), and Defensive Distillation (Papernot, McDaniel, Wu, Jha,
& Swami, 2016).
Adversarial training is a defensive strategy proposed by Goodfellow et al. (2015) to increase the
resilience of ML models from adversarial attacks. The general principle behind adversarial training is
that including adversarial examples in the dataset will learn to detect adversarial examples, increasing
the resilience of the generated ML model.
Ensemble adversarial training was proposed by Tramèr et al. (2018) to increase the resilience of an
ML algorithm in comparison to the original adversarial training which was found to be vulnerable to
transfer attacks. In Ensemble adversarial training, adversarial examples which have been trained to
attack an ensemble of different models are introduced into the training dataset to increase resilience
from adversarial attacks. As the transferability property has shown that adversarial examples trained
on one model can be successfully transferred to attack another model even if the dataset used for
training was different (Szegedy et al., 2014), the extended adversarial training defence was proposed
to increase resilience by training with a greater diversity of adversarial examples.
Defensive distillation is a defensive method developed by Papernot et al. (2016) to increase the
resilience of Deep Neural Network (DNN) trained classifiers from adversarial attacks. Defensive
distillation is based off the distillation method for neural networks produced by Hinton, Vinyals, and
Dean (2014). Distillation is a method which was developed to reduce the amount of computational
power required to perform predictive classification. Distillation works by training a DNN using
additional information which is obtained from evaluating the DNN, to determine the classification
probability of the training data to each class. The additional information is known as soft labels,
which are used to label the data when training the distilled DNN. The soft labels reduce the amount of
training points required and reduce the amount of bias in the network which can lead to overfitting.
Defensive distillation uses the same approach as the original distillation, with the difference that the
original network and the distilled network are identical in their architecture. The aim of defensive
distillation is not to reduce the amount of training points but to utilise the soft labels to prevent
adversarial examples from effectively poisoning the network.
An attack against defensive distillation was developed by Carlini and Wagner (2016), in which it was
shown that defensive distillation was not as secure as originally thought. An extension of defensive
distillation was developed by Papernot and McDaniel (2017) to increase the resilience in response to
exposed vulnerabilities. The extension differs from the original in that additional information is used
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in combination with the original classification probabilities. The additional information is a predictive
uncertainty value which is computed from the original DNN.
2.7.2.3

On the (Statistical) Detection of Adversarial Examples

Grosse, Manoharan, Papernot, Backes, and McDaniel (2017) used statistical tests to identify
adversarial examples from genuine data. The basis of the defence is that adversarial examples are not
drawn from the same distribution as genuine data and can be identified through statistical tests. After
identifying the adversarial examples, the ML model is modified with another class which is used to
classify adversarial examples. The test used in the defence is a kernel-based two-sample statistical
hypothesis test called the Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) test, which was developed by
Gretton, Borgwardt, Rasch, Schölkopf, and Smola (2012). The MMD test is as follows:
We test whether distributions p and q are different on the basis of samples drawn from each of
them, by finding a well behaved (e.g., smooth) function which is large on the points drawn
from p, and small (as negative as possible) on the points from q. We use as our test statistic
the difference between the mean function values on the two samples; when this is large, the
samples are likely from different distributions. (Gretton et al., 2012)
Although MMD was successful in detecting adversarial examples from genuine examples, Carlini and
Wagner (2017) found that they were able to generate adversarial examples using the C and W attack
algorithm which were not detected by the MMD defence.
2.7.2.4

Activation Clustering Defence

B. Chen et al. (2018) developed a defence for backdoor poisoning attacks on neural network models
by analysing the neurons from the last hidden layer for anomalous clusters. The intuition behind the
defence was that for the backdoor poisoning attack (where a trigger image was superimposed onto
target images mislabelled with a target label, e.g., a stop sign with a trigger was labelled as a speed
sign) is that the network learns both the features of the original source image and the target adversarial
class (from the trigger). The authors proceeded by testing adversarial images and examining the
neurons from the last hidden layer, which provided the required information to clearly separate the
adversarial images from the clean. The results from performing the activation clustering defence on a
poisoned MNIST dataset is shown in
.

Page | 49

Table 7 - Activation and Raw Image Data Clustering Results Adapted From (B. Chen et al., 2018)
Refer to
Chen, B., Carvalho, W., Baracaldo, N., Ludwig, H., Edwards, B., Lee, T., . . . Srivastava, B. (2018).
Detecting Backdoor Attacks on Deep Neural Networks by Activation Clustering. ArXiv eprints.
Retrieved from https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.03728.pdfm

2.7.2.5

Spectral Signatures

Tran, Li, and Madry (2018) identify a property of backdoor attacks which they name “Spectral
Signatures”, they argue that backdoor attacks “tend to leave behind a detectable trace in the spectrum
of the covariance of a feature representation learned by the neural network”. By identifying the
spectral signatures residing in the network the authors were able to identify the poisoned inputs and
remove them from the network. The process for identifying spectral signatures and removing the
corresponding adversarial examples is described as follows:
We take a black-box neural network with some designated learned representation. This can
typically be the representation from an autoencoder or a layer in a deep network that is
believed to represent high level features. Then, we take the representation vectors for all
inputs of each label. The intuition here is that if the set of inputs with a given label consists of
both clean examples as well as corrupted examples from a different label set, the backdoor
from the latter set will provide a strong signal in this representation for classification. As long
as the signal is large in magnitude, we can detect it via singular value decomposition and
remove the images that provide the signal. (Tran et al., 2018)
For the majority of the experiments, the authors were able to remove 100% of the adversarial
examples by applying the spectral signature defence.
2.7.2.6

Neuron Pruning and Unlearning

Two defensive strategies were developed by Wang et al. (2019) to patch poisoned neural networks
after identifying backdoor triggers within the dataset. The poisoning attacks were identified by
examining the neuron activation weights from the last hidden layer of the model, as that layer contains
all the encoded data from the previous layers. In the last hidden layer, the authors found that the
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activation weights of adversarial examples were 3-7 times higher than clean input images.
After identifying the model as being poisoned, an identification and filtering method is applied to the
model to prevent any incoming adversarial examples from bypassing misclassification. While the
filtering method is in place, the authors presented two defensive patches to fix the model.
The first strategy is neuron pruning, it involves removing the backdoored neurons from the model to
prevent the trigger from being activated, without significant negative impact to the
general classification of the model. An example from one set of poisoned attacks had shown that only
the top 1% of neurons were required to be active (i.e., all other neurons were masked to zero)
for the adversarial example to be classified as its target label. Even though only 1% of neurons were
required for the attack to work, in that example, 30% of the neurons needed to be pruned to reduce
the success of attacks to near zero, this is due to neurons being trained with backup information for
the model.
The second strategy is an unlearning approach, where the model is trained to unlearn the trigger. The
unlearning is performed by reverse engineering the trojan trigger and examining how it affects
the change in activation weight values of the network which can then be patched. The results
from the patching experiments are shown in Table 8.
Table 8 - Model Patching Performance Comparison Adapted From (Wang et al., 2019)
Refer to
Wang, B., Yao, Y., Shan, S., Li, H., Viswanath, B., Zheng, H., & Zhao, B. Y. (2019, 19-23 May 2019).
Neural Cleanse: Identifying and Mitigating Backdoor Attacks in Neural Networks. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
(SP).https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8835365
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2.7.2.7

Revisiting Adversarial Training

Adversarial training is a robust algorithm approach to defend against adversarial examples by training
the model to not only be accurate for the original task, but to be able to identify adversarial examples.
The adversarial training process is performed by training the model on the original training data and
with additional adversarial examples. According to Wong, Rice, and Kolter (2020) adversarial training
was assumed to be quite computationally expensive when including the creation of the adversarial
examples, but this is not the case in the experiments performed by Wong et al. (2020), as they were
able to train a robust algorithm by using weaker adversarial examples which are computationally
cheaper to generate using fast gradient sign method.
2.7.2.8

Detection of Adversarial Training Examples in Poisoning Attacks through Anomaly
Detection

Paudice, Muñoz-González, Gyorgy, and Lupu (2018) developed a defensive strategy against
adversarial poisoning attacks by pre-filtering the training data to remove adversarial examples by
means of outlier detection. According to the authors, adversarial examples differ significantly from
genuine training data points, which allows for their identification and removal. The defence is
proposed as an alternative to testing each training sample to identify adversarial examples, as that
approach, which can succeed in identifying poisoning attacks, is computationally expensive. The
developed defence is for linear classifiers and is model agnostic. The defence was tested against two
attacks, the optimal attack developed by the authors, and a label flipping attack. The label flipping
attack was shown to be more resilient than the optimal attack to the authors defensive technique as the
datapoints of the label flipping attacks are closer to the original data compared to the optimal attacks.
The experiments were performed on the SpamBase and MNIST datasets. The optimal attack strategy
increased the classification error of the SpamBase model from 0.112 ± 0.010 to 0.195 ± 0.019 and the
MNIST from 0.037 ± 0.005 to 0.391 ± 0.160. For the SpamBase model, the best performing defence
achieved a 0.111 ± 0.009 classification error, and the worst performing defence achieved a 0.137 ±
0.015 classification error. For the MNIST model, the best performing defence achieved a 0.070 ±
0.013 classification error, and the worst performing defence achieved a 0.079 ± 0.022 classification
error.
2.7.2.9

Label Sanitisation against Label Flipping Poisoning Attacks

Paudice, Muñoz-González, and Lupu (2018) developed a defensive strategy to defend against
adversarial label flipping poisoning attacks, as the defence from the previously discussed paper did
not perform as well against label flipping attacks compared to optimal attacks. The defence strategy
utilises k-Nearest-Neighbours (k-NN) to identify adversarial data inputs which negatively affect the
accuracy of the model. The defence was tested on linear classifier models which were trained on three
datasets (UCI BreastCancer, MNIST and SpamBase). The defence was developed using a worst-case
scenario where the attacker has complete white-box knowledge of the defender’s system (e.g., model
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architecture, training set, loss function). The authors understand that this is an unlikely scenario but
wanted to test their defence under a worse-case scenario. The defence mitigates the label flipping
attack by re-labelling identified outliers (suspicious data points) to malicious. The outliers are
identified using k-NN to locate data points which are far from genuine points of the same label. The
proposed defence was able to minimise the classification error from the label flipping attack. The
results from the label flipping attacks and the sanitisation defence are shown in Figure 2.10, where
the red line illustrates the performance of the model without a defence applied, and the blue line
illustrates the performance after the defensive strategy was applied.

Figure 2.10 - Label Sanitisation Defence Results Adapted From (Paudice, Muñoz-González, & Lupu, 2018)
Refer to
Paudice, A., Muñoz-González, L., & Lupu, E. (2018). Label Sanitization against Label Flipping
Poisoning Attacks. ArXiv e-prints. Retrieved from https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.00992

2.8

EMBER Dataset

The EMBER dataset is a collection of extracted features from 1.1 Million portable executable
(PE) files (900,000 train and 200,000 test). The 900,000 training files are split equally into three
categories, malicious, benign, and unknown. The unknown category is not used when training the
ML model, so the actual size of the EMBER dataset when training is 800,000. EMBER was
developed to serve as a benchmark for machine learning malware research.
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In the EMBER dataset, the feature generation was performed from a selection of the PE32 file
information shown in Table 9, which generates a 2351 bit dimension vector from each PE32 file using
the feature hashing module from sklearn.
Table 9 - EMBER Feature Engineering

Feature Class

Vector Dimension Size

Information

ByteHistogram

256

Entire byte histogram

ByteEntropyHistogram

256

Histogram of joint probability
of each byte value and local
entropy

SectionInfo

255

Feature hash of section names,
sizes, and entropy

ImportsInfo

1280

Feature hash of import libraries
and their functions

ExportsInfo

128

Feature

hash

of

exported

functions
GeneralFileInfo

10

General file information (size,
vsize,

has_debug,

imports,
has_resources,

exports,

has_relocations,
has_signature,

has_tls, symbols)
HeaderFileInfo

62

Information about the OS,
architecture, and other header
information

StringExtractor

104

Extracted string information

As discussed in 2.3.1 Feature Engineering, the engineering of salient features is a crucial step in the
development of an ML model. The features chosen for use by the researchers at Endgame are based
upon the work of several researchers which have identified what features in a Windows PE32 file
contribute the most when training a malware detection ML model. A summary of three feature
engineering research papers, which the Endgame researchers followed in developing their feature
engineering process are given below:
Paper 1 – Deep Neural Network Based Malware Detection Using Two-Dimensional Binary
Program Features
Saxe and Berlin (2015) developed an approach for detecting malware files by using static features
extracted from binary files to train a deep neural network. The feature engineering performed on the
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binary files is comprised of extracting information from four sections of the binary file and creating a
1024-dimensional feature vector. The 1024-dimensional feature vector is comprised of four 256dimensional feature vectors. The first set of feature vectors extracted from the binary file are the
byte/entropy histogram of the file, which was performed to generate a model of the file’s features in a
file format agnostic approach. The second set of feature vectors extracted from the binary file are
from the import address table. The import features 256 dimension vector is comprised of a hash of
each tuple of import name and associated import function e.g. kernel32.dll:SetFilePointer. The
imports section was included to identify the association of the external function calls the binary file
relies upon to operate. The third set of feature vectors is a 256-bit hash of strings extracted from the
binary file and the last set of feature vectors are computed from the numerical values extracted from
the binary file’s packaging, which were extracted using pefile.
Paper 2 – Data Mining Methods for Detection of New Malicious Executables
Schultz, Eskin, Zadok, and Stolfo (2001) developed a data-mining framework for identifying
malicious files by identifying pattens which differentiate between malicious and benign files. The
authors extracted static properties of the binary files to be used in generating a detection model to
classify new unseen malicious files as malicious. The features extracted were from the system
resource information, strings and byte sequences of the binary file. Three different learning algorithms
were used to train the classification models. The first set of features extracted from the binary files to
train the classification models were from the DLLs used, their function calls and the number of
function calls within each DLL. The second set of features extracted were the strings contained within
the binary file, and the last set of features extracted were the byte sequences of the binary file
generated using hexdump.
Paper 3 – A Framework for Efficient Mining of Structural Information to Detect Zero-Day
Malicious Portable Executables
Shafiq, Tabish, Mirza, and Farooq (2009) developed a real-time PE-Miner framework which
automatically extracts salient information from PE files to detect Zero-day malware files. The PEMiner operates in three steps, the first is to identify which features are to be extracted from the PE
file, the second is to perform pre-processing on the extracted features to remove redundant and
irrelevant features, the third step is the selection of a data mining algorithm to perform the
classification. The features the authors selected for extraction are shown in Table 10.
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Table 10 - Realtime PE-Miner Extracted PE Features Adapted from (Shafiq et al., 2009)
Refer to Shafiq, M. Z., Tabish, S. M., Mirza, F., & Farooq, M. (2009, September). Pe-miner: Mining structural information to detect
malicious executables in realtime. In International workshop on recent advances in intrusion detection (pp. 121-141). Springer, Berlin,
Heidelberg. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-642-04342-0.pdf

The pre-processing was performed by using either Redundant Feature Removal (RFR), Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) or Haar Wavelet Transform (HWT) and the classification was performed
using a selection of five data mining algorithms: instance based learner (IBk), decision tree (J48),
Naïve Bayes, inductive rule learner (RIPPER) and support vector machines. Shafiq et al. (2009)
found that the decision tree model performed the best for the majority of experiments.

2.9

Summary

Machine learning is a subset of Artificial Intelligence which is utilised in a variety of different fields
to increase productivity through training machines to automatically perform a task. Machine learning
has been implemented in many different fields such as medical science, information technology,
finance, and cyber security. Machine learning algorithms build models for the purpose of mapping an
input to an output with a high degree of accuracy. These models significantly improve the
performance of technology through automation of feature detection which previously required human
input.
However, ML algorithms have shown to be susceptible to a variety of different adversarial attacks
which target the integrity, availability, and privacy of ML models. The adversarial attacks are a threat
to computer systems which rely on malware protection from applications which have been trained to
detect malware through ML approaches. Critical Infrastructure (CI) systems are often not able to
support the extended lengths of downtime required when updating and patching vulnerabilities and
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instead rely on protection software to prevent vulnerabilities from being exploited. Machine learning
is a new approach utilised in malware detection, which could be utilised for the detection of unknownunknown (Zero-day) malware.
As ML-based malware detection applications require periodic retraining of new data to stay up-todate in detecting new malware variants, this retraining provides an attack vector for adversaries to
perform poisoning attacks, reducing the efficacy of the ML model. This research aims to explore the
different avenues of adversarial attacks and to develop defensive strategies for protecting ML-based
malware detection applications. A traditional scientific approach has been identified as the most
appropriate method and the research has been designed with the risks, limitations and ethical
considerations being examined.
Malware detection is an important area in cyber security. Computer systems around the world rely on
malware detection applications to prevent malware attacks from succeeding. Malware detection is not
a straightforward task, as new variants of malware are generated at an ever-increasing rate. ML has
been utilised to generate predictive classification models to identify new malware which conventional
malware detection methods may not detect. Machine learning however has been found to be
vulnerable to different types of adversarial attacks, in which an attacker is able to negatively affect the
integrity and availability of the ML model.
Different types of defences have been proposed to mitigate adversarial attacks, but no generally
effective fix has been developed. For ML-based malware detection applications, an effective defence
against adversarial attacks is key in ensuring the integrity of the application, as the open-training
model used provides an attack vector for adversarial poisoning attacks. A summary of the problems
identified are shown in
.
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Table 11 - Summary of Identified Problems

Identified Problem

Addressed in Research

Machine learning algorithms Yes

Related Research Question
RQ1

are vulnerable to adversarial
attacks
A general mitigation strategy Yes

RQ2

has not been developed to
counter all adversarial attacks
Researchers do not share their No
malware

databases,

which

makes replicating the results
difficult

The problems identified in the literature review and summarised in Table 11 only provide a broad
overview of the issues relating to adversarial machine learning attack and defence research. An
important problem which has not been covered in other research is the fact that for the majority of the
developed adversarial machine learning defences to operate, they require a trusted clean dataset which
can be used as a benchmark to identify and remove adversarial examples. The problem which arises
from this method is that it is not possible to know for certain if the trusted clean dataset is in fact
clean, or if adversarial examples have been introduced into the dataset without the researcher being
aware. Trust in a clean dataset becomes more difficult when the data is required to be sourced online
or from a third party, compared to a dataset which was curated inhouse. The problem with using an
inhouse dataset, is that without the large variation in data which occurs when data is gathered from
multiple channels, overfitting is more likely to occur in the trained ML model. The trust issue was
addressed in this thesis when developing the defensive measure to prevent targeted adversarial
poisoning attacks from succeeding.
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3 Research Methods and Design
This chapter begins with a discussion of philosophical systems and research approaches. This is
followed by a discussion of research methods and a justification of the selected method for this
research. Next, the research design, describing the process used to develop the research questions and
their corresponding hypotheses was done in accordance with the traditional scientific approach, which
was identified as the most appropriate research approach for this thesis. Next, an outline of the
research phases was produced, starting with the acquisition and analysis of malware databases, the
development of ML models, the development and execution of the preliminary and main experiments,
and finishing with the development of a defensive strategy to mitigate the targeted adversarial
poisoning attack. The chapter concludes by covering the materials required to complete the research
phases, an overview of the risks and limitations and ethical considerations related to the research topic
are discussed.

3.1

Philosophical Systems

The philosophical systems which encompass scientific research are ontology, epistemology,
methodology, and methods (Zukauskas, Vveinhardt, & Andriukaitienė, 2018). These four areas
provide the basis for how new information is obtained through a research process. Different
researchers have developed different systems which encompass the four areas and provide a variety of
approaches for performing scientific research. In
, an overview is given of a few of the different systems. The areas described in
were explored and a number of methodologies were considered, but all were ruled out except for the
traditional quantitative scientific approach of hypothesis development and experimentation.
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Table 12 - Research Methods Adapted from Williamson and Johanson (2017)

Research

Ontology

Epistemology

Research

paradigm

Modes of inquiry

methodology

(world view)
Interpretive

Society
constructed

is Knowledge

is Qualitative

and subjective and is

Interviews
Case studies

social reality is generated
Field Experiment

constantly

through

interpreted

“exploration
the

of

beliefs,

feelings

and

interpretations of
research
participants”
(Williamson

&

Johanson, 2013)
Positivist

A theory, if not Knowledge
proven false, is objective
corroborated but generated
not proven true

is Quantitative
and

Experimental
QuasiExperimental

through
observation.

Surveys

3.1.1 Scientific Research Paradigms
A paradigm refers to “a system of ideas, or world view, used by a community of researchers to
generate knowledge. It is a set of assumptions, research strategies and criteria for rigour that are
shared, even taken for granted by that community” (Fossey, Harvey, McDermott, and Davidson,
2002, p. 718).
There are currently three main philosophical paradigms currently accepted by the scientific
community as being the most appropriate in exploring the nature of reality, these systems are
positivism, constructivism, and interpretivism. Using any of these philosophical approaches enables
researchers to assess their research in either objective or subjective ways. Each of these scientific
paradigms were explored, but as constructivism and interpretivism were not appropriate choices for
the research performed in this thesis, they will not be discussed in the following sections.
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3.1.1.1

Positivism

The positivist paradigm is focused on the objective analysis of data. It does not take into consideration
the feelings of the researcher when examining the research to identify the truth (Guba, 1981).
Positivism is strongly associated with quantitative research methods, analysing numerical data
obtained through traditional scientific experiments (Zukauskas et al., 2018). The positivist research
process is illustrated in Figure 3.1, it starts with the development of hypotheses which can be
empirically tested and ends with the writing of results. The positivist researcher aims to gather
knowledge through empirical testing which support their hypotheses and discover a set of general
laws (Neuman, 2014).

Figure 3.1 - Positivist Research Process Adapted from (Williamson & Johanson, 2017)

3.1.1.2

Existing Taxonomies of Research Approaches

Galliers (1990) identified several different research approaches in the domain of information systems,
as shown in Table 13. The approaches identified are categorised across a spectrum ranging between
qualitative and quantitative. Each approach identified has been analysed to determine which type of
research would be most suitable for the research described in this thesis. The acceptable approaches
were narrowed down to the traditional empirical approaches (quantitative), as performing experiments
and analysing the results is a core aspect of the proposed research. The approaches chosen for
consideration are laboratory experiment, field experiment, theorem proof and simulation.
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Table 13 - Information Systems Research Approaches. Adapted from (Galliers, 1990)
Refer to
Galliers, R. D. (1990). Choosing appropriate information systems research approaches: a revised taxonomy. In In
Proceedings of the IFIP TC8 WG8. 2.

A laboratory experiment is the most suitable approach for research which requires high precision in
controlling the variables and environment to produce an experiment which can be easily reproduced
to replicate the findings. Due to the nature of the research questions involving malware and the need
for a high level of control, a laboratory experiment is a suitable research approach for the
development, testing and analysis required to obtain the answers from the proposed research
questions.
A field experiment is not as suitable as a laboratory experiment due to the malware dataset required
for experimentation. If a field experiment was chosen, a honeypot environment would be required for
the collection of new malware samples, in addition to the pre-assembled malware database. The
timeframe of collecting wild malware would be unknown, which would not be suitable, in addition to
the fact that it would not be known if the captured files are malicious in every instance and controlling
the families which the captured malware belong to would also be difficult. Due to the aforementioned
issues, a laboratory experiment is more suitable, with field experiments being left to future research.
Theorem proof as defined by Vogel and Wetherbe (1984) are “application areas from fields such as
Computer Science that otherwise would not be identified”. The aim of the research is not to develop
an ML algorithm but instead, perform an evaluation of the different family of algorithms and develop
an adversarial attack/defence. As the evaluation better fits the laboratory experiment approach,
theorem proof was not selected for use.
Simulation is a suitable approach for research problems where undertaking a field experiment is not
appropriate, but a simulation of a live environment can be developed from observing a live scenario
and generating the required variables, to replicate the environment as accurately as possible. A
simulation approach does not provide any added benefits over a laboratory experiment for the
proposed research. The generation of adversarial malware examples is needed to be done in a
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laboratory setting, as a high level of precision is needed to control how the adversarial attacks perform
and to provide control for replicating the experiments.
Edgar and Manz (2017) suggest a decision tree approach for determining the most appropriate
research method. The authors go into detail for each of the different research approaches which are
applicable for the many different sub-fields of cyber security. The main overarching research fields
identified are observational research, mathematical research, experimental research and applied
research. An illustration of the decision tree is shown in Figure 3.2.
Observational research methods cover open-ended and broad research topics. The methods are most
suitable for research topics which aim to understand a cyber system, without some preconceived
hypothesis of expected behaviour. Mathematical research methods cover the theoretical approaches
previously defined by Vogel and Wetherbe (1984) and the simulation approach presented by
(Galliers, 1990). Experimental research methods cover Hypothetico-deductive research and Quasiexperimental research. Hypothetico-deductive research is the term used by Edgar and Manz (2017) to
refer to the traditional scientific approaches such as the field and laboratory experiment approaches
proposed by Galliers. Quasi-experimental research approaches are similar to the traditional
experimental approach but differ in that control of the variables is difficult to obtain, which leads to
less reliable results. Applied research methods cover applied experiment approach and applied
observational study. Applied research methods are suitable for research which aims to evaluate the
efficacy of a system for solving a problem.
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Figure 3.2 -Edgar and Manz Research Decision Tree Pt.1 Adapted from (Edgar & Manz, 2017)
Refer to
Edgar, T. W., & Manz, D. O. (2017). Research Methods for Cyber Security: Syngress Publishing.
ESET. (2020). Trojan Horse. Ch.3, P.80. Retrieved from https://www.eset.com/uk/types-of-cyber-threats/trojanhorse/ .

3.1.1.3

Cyber Security Research

Edgar and Manz (2017) proposed a decision tree structure to identify which research method is
most suitable for a proposed research problem. There are four overarching categories of research
from which a cyber security researcher can select. The four categories of research are
Theoretical, Observational, Experimental, and Applied Research, as described by Edgar and Manz
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Theoretical research is the examination of the behaviour of a cyber system. It involves theorising or
defining the operation of a cyber system and its environment. The two methodologies of theoretical
cyber research are Formal Theory and Simulation. Formal theory is the development of mathematical
proofs and internal validity. Cryptographic research is a research field which is strongly associated
with formal theory research. Simulation theory is used in areas which contain complex problems that
are difficult to develop a formal model for. Simulation theory is used to test smaller sets of data to
identify if the area is worth pursuing at a more complex level.
Observational research is appropriate when the research question involves the understanding of a realworld cyber system. The methods used in observational research are Exploratory and Descriptive
Studies. Exploratory and descriptive studies both involve the collection, analysis, and interpretation
of data. The two methods differ in their scope, with exploratory studies being more general and
examining entire systems, and descriptive studies being more in depth on a particular aspect of a
system.
Edgar and Manz (2017) include ML in their taxonomy of research methods. This is perhaps unusual,
but in their view, ML as a research method is for automating phases of the research cycle. Machine
learning as a research method does not focus on the use of ML when undertaking research, such as
developing an algorithm or defence for an adversarial attack. The use of machine learning as a
research method was defended by Edgar and Manz (2017) as an approach due to the significant
progress in machine learning research and its application in the cyber security domain.
Experimental research is the traditional experimental process which is most commonly associated
with scientific research. The methods used in experimental research are Hypothetico-Deductive and
Quasi-Experiment. Hypothetico-deductive is the term the authors use for the traditional scientific
experiment approach, where a hypothesis is developed, and experiments are performed to gather
information to either support the hypothesis/null-hypothesis. The quasi-deductive approach is similar
to the hypothetical-deductive approach but differs in the control of the experiment. If a researcher is
unable to perform their experiments in a real-world scenario but can create a simulation with control
over the variables, then a quasi-experiment is the appropriate method of choice.
Applied research is the process of identifying how well the information gathered from other
experiments is used to solve a given problem. The methods used in applied research are applied
experimentation and applied observational study. Applied experimentation identifies how well a
proposed solution is by evaluating a set of controlled experiments. The results from the experiments
are used as a benchmark for comparison from the original operation of the cyber system and to any
new solutions which may be developed. Applied observation study is the evaluation of cyber systems
in different situations testing a variety of conditions for the operation of the system. It is a useful
method for identifying the bounds within which a cyber system is able to operate.

Page | 65

From following the decision tree developed by Edgar and Manz (2017), the hypothetico-deductive
research method was determined to be the most appropriate choice. This outcome is consistent with
the result using the taxonomy of Galliers (1990), that a traditional scientific experiment approach is
the most suitable for conducting the proposed research.

3.2

Research Design

The research design is divided into four sections, research questions, hypotheses, research phases, and
materials. Each section covers an area required for the development of the experiments when
undertaking a traditional scientific research approach, as it was identified in the previous section as
the most appropriate research approach for the topic of this thesis. The research questions and
hypotheses sections are straight forward, they contain the proposed research questions and their
related hypotheses which were tested to determine if it was possible to induce targeted false negatives
in ML malware detection applications and if it is possible to detect the false negatives. The research
phases section outlines the path the research process followed, starting from acquiring the relevant
databases and concluding with the documenting of analysed results. The materials section outlines
what was required to setup and undertake the experiment phases.

3.2.1 Hypotheses
From the proposed research questions stated in section 1.4, the following hypotheses were developed
and tested throughout the experimentation phase of the research.
H1. A manual selection of features can be used for a successful adversarial poisoning attack.
H2. A random selection of features can be used for a successful adversarial poisoning attack.
H3. No more than 5% of the benign training data feature space is required to be poisoned to reduce the
general efficacy of the model.
H4. No more than 10% of the benign training data files are required to be poisoned to reduce the
general efficacy of the model.
H5. No more than 10% of the benign training data files are required to be poisoned for a targeted
adversarial attack to succeed.
H6. The targeted adversarial attack can be prevented at test time.
The research questions and their corresponding hypotheses are illustrated in Table 14.
.
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Table 14 - Research Question Relationships

Research Question

Hypotheses

Output

RQ1

H1, H2, H3, H4, H5

Identify
adversarial

if

a
attack

targeted
can

be

successfully performed

RQ2

H6

Develop defensive strategy for
targeted adversarial poisoning
attack

3.2.2 Research Phases
3.2.2.1

Acquire Datasets

The initial phase of research was obtaining the required Microsoft Windows PE file datasets for
development of a machine learning based malware detector and to be used as the samples for creation
of adversarial malware. The datasets were acquired from the anti-malware vendor VirusShare and
from anti-malware researchers at Endgame. As VirusShare contained a significant amount of malware
samples and the EMBER dataset contained 1.1 million data samples, no further datasets were sought
for use.
3.2.2.2

Perform Feature Analysis

The second phase was to perform feature analysis on the datasets. The EMBER dataset provided a
script for performing feature engineering on new data in the same format as EMBER, this allowed for
the binary malware files obtained from VirusShare to be converted into the JSON format which
EMBER used.
3.2.2.3

Test Malware Detection Model

The third phase was to evaluate the performance of the ML malware detection model provided in the
EMBER dataset on the selection of malware files obtained from VirusShare. It was required to
identify which malware files from VirusShare could be possible candidates for the targeted
adversarial poisoning attacks. The EMBER model is a GBDT which uses the default LightGBM
parameters. EMBER uses the AUC ROC curve method for comparing the performance of binary
classifiers. The default EMBER model achieves an AUC ROC score of 0.9991123, which is used as a
baseline for comparison in the adversarial poisoning attack experiments. The same parameters are
used to train the GBDT models in the general efficacy and targeted adversarial poisoning attacks. The
code for training the GBDT EMBER model is in Appendix A – Machine Learning Model Code.
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3.2.2.4

Test General efficacy Attack

The fourth phase was to perform an adversarial poisoning attack with the aim of reducing the general
efficacy of the EMBER model. The aim was to identify if it is possible for the features from the
selected malware files, which will act as Zero-day malware files, are acceptable for use in the targeted
adversarial poisoning attack. Different sets of features and different injection percentages were tested
to provide the targeted adversarial attack with a set of features to choose from. The features were
selected from the imports section of the malware files and the poisoning attacks were performed in
steps of 5 percent. The imports section was selected as inserting import functions into the EMBER
JSON files was a straightforward task and the imports section has been identified by other researchers
as a positive contributing feature space for malware detection (section 2.8)
3.2.2.5

Test Targeted Adversarial Attack

The fifth phase was the development of a targeted adversarial poisoning attack which allows for the
targeted Zero-day malware file to bypass detection, while the general efficacy of the model is not
significantly affected. The attack was different from the current adversarial poisoning attacks
performed against malware detection models e.g., label flipping. Testing with different sets of features
and at different poisoning percentages was performed to identify the optimal parameters for
performing a successful targeted poisoning attack. The model performance was compared using the
AUC ROC and the threshold value to determine if the targeted adversarial poisoning attacks were
capable of allowing for a targeted Zero-day malware file to bypass detection, while the general
efficacy of the model was within an acceptable variation from the baseline metric of the default clean
EMBER model.
3.2.2.6

Test Different Machine Learning Model

The sixth phase was to replicate the previous attacks on an MLP model trained using a subset of the
data from the EMBER dataset. A smaller dataset was used in the MLP model as the workstation was
not powerful enough to train an MLP model using the entire EMBER dataset. The results from which
were used to identify which model was the focus of the defensive strategy. The AUC ROC and
threshold scores are used to compare the efficacy of the trained MLP models as they were used in the
previous GBDT training/testing phases. A direct comparison of performance between the GBDT and
MLP models are discussed in section 5. The MLP model was configured as a feed forward dense
model with the following parameters:
•

RELU Activation at hidden layers

•

Sigmoid Activation at output layer

•

Five hidden layers of [2048, 1024, 512, 256, 10] neurons

•

Input_dropout=0.05

•

Hidden_dropout=0.1
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•

Batch_size=128

•

Epochs=100

In a feed forward dense ML model, each neuron is connected to all the neurons in the following layer
and the only direction of the connections is forward. The code for the MLP model is in Appendix A –
Machine Learning Model Code.
3.2.2.7

Develop/Test Defensive strategy

The seventh phase was to develop a new defensive strategy to defend against the targeted adversarial
attack. The defensive strategy was developed to focus on identifying suspicious files at test time, in
contrast to the current defences which identify poisoning at the training stage. The defensive strategy
was developed under the assumption that it is not possible to obtain a trusted clean dataset to develop
a baseline for the identification and removal of adversarial features from the training dataset.
3.2.2.8

Document Results

The eighth phase was the final documentation after analysing the results from the adversarial attack
and defence phases. An analysis of the other defences and a comparison with the proposed defensive
strategy was also provided

Figure 3.3 - Research Design
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3.2.3 Materials
•

Workstation (Detailed in Section 4.1)

•

Malware Database(s) (Detailed in Section 4.2)

•

Machine Learning Toolkit(s)

A workstation was required to develop the laboratory environment which was comprised of virtual
machines in a segregated network, as the experimentation was on files of a malicious nature. Multiple
malware databases were obtained to generate the malware detection model and the adversarial
examples.

3.3

Risks and Limitations

The research was limited in selecting a traditional experiment approach over a field experiment in that
the Zero-day malware selected for testing was simulated by using a malware obtained after a cut-off
date from the training dataset, instead of being obtained through a honeypot or waiting for a new
Zero-day malware to be identified. The limitation is not severe, as all of the malware sourced is real,
and the experiments represent a real-world scenario of ML malware detection development. Other
risks which have been identified are shown in Table 15, with their corresponding mitigation strategy
and likelihood of occurrence.
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Table 15 - Risks and Mitigation Strategies

Risk

Mitigation

Likelihood/Severity

Accidently exposing malware to a

Experimentation will be

Low

network.

performed on a private
network. If for some
reason a private network is
not suitable for an
experiment, appropriate
measures will be taken to
ensure it is not exposed to
a live network.

No access to proprietary malware

Develop substitution

detection models

environments where

High

needed using published
detection models

ML algorithm does not perform as

Choose another algorithm

intended

for the potential candidate

Moderate

selection

Access to Zero-day malware

Generate new malware

Low

from old samples

Loss of material

Perform backups

Moderate

Malware database stolen

Encrypt data

Moderate

3.4

Ethics

The research topic was on the efficacy of different machine learning algorithms in the application of
malware detection and the resilience of the algorithms to adversarial machine learning attacks. The
research did not involve any living creature. The experimental data are not of a private or sensitive
nature. The results of the research have not in any way contributed to oppression or humiliation of any
group or individual.
The ethics declaration was approved on 22/11/2018 under declaration number 22307.
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3.5 Summary
In this chapter a description of the different scientific paradigms was presented along with the
approaches that researchers utilise in the development of their research design. From examining the
different scientific paradigms and the research approaches available, it was determined that the
traditional scientific approach of hypotheses development and testing was the most appropriate
approach for exploring the research questions proposed in this thesis. A selection of research phases
were developed to frame the experimentation in a logical sequence of events, starting with the
acquisition of malware datasets and finishing with the analysis of the experiments’ results. A
description of the materials required to undertake the experiments was given, along with an overview
of the risks and limitations identified which could impact the research. Finally, the ethical
considerations of the research topic were stated.
In the following chapter, the environment required to perform the experiments is discussed, along
with an analysis of the datasets acquired for experimentation. The chapter follows with the
preliminary and main experiment sections. In the preliminary experiment section, a selection of
candidate adversarial features are evaluated in a variety of adversarial poisoning attacks to determine
which set of adversarial features are to be used in the targeted poisoning attack in the main
experiments. In the main experiment section, a set of targeted adversarial poisoning attacks are
performed at varying degrees of injection against both GBDT and ANN trained ML models. Finally, a
defensive strategy for mitigating the targeted adversarial poisoning attack was proposed, which
identified false negatives at test time.
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4 Experimentation

–

Adversarial

Poisoning

Attacks

and

Defences
In this chapter, research phases one through to seven are documented. The first two phases cover the
acquisition of malware datasets from EMBER and VirusShare and the feature analyse process which
was performed. In the third phase the malware files obtained from VirusShare were scanned using the
GBDT model generated from the EMBER dataset to identify malware candidates for the experiment
phases. The fourth phase documents the testing of the preliminary experiments which identified that
it is possible to reduce the overall efficacy of trained EMBER ML models through indiscriminate
poisoning attacks. The fifth phase documents the process for the development and testing of a targeted
adversarial poisoning attack, which, following the process explored in phase five, poisons the
EMBER dataset but does not reduce the overall efficacy while inducing a targeted false negative. The
sixth phase introduces the use of another ML algorithm (ANN) to test the targeted adversarial
poisoning attack and compares the results from the default EMBER GBDT model and the new ANN
model. The seventh phase documents the defensive strategy which was developed to identify false
negatives at test time.

4.1 Environment
All experiments were performed on a desktop PC with the following specifications:
•

OS - Ubuntu 18.04

•

CPU - AMD Ryzen 7 3700X 8-Core Processor

•

RAM - 32GB DDR4 C16 3200Mhz

•

GPU – AMD RX5700

•

SSD – 512GB Samsung EVO 860

At the time of experimentation, the RX5700 did not have ROCm support for Keras. ROCm is an
open-source development platform for AMD GPUs to accelerate compute-intensive tasks such as ML.
The implications for this research were, that without this support, ML training tasks would take some
time.

4.2

Datasets

To obtain the malicious files, a request was sent to both VirusShare and VirusTotal to gain researcher
access to the data repositories. Access to VirusShare was granted but access to VirusTotal was not
obtained. There may have been a problem with the VirusTotal application process, as no confirmation
email was received. As access to VirusShare was granted, gaining further access to VirusTotal was
postponed until a later date if required. The VirusShare files which were chosen as the Zero-day
malware in this research were analysed by VirusTotal through their open API, this was done to
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identify if any of the chosen VirusShare files had been submitted and identified as malicious before
the cut-off date of the EMBER dataset (2017). None of the VirusShare files had been identified as
malicious during or before 2017, and as such, were acceptable for use as Zero-day malware.

4.2.1 EMBER
The dataset chosen for testing adversarial poisoning attacks and defences was the Endgame Malware
BEnchmark for Research (EMBER) dataset. The EMBER dataset is a collection of extracted features
from 1.1 Million portable executable (PE) files (900,000 train and 200,000 test). The 900,000 training
files are split equally into three categories, malicious, benign, and unknown. The unknown category is
not used when training the ML model, so the actual size of the EMBER dataset when training is
800,000. EMBER was developed to serve as a benchmark for machine learning malware research. At
the time of writing, there are three available EMBER datasets, EMBER2017, EMBER2017_v2, and
EMBER2018. Both EMBER2017 and EMBER2017_v2 contain PE files scanned no later than 2017,
and EMBER2018 contains PE files scanned no later than 2018. The features from the PE files were
extracted using LIEF (Library to Instrument Executable Formats) and saved into JSON format. LIEF
is a cross-platform library designed to parse, modify, and abstract various binary executable formats,
including Windows PE files.
4.2.1.1

EMBER Model Performance

The third phase was to train the ML models which was done in two stages, training the clean models
and training the poisoned models. The clean models are required to be used as a baseline for
evaluating the efficacy of the poisoning attacks and defences. A clean trained GBDT model is
provided along with the EMBER datasets and a summary of each model’s performance is shown in
Table 16 and Table 17 for 1% and 0.1% FPR. The performance of each model is calculated by the set
FPRs (1% and 0.1%), the threshold value separates the benign and malicious files for the different
FPRs. As an example, the EMBER2017 model at 1% FPR classes a file as malicious if it’s predicted
score is above 0.529.
Table 16 - EMBER Performance 1% FPR

Model

ROC AUC

Threshold

FNR

Detection Rate

EMBER2017

99.911%

0.529

1.838%

98.162%

EMBER2017_v2 99.908%

0.541

1.781%

98.219%

EMBER2018

0.850

17.071% 82.929%

98.495%
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Table 17 - EMBER Performance 0.1% FPR

Model

ROC AUC

Threshold

FNR

Detection Rate

EMBER2017

99.911%

0.871

7.009%

92.991%

EMBER2017_v2 99.908%

0.884

7.671%

92.329%

EMBER2018

0.951

35.794% 64.206%

98.495%

4.2.2 VirusShare
VirusShare, the online virus repository, was used to obtain the malicious files required for testing the
proposed adversarial poisoning attack. From VirusShare, the pack 00352 was selected for use because
it was released at a later date than the EMBER2017 dataset, which was, at the time of exploratory
examination, the only EMBER dataset available. After obtaining the malicious file package from
VirusShare, each file was analysed by VirusTotal to identify if any of the files had in fact been
submitted during 2017 or before. The VirusShare_00352 package contained 65,536 malicious files,
which were scanned using the clean EMBER2017 model. Out of the 65,536 files, 2555 were PE32
files, which was determined by examining the contents of each file for the digital signature “4d 5a”.
From the 2555 PE32 files, 2040 were correctly classified as malicious using the EMBER2017 model.
The VirusShare package contains malicious files in general, it was not a package that only contained
files of a certain nature e.g., Trojan or Ransomware.
The EMBER2017_v2 and EMBER2018 models were also used to scan the 2555 PE32 files. As the
two models were generated using training data from 2018, unlike EMBER2017 which consisted of
only files up to 2017, it was expected that the models would have a better classification rate as they
were trained on newer data. An increase in the successful classification of malicious files would
indicate that continuous retraining using newer files is required for the successful classification of
Zero-day malware. This continuous retraining of models is what provides an attack vector for a
malicious actor to perform an adversarial poisoning attack.
Out of the 2555 PE32 files, EMBER2017_v2 classified 2014 as malicious while EMBER2018
classified 1753. The Endgame researchers did state that EMBER2018 was constructed in such a way
that it would be harder for the machine learning algorithms to classify accurately. The
EMBER2017_v2 model, which was trained using files released up to 2018, incorrectly classified 26
more files (around 1%) than the EMBER2017 model, which was trained on files only from 2017 and
earlier.

4.3 Feature Analysis
From the eight feature classes, the ImportsInfo class was chosen as the target for the adversarial
poisoning attack. The import section of PE files contains a significant number of variables to choose
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from for poisoning. Injecting a selection of import features into the training data can be easily
performed by appending the feature to the correct section of the JSON file. The ImportsInfo class
comprise the majority of the 2351 feature vectors (54%). Saxe and Berlin (2015) found that the import
section by itself was the worst performing area for detecting malicious files but despite this, the
ImportsInfo class will be evaluated for its adversarial poisoning performance.
The feature analysis of the EMBER2017 and VirusShare_00352 datasets began with counting the
import libraries and their import functions. From the EMBER2017 dataset, the 900,000 samples from
the training set were analysed to identify the most common unique libraries and the most common
import functions from each of the labelled classes (benign, malicious and unknown). From the
analysis, five unique libraries from the top ten were selected for the poisoning attacks. Five libraries
were chosen as selecting more libraries would reduce the amount of target Zero-day files which
contained all libraries, and the number of benign files which could be poisoned would also be
reduced. From each of the unique libraries, different selections of import functions were chosen for
the poisoning attacks. In the first test, five and ten import features which were found to be more
common among the malicious data were chosen for injection. In the second test, five and ten features
were randomly selected from the top one hundred import features from the malicious data. The
chosen unique libraries and their total count are shown in Table 18.
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Table 18 - Import Library and Function Amount

Library

Class

Import

Library Import Function Count

Count
Kernel32.dll

Shell32.dll

User32.dll

Advapi32.dll

Msvcrt.dll

All Libraries

Benign

153,370

9,756,993

Malicious

242,290

9,118,519

Unknown

219,259

12,524,850

Benign

41,410

241,822

Malicious

92,838

271,802

Unknown

93,187

339,111

Benign

84,533

4,598,947

Malicious

154,733

3,476,420

Unknown

150,828

6,521,411

Benign

84,554

1,118,428

Malicious

100,853

859,340

Unknown

124,522

1,284,236

Benign

33,356

1,068,236

Malicious

61,809

1,629,194

Unknown

43,510

1,218,773

Benign

1,394,044

39,953,980

Malicious

1,226,244

21,911,172

Unknown

1,573,555

36,579,239

Total

4,193,843

98,444,391
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4.4

Preliminary Experiments

As stated in Section 3.2.2, before performing the targeted adversarial poisoning attacks the fourth
project phase was to conduct preliminary experiments to examine the efficacy of injecting import
features into the benign feature space as an indiscriminate poisoning attack. The aim of the
preliminary experiments was to identify the parameters for the targeted poisoning attacks i.e., should
the import features chosen for poisoning be randomly or manually selected, what percentage of
injection should be performed, should the injection percentage be based on the total feature space or a
percentage of the training data amount?
The preliminary experiments were split into two categories, manual import function selection and
random import function selection. Each category contained two sets of preliminary experiments,
which tested adversarial poisoning attacks at different percentages of injection. Two methods were
used to calculate the poisoning percentages. The first method calculated the poisoning percentage
from the total number of import functions from all import libraries in the benign training files, which
is referred to as the total benign feature space. The first set of preliminary experiments were designed
to test H3, in that no more than 5% of the total benign feature space was to be poisoned. After
examining the logs and identifying that for each poisoning experiment, 100% of the benign training
files which contained the target import library were injected with the adversarial features, the method
for calculating the poisoning percentage for the second set of preliminary experiments was altered.
In the second set of preliminary experiments, the poisoning percentage was calculated from the
number of benign files which contained the target import library. This method is referred to as the
target benign files. The second set of preliminary experiments tested poisoning in steps of 5% of the
target benign files, starting at 5% and ending at 100%, with the 100% attack being the same as the
attack in the first set of preliminary experiments. The second set of preliminary experiments were
developed to identify at what percentage of poisoning of the target benign files does the quality of the
model start to degrade.
The import functions selected came from a pool of the total import functions extracted from the
malicious files in VirusShare_00352 which were identified as malicious by the EMBER2017 model.
The total amount of import functions is shown in Table 19 and the top 20 import libraries are shown
in Table 20. All the ML models generated in the preliminary attacks used the code to generate a
GBDT model which was supplied with the EMBER dataset. The EMBER GBDT code was used as it
provided a clear comparison to the clean EMBER model.
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Table 19 - VirusShare_00352 Import Library and Function Count

Import Library

Import Count

Function Count

kernel32.dll

2125

182133

shell32.dll

1115

4398

user32.dll

1560

111484

advapi32.dll

1412

13767

msvcrt.dll

128

2007

Table 20 - Top 20 Import Libraries

Position

Import
Library

Total Count

Position

Import
Library

Total
Count

1

kernel32.dll

2125

11

shlwapi.dll

514

2

user32.dll

1560

12

winspool.drv 357

3

advapi32.dll

1412

13

ws2_32.dll

283

4

gdi32.dll

1186

14

wininet.dll

267

5

shell32.dll

1115

15

shfolder.dll

221

6

oleaut32.dll

1085

16

mscoree.dll

195

7

ole32.dll

870

17

winmm.dll

192

8

comctl32.dll

831

18

psapi.dll

187

9

comdlg32.dll 703

19

crypt32.dll

143

10

version.dll

20

msvcrt.dll

128

578

Even though Table 20 shows that the import library “gdi32.dll” was in the top five most common
import libraries, some curation was done in the library section and it was not selected for use as it is a
graphical interface library, as the import functions from that library are unlikely to contain any special
meaning towards malicious files. The import library “msvcrt.dll” was chosen for use in the
preliminary experiments even though it was number twenty in the twenty most common import
libraries. “msvcrt.dll” was chosen to be used as a comparison against the other import libraries which
were in the top five of the most commonly used import library list.
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4.4.1 Preliminary Experiments Stage One
The first stage of the preliminary experiments tested the five chosen import libraries “kernel32.dll”,
“shell32.dll”, “user32.dll”, “advapi32.dll”, and “msvcrt.dll” at 5% injection of the total benign feature
space. For each of the five import libraries, four experiments were performed which differed in how
the import functions were select (manual or random) and the amount of import functions selected
(five and 10). To reduce the amount of repeated information, the final results are summarised in two
tables and the percentage of injection is only given for the “kernel32.dll” experiments.
4.4.1.1

Experiment 1.1 – Total Benign Feature Space Attack – Manual Selection

The first set of preliminary experiments in the first stage were developed to test the following two
hypotheses:
H1. A manual selection of features can be used for a successful adversarial poisoning attack.
H3. No more than 5% of the benign training data feature space is required to be poisoned to
reduce the general efficacy of the model.
The 5% of the benign training data feature space was calculated from the total amount of import
functions in the benign training data (39,953,980), which was shown in Table 18.
For each import library selected, a selection of five and ten import libraries were chosen as the
adversarial features which would be injected into the benign training data files. The import libraries
were selected from the VirusShare dataset which supplied the Zero-day malware files and are detailed
in Appendix A – . When examining the logs from the adversarial poisoning attack, it was found that
the 5% injection threshold was never met, and that 100% of the benign training files which contained
the target import library were injected with the adversarial features.
In experiment 1.1a, the five “kernel32.dll” import functions chosen for injection into each benign
instance containing “kernel32.dll” were “WaitForSingleObject”, “SetFilePointer”, “WriteFile”,
“ReadFile” and “GetModuleHandleA”. The total injection percentages among each of the training
files is shown in Table 21, the total number of adversarial injections is 426,601, which is 4.372% of
the target benign “kernel32.dll” feature space (9,756,993) and 1.068% of all the total benign feature
space (39,953,980).
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Table 21 - Kernel32.dll Five Functions Preliminary Poisoning Attack (Manual Selection)

Training file

Unique

Library

Function

Injection

Library

Function

Injection

Percentage

Count

Count

Count

train_features_0.JSONl

19,100

1,248,297

46,761

3.745%

train_features_1.JSONl

26,354

1,740,959

75,924

4.361%

train_features_2.JSONl

29,605

1,852,481

87,451

4.720%

train_features_3.JSONl

26,892

1,562,435

74,754

4.784%

train_features_4.JSONl

28,480

2,104,726

71,005

3.373%

train_features_5.JSONl

22,939

1,248,095

70,706

5.665%

Total

153,370

9,756,993

426,601

4.372%

Experiment 1.1b was performed using “kernel32.dll” as the injection target for the poisoning attack
and a manual selection of ten import functions. The ten “kernel32.dll” import functions chosen were
“WaitForSingleObject”,

“SetFilePointer”,

“WriteFile”,

“ReadFile”,

“GetModuleHandleA”,

“ExitProcess”, “GetProcAddress”, “GetLastError”, “LoadLibraryA” and “MultiByteToWideChar”.
The total injection rate among each of the training files is shown in Table 22, with 723,518 functions
being injected in total. The injection percentage across the benign import feature space (39,953,980
functions) and the benign and malicious import feature space (61,865,152 functions) was 1.810% and
1.170%.
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Table 22 - Experiment 1.1b Injection Percentages

Training file

Unique

Library

Function

Injection

Library Count

Function

Injection Count

Percentage

Count
train_features_0.JSONl 19,100

1,248,297

78,752

6.308%

train_features_1.JSONl 26,354

1,740,959

124,009

7.123%

train_features_2.JSONl 29,605

1,852,481

146,662

7.917%

train_features_3.JSONl 26,892

1,562,435

129,749

8.304%

train_features_4.JSONl 28,480

2,104,726

122,903

5.839%

train_features_5.JSONl 22,939

1,248,095

121,443

9.730%

Total

9,756,993

723,518

7.415%

From

153,370

the

results

shown

in
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Table 23, the only import library which did not significantly increase the FNR of the ML model was
the “msvcrt.dll” import library. The “msvcrt.dll” library was selected for a comparison as it contained
the least number of instances in the VirusShare dataset, but as shown in Table 18, the msvcrt.dll
library was in a similar amount of benign and malicious files as “shell32.dll” while containing almost
five times the amount of import functions in both the benign and malicious training data. It is not clear
why the “msvcrt.dll” poisoning attacks did not induce as many false negatives as the other attacks, but
what is shown is that the results is support the tested hypotheses H1, and H3.
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Table 23 - Manual Import Selection - 5% Total Benign Feature Space

Attack Name

4.4.1.2

FPR

FNR

Threshold

ROC %

Detection

1%

1%

1%

manual_kernel32_5

0.986

13.379

0.980

99.291

86.621

manual_kernel32_10

0.992

17.118

0.989

99.188

82.882

manual_user32_5

0.571

58.177

0.999

97.714

41.823

manual_user32_10

0.000

100.000

1.000

97.491

0.000

manual_shell32_5

0.965

34.630

0.992

98.959

65.370

manual_shell32_10

0.810

53.969

0.997

98.307

46.031

manual_advapi32_5

0.419

56.358

0.998

98.145

43.642

manual_advapi32_10

0.993

51.452

0.998

97.575

48.548

manual_msvcrt_5

0.997

4.114

0.802

99.757

95.886

manual_msvcrt_10

0.996

4.623

0.806

99.746

95.377

Rate 1%

Experiment 1.2 - Total Benign Feature Space Attack – Random Selection

The second set of preliminary experiments in the first stage were developed to test the following two
hypotheses:
H2. A random selection of features can be used for a successful adversarial poisoning attack.
H3. No more than 5% of the benign training data feature space is required to be poisoned to
reduce the general efficacy of the model.
Experiment 1.2a was performed using “kernel32.dll” as the injection target for the poisoning attack.
The five kernel32.dll import functions randomly chosen for injection were “VirtualFree”,
“SetFilePointer”, “InterlockedDecrement”, “lstrlenA” and “IsDebuggerPresent”. The total injection
rate among each of the training files is shown in Table 24 with 517,791 functions being injected in
total. The injection percentage across the benign import feature space (39,953,980 functions) and the
benign and malicious import feature space (61,865,152 functions) was 1.296% and 0.837%. In Table
24, the percentage of injected adversarial features is shown compared to the import library count and
import library function count for “kernel32.dll” in the benign training files.
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Table 24 - Experiment 2.1a Injection Percentages

Training file

Unique

Library

Function

Injection

Library Count

Function

Injection Count

Percentage

Count
train_features_0.JSONl 19,100

1,248,297

61,311

4.911%

train_features_1.JSONl 26,354

1,740,959

92,312

5.302%

train_features_2.JSONl 29,605

1,852,481

104,149

5.622%

train_features_3.JSONl 26,892

1,562,435

89,945

5.756%

train_features_4.JSONl 28,480

2,104,726

85,185

4.047%

train_features_5.JSONl 22,939

1,248,095

84,889

6.801%

Total

9,756,993

517,791

5.306%

153,370

Experiment 2.1b was performed using “kernel32.dll” as the injection target for the poisoning attack.
The ten “kernel32.dll” import functions randomly chosen for injection into each benign instance
containing “kernel32.dll” were “VirtualFree”, “SetFilePointer”, “InterlockedDecrement”, “lstrlenA”,
“IsDebuggerPresent”,

“LocalFree”,

“TerminateProcess”,

“WideCharToMultiByte”,

“GetCommandLineA” and “GetFileAttributesA”. The total injection rate among each of the training
files is shown in Table 25, with 952,233 functions being injected in total. The injection percentage
across the benign import feature space (39,953,980 functions) and the benign and malicious import
feature space (61,865,152 functions) was 2.383% and 1.539%.
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Table 25 - Experiment 2.1b Injection Percentages

Training file

Unique

Library

Function

Injection

Library Count

Function

Injection Count

Percentage

Count
train_features_0.JSONl 19,100

1,248,297

112,493

9.011%

train_features_1.JSONl 26,354

1,740,959

164,798

9.465%

train_features_2.JSONl 29,605

1,852,481

187,832

10.139%

train_features_3.JSONl 26,892

1,562,435

169,003

4.416%

train_features_4.JSONl 28,480

2,104,726

162,061

7.699%

train_features_5.JSONl 22,939

1,248,095

156,046

12.502%

Total

9,756,993

952,233

9.759%

153,370

From the results shown in Table 26, the only import library which did not significantly increase the
FNR of the ML model was the “msvcrt.dll” import library, this is the same result from the set of tests
in experiment 1.1. The “msvcrt.dll” library was selected for a comparison as it contained the least
number of instances in the VirusShare dataset, but as shown in Table 18, the msvcrt.dll library was in
a similar amount of benign and malicious files as “shell32.dll” was while containing almost five times
the amount of import functions in both the benign and malicious training data. It is not clear why the
“msvcrt.dll” poisoning attacks did not induce as many false negatives as the other attacks, but what is
shown that the results support the tested hypotheses H1, and H3.
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Table 26 - Random Import Selection - 5% Total Benign Feature Space

Attack Name
random_kernel32_5
random_kernel32_10
random_user32_5
random_user32_10
random_shell32_5
random_shell32_10
random_advapi32_5
random_advapi32_10
random_msvcrt_5
random_msvcrt_10

FPR
1%
0.000
0.000
0.569
0.264
0.944
0.944
0.539
0.353
0.998
0.998

FNR Threshold
1%
1%
100.000
1.000
100.000
1.000
48.914
0.998
60.938
0.999
21.954
0.991
21.954
0.991
63.209
0.999
65.769
0.999
2.876
0.689
4.346
0.786

ROC % Detection
Rate 1%
98.143
0.000
97.867
0.000
98.419
51.086
98.034
39.062
99.153
78.046
99.153
78.046
96.910
36.791
97.225
34.231
99.843
97.124
99.763
95.654

4.4.2 Preliminary Experiments Stage Two
In the second stage of the preliminary experiments, the percentage of injection was changed from
using the total benign feature space to the amount of the target benign files. As with the first stage of
preliminary experiments, the same set of import functions from each test (manual and random) were
used. The percentage of injection for each experiment started at 5% of the target benign files and
continued in steps of 5% until 100%, with the final experiment being the same as the 5% benign
feature space experiments.
4.4.2.1

Experiment 2.1a – Five Import Functions Manual

The second set of preliminary experiments were developed to test the following two hypotheses:
H1. A manual selection of features can be used for a successful adversarial poisoning attack.
H4. No more than 10% of the benign training data files are required to be poisoned to reduce
the general efficacy of the model.
As the results from the previous preliminary experiments showed that trying to inject adversarial
features into no more than 5% of the total benign feature space was the same as injecting adversarial
features into 100% of the benign training data, the following set of experiments were performed,
starting with 5% of the target benign files being injected with adversarial features and continuing in
steps of 5% until 100%. The preliminary experiments were performed this way to see if there is an
identifiable injection percentage which significantly impacts the target model.
The results from every test are detailed in Appendix A – , as there are too many tables to present in
this section, the results from the “kernel32.dll” poisoning attack will be used as an example. The
“kernel32.dll” import library was the most common library among all classes within the EMBER
dataset. The five “kernel32.dll” import functions chosen for injection into each benign instance
containing “kernel32.dll” were “WaitForSingleObject”, “SetFilePointer”, “WriteFile”, “ReadFile”
and “GetModuleHandleA”.
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Table 27 - Experiment 2.1a Results

Threshold
FPR_1% FNR 1%

Attack Name
manual_kernel32_5_5
manual_kernel32_5_10
manual_kernel32_5_15
manual_kernel32_5_20
manual_kernel32_5_25
manual_kernel32_5_30
manual_kernel32_5_35
manual_kernel32_5_40
manual_kernel32_5_45
manual_kernel32_5_50
manual_kernel32_5_55
manual_kernel32_5_60
manual_kernel32_5_65
manual_kernel32_5_70
manual_kernel32_5_75
manual_kernel32_5_80
manual_kernel32_5_85
manual_kernel32_5_90
manual_kernel32_5_95
manual_kernel32_5_100

0.997
0.992
0.999
0.999
1.000
0.996
1.000
0.995
0.997
0.999
0.995
1.000
0.997
0.995
1.000
1.000
0.999
0.999
0.994
0.986

Detection

1%

1.793
1.795
1.758
1.781
1.784
1.758
1.793
1.831
1.884
1.851
2.012
1.943
2.061
2.005
2.139
2.221
2.461
2.826
4.389
13.379

ROC %
0.531
0.53 0
0.531
0.533
0.540
0.545
0.552
0.551
0.555
0.571
0.579
0.597
0.608
0.625
0.643
0.675
0.721
0.761
0.854
0.980

99.905
99.903
99.908
99.908
99.905
99.906
99.908
99.905
99.902
99.900
99.890
99.891
99.892
99.886
99.883
99.880
99.866
99.847
99.768
99.291

Rate

1%
98.207
98.205
98.242
98.219
98.216
98.242
98.207
98.169
98.116
98.149
97.988
98.057
97.939
97.995
97.861
97.779
97.539
97.174
95.611
86.621

The results from the experiments in 2.1a, shown in Table 27, indicate that the efficacy of the model
did degrade to a point which would render the model unusable, but only for the top injection rate of
100%. If using the threshold of 1% FPR, at 85% injection of the benign training files, the threshold
increases from the clean model at 0.529 to 0.721. The 85% injection model still has a detection rate
greater than 97.539%, but from a cursory glance it is obvious that something has gone awry during the
training process. The results from the experiments support both H1 and H3, as a manual selection of
adversarial features was able to degrade the performance of the model with less than 5% of the total
benign training data feature space being poisoned. The results from the experiments did not support
H4, as the amount of benign training files which were poisoned for the successful attack exceeded
10% of the total benign training files.
4.4.2.2

Experiment 2.1b – Ten Import Functions Manual – kernel32.dll

Experiment 2.1b follows same process described for the previous “kernel32.dll” poisoning attack,
with an addition of five import functions chosen for poisoning. The ten “kernel32.dll” import
functions chosen for injection were “WaitForSingleObject”, “SetFilePointer”, “WriteFile”,
“ReadFile”,

“GetModuleHandleA”,

“ExitProcess”,

“GetProcAddress”,

“GetLastError”,
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“LoadLibraryA” and “MultiByteToWideChar”. The results from the experiments are shown in Table
28.
Table 28 - Experiment 2.1b Results

FPR
Attack Name
manual_kernel32_10_5
manual_kernel32_10_10
manual_kernel32_10_15
manual_kernel32_10_20
manual_kernel32_10_25
manual_kernel32_10_30
manual_kernel32_10_35
manual_kernel32_10_40
manual_kernel32_10_45
manual_kernel32_10_50
manual_kernel32_10_55
manual_kernel32_10_60
manual_kernel32_10_65
manual_kernel32_10_70
manual_kernel32_10_75
manual_kernel32_10_80
manual_kernel32_10_85
manual_kernel32_10_90
manual_kernel32_10_95
manual_kernel32_10_100

1%
0.997
0.999
0.997
0.997
0.971
0.998
0.998
0.992
0.999
1.000
1.000
0.999
1.000
1.000
0.998
0.982
0.997
0.997
1.000
0.992

Threshold
FNR 1%

1%

1.809
1.679
1.704
1.772
1.716
1.675
1.787
1.819
1.814
1.931
2.098
2.001
2.095
2.099
2.088
2.532
2.689
3.370
4.786
17.118

Detection Rate
ROC %

0.529
0.522
0.531
0.540
0.541
0.544
0.543
0.557
0.566
0.579
0.593
0.602
0.622
0.641
0.657
0.702
0.737
0.804
0.881
0.989

99.908
99.909
99.906
99.900
99.911
99.909
99.904
99.904
99.897
99.896
99.894
99.897
99.892
99.890
99.878
99.865
99.845
99.815
99.754
99.188

1%
98.191
98.321
98.296
98.228
98.284
98.325
98.213
98.181
98.186
98.069
97.902
97.999
97.905
97.901
97.912
97.468
97.311
96.630
95.214
82.882

The results from the experiments in 2.1b show that the availability of the model did degrade to a point
which would render the model unusable, but only for the top injection rate of 100%. If using the
threshold of 1% FPR, at 85% injection of the benign training files, the threshold increases from the
clean model at 0.529 to 0.737. The 85% injection model had an acceptable detection rate of just under
97.311%, but from a cursory glance it is obvious that something has gone awry during the training
process. The results from the experiments support both H1 and H3, as a manual selection of
adversarial features was able to degrade the performance of the model with less than 5% of the total
benign training data feature space being poisoned. The results from the experiments did not support
H4, as the amount of benign training files which were poisoned for the successful attack exceeded
10% of the total benign training files, as shown in Table 29.
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Table 29 - Benign Training Files Injection Percentage - Manual Selection Attack

Import Library

Attack Success

Total
Training

Benign Percent
files Benign

Injected

files

kernel32.dll

Yes

153,370

51.123%

shell32.dll

Yes

41,410

13.803%

user32.dll

Yes

84,533

28.178%

advapi32.dll

Yes

84,554

28.185%

msvcrt.dll

No

33,356

11.119%

4.4.2.3

of

Total

Training

Experiment 2.2a – Five Import Functions Random – kernel32.dll

The second set of preliminary experiments were developed to test the following two hypotheses:
H2. A random selection of features can be used for a successful adversarial poisoning attack.
H4. No more than 10% of the benign training data files are required to be poisoned to reduce
the general efficacy of the model.
The second set of experiments using the step of 5% injection of the benign training file amount used
the same set of adversarial import functions as the basis of the injection attack. The aim of the
experiments was to see what level of degradation to the general efficacy of the model was achieved at
the different percentages of adversarial injection. The results from each attack are shown in Table 30.
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Table 30 - Experiment 2.1a Results

Attack Name
random_kernel32_5_5
random_kernel32_5_10
random_kernel32_5_15
random_kernel32_5_20
random_kernel32_5_25
random_kernel32_5_30
random_kernel32_5_35
random_kernel32_5_40
random_kernel32_5_45
random_kernel32_5_50
random_kernel32_5_55
random_kernel32_5_60
random_kernel32_5_65
random_kernel32_5_70
random_kernel32_5_75
random_kernel32_5_80
random_kernel32_5_85
random_kernel32_5_90
random_kernel32_5_95
random_kernel32_5_100

FPR 1%
1.000
0.995
0.994
0.998
0.999
0.999
0.997
0.996
0.999
0.999
0.999
1.000
0.996
1.000
0.996
0.996
0.997
0.992
0.989
0.000

FNR

Threshold

1%

1%

1.820
1.737
1.815
1.802
1.869
1.858
1.952
2.004
1.969
1.992
2.041
2.156
2.248
2.425
2.386
2.747
2.877
3.219
5.344
100.000

Detection
ROC %

0.528
0.528
0.538
0.547
0.556
0.564
0.586
0.597
0.602
0.630
0.648
0.660
0.689
0.725
0.751
0.795
0.836
0.877
0.941
1.000

99.907
99.904
99.905
99.904
99.905
99.901
99.899
99.901
99.894
99.895
99.892
99.892
99.880
99.881
99.880
99.864
99.859
99.838
99.753
98.143

Rate

1%
98.180
98.263
98.185
98.198
98.131
98.142
98.048
97.996
98.031
98.008
97.959
97.844
97.752
97.575
97.614
97.253
97.123
96.781
94.656
0.000

The results from the second set of experiments in 2.2a show that the availability of the model did
degrade to a point which would render the model unusable, but only for the top injection rate of
100%. If using the threshold of 1% FPR, at 85% injection of the benign training files, the threshold
increases from the clean model at 0.529 to 0.836. The 85% injection model still has a detection rate
greater than 97.123%, but from a cursory glance it is obvious that something has gone awry during the
training process.
The results from experiment support H3 as the total amount of the benign training files feature space
injected with the adversarial features did not surpass 5%. The results did not support H4, as the
general efficacy of the model with ten percent of the benign training data being injected did not
reduce the overall availability. The results do not mean that it is impossible to reduce the overall
availability with ten percent of the benign training files being injected, but that the features chosen did
not contain enough salient information or were too small an amount to reduce the overall availability
of the model.
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4.4.2.4

Experiment 2.2b – Ten Import Functions Random – kernel32.dll

Experiment 2.1b follows same process described for the previous “kernel32.dll” poisoning attack,
with an addition of five import functions chosen for poisoning. The ten “kernel32.dll” import
functions chosen for injection were “kernel32.dll” were “VirtualFree”, “SetFilePointer”,
“InterlockedDecrement”,

“lstrlenA”,

“IsDebuggerPresent”,

“LocalFree”,

“TerminateProcess”,

“WideCharToMultiByte”, “GetCommandLineA” and “GetFileAttributesA”. The results from the
experiments are shown in Table 31.
Table 31 - Experiment 2.1b Results

FPR
Attack Name
random_kernel32_10_5
random_kernel32_10_10
random_kernel32_10_15
random_kernel32_10_20
random_kernel32_10_25
random_kernel32_10_30
random_kernel32_10_35
random_kernel32_10_40
random_kernel32_10_45
random_kernel32_10_50
random_kernel32_10_55
random_kernel32_10_60
random_kernel32_10_65
random_kernel32_10_70
random_kernel32_10_75
random_kernel32_10_80
random_kernel32_10_85
random_kernel32_10_90
random_kernel32_10_95
random_kernel32_10_100

1%
0.997
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.997
0.995
1.000
0.998
0.999
0.999
0.996
0.994
0.995
1.000
0.996
0.997
0.996
0.989
0.990
0.000

Threshold
FNR 1%
1.764
1.737
1.804
1.827
1.753
1.847
1.929
2.010
1.951
2.077
2.008
1.971
2.246
2.372
2.658
2.858
3.149
3.513
4.681
100.000

1%

ROC
0.540
0.534
0.548
0.551
0.554
0.564
0.581
0.599
0.609
0.635
0.644
0.657
0.688
0.733
0.773
0.806
0.843
0.892
0.945
1.000

Detection Rate 1%
99.908
99.906
99.907
99.904
99.907
99.901
99.893
99.895
99.901
99.883
99.891
99.895
99.886
99.874
99.871
99.863
99.850
99.821
99.766
97.867

98.236
98.263
98.196
98.173
98.247
98.153
98.071
97.990
98.049
97.923
97.992
98.029
97.754
97.628
97.342
97.142
96.851
96.487
95.319
0.000

The results from the first experiment in 1.1a (5% benign feature space) show that the availability of
the model degraded in quality to a point which would render the model unusable. The results support
hypothesis (H1, H2) in that using a (manual, random) selection of features is adequate for performing a
successful indiscriminate poisoning attack targeting the availability of a ML model.
The results from the second set of experiments in 1.1a show that the availability of the model did
degrade to a point which would render the model unusable, but only for the top injection rate of
100%. If using the threshold of 1% FPR, at 85% injection of the benign training files, the threshold
increases from the clean model at 0.529 to 0.843. The 85% injection model still has a detection rate
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greater than 96.851%, but from a cursory glance it is obvious that something has gone awry during the
training process.
The results from experiment support H3 as the total amount of the benign training files feature space
injected with the adversarial features did not surpass 5%. The results did not support H4, as the
general efficacy of the model did not degrade with ten percent of the benign training data being
injected with adversarial features.
Table 32 - Benign Training Files Injection Percentage - Random Selection Attack

Import Library

Attack Success

Total
Training

Benign Percent
files Benign

Injected

files

kernel32.dll

Yes

153,370

51.123%

shell32.dll

Yes

41,410

13.803%

user32.dll

Yes

84,533

28.178%

advapi32.dll

Yes

84,554

28.185%

msvcrt.dll

No

33,356

11.119%

of

Total

Training

The percentages of benign training files being injected with adversarial features for the final attack
(100% of the target benign files being injected) for each target import library are shown in Table 32.
In every example the amount of benign training files injected for a successful attack exceeded 10% of
the benign training files (300,000).

4.4.3 Preliminary Experiments Discussion
The following sections contains a summary of the results and how they relate to their corresponding
research question / hypothesis. The format of the following two sections is the same, with the only
difference being the approach for selecting the adversarial features (manual and random selection).
4.4.3.1

Manual Import Function Selection

For the first set of experiments, using a maximum of 5% of the total benign feature space was chosen
as the threshold for the adversarial poisoning attack. No instances of the adversarial poisoning attack
achieved an injection rate of 5%, and for each poisoning attack every benign training file which
contained the targeted import library was injected with the adversarial functions. The results from the
preliminary experiments using a manual selection of five and ten import functions is shown in Table
33.
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Table 33 - General efficacy Attack - Feature Space Manual

Attack Name
advapi32_10_manual
kernel32_10_manual
user32_10_manual
msvcrt_10_manual
shell32_10_manual
advapi32_5_manual
kernel32_5_manual
user32_5_manual
msvcrt_5_manual
shell32_5_manual

FPR
1%
0.993
0.992
0.000
0.995
0.810
0.419
0.986
0.571
0.993
0.965

FNR
1%
51.452
17.118
100.000
3.155
53.969
56.358
13.379
58.177
2.725
34.630

Threshold 1%
0.998
0.989
1.000
0.720
0.997
0.998
0.980
0.999
0.686
0.992

ROC
%
97.575
99.188
97.491
99.828
98.307
98.145
99.291
97.714
99.838
98.959

Detection Rate 1%
48.548
82.882
0.000
96.845
46.031
43.642
86.621
41.823
97.275
65.370

The second set of experiments tested the general efficacy of the model after injecting adversarial
features into percentages of the target benign feature space. The poisoning attacks were increasing in
steps of 5%, starting at 5% and finishing at 100% of the benign files containing the targeted import
library being injected with the adversarial functions.
The performance pattern of the second set of experiments held the same for each import library. The
threshold and FNR slowly increased up until 100% of the benign training files containing the import
library were injected. Once 100% injection was achieved, the FNR of the model jumped significantly
from the rest of the experiments. The only import library which did not have a significant increase in
FNR at 100% injection was “msvcrt.dll”. The highest FNR achieved in a manual selection
“msvcrt.dll” attack was 4.623% at 100% of the benign training files containing the library being
injected with the adversarial features.
The hypotheses being tested in manual import selection stages of the preliminary experiments were
H1, H3, and H4 which are stated below. The results from testing the hypotheses are shown in Table 34.
H1. A manual selection of features can be used for a successful adversarial poisoning attack.
H3. No more than 5% of the benign feature space is required to be poisoned to reduce the
general efficacy of the model.
H4. No more than 10% of the training data is required to be poisoned to reduce the general
efficacy of the model.
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Table 34 - H1, H3, and H4 Results

Hypothesis

Related Experiments

Supported

H1

All

Yes

H3

All

Yes

H4

All

No

The only hypothesis which was not supported by the results from any of the experiments was H 4.
None of the experiments were able to reduce the general efficacy of the model at an injection rate of
10% benign training files containing the targeted import library.
It was shown that it is possible to reduce the overall availability of the model from a manual selection
of adversarial features which supports H1, the overall amount of training files which needed to be
injected when using the chosen sample set of adversarial features was significantly large. The high
percentage of poisoning was likely due to the small number of features chosen for injection, as the
imports section of Windows PE32 files in EMBER comprises the majority of the feature vectors used
for training the model.
Additional experiments to identify what number of features are required to reduce the general efficacy
of the model at a smaller injection percentage were not performed as one of the aims of the targeted
Zero-day attack is to perform the attack in a black-box scenario. Identifying which features contribute
the most to a model’s classification would require having access to the target training dataset or a
surrogate model trained using the same model architecture. As the targeted Zero-day attack uses
Windows PE32 files as the basis of the attack, it is safe to assume that the imports section of the file
will provide some level of contribution to the model’s classification, as the feature engineering
summarised in section 2.8 identified the imports section as a positive contributor for training ML
malware detection models
H3 was supported from the experiments as 5% of the benign feature space of the training data being
injected with adversarial features was never achieved using the target manual selection of adversarial
features. In the benign feature space experiments, it was found that every instance of benign training
files which contained the target import library were injected with the adversarial features, the same as
the 100% injection attack performed in the other set of preliminary experiments. The target import
library “msvcrt.dll” was the only experiment to not reduce the overall availability of the model after
injecting the adversarial features into every benign training file.
4.4.3.2

Random Import Function Selection

For the first set of experiments, a maximum of 5% of the total benign feature space was chosen as the
threshold for the adversarial poisoning attack, while the adversarial features were randomly selected
from the import library. No instances of the adversarial poisoning attacks achieved an injection rate of
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5%, and for each poisoning attack every benign training file which contained the targeted import
library was injected with the adversarial features. The results from the preliminary experiments using
a random selection of five and ten import functions is shown in Table 35.
Table 35 - General efficacy Attack - Feature Space Random

Attack Name
advapi32_10_random
kernel32_10_random
user32_10_random
msvcrt_10_random
shell32_10_random
advapi32_5_random
kernel32_5_random
user32_5_random
msvcrt_5_random
shell32_5_random

FNR
Threshold
Detection Rate
FPR 1%
1%
1%
ROC % 1%
97.225
0.353
65.769
0.999
34.231
97.867
0.000 100.000
1.000
0.000
98.034
0.264
60.938
0.999
39.062
99.763
0.998
4.346
0.786
95.654
97.244
0.247
76.591
0.999
23.409
96.910
0.539
63.209
0.999
36.791
98.143
0.000 100.000
1.000
0.000
98.419
0.569
48.914
0.998
51.086
99.843
0.998
2.876
0.689
97.124
97.892
0.608
63.109
0.998
36.891

The second set of experiments tested the general efficacy of the model after injecting adversarial
features into percentages of the total benign training files containing the targeted import library. The
poisoning attacks were increasing in steps of 5%, starting at 5% and finishing at 100% of the benign
files containing the targeted import library being injected with the adversarial functions.
The performance pattern of the second set of experiments held the same for each import library. The
threshold and FNR slowly increased up until 100% of the benign training files containing the import
library were injected. Once 100% injection was achieved, the FNR of the model jumped significantly
from the rest of the experiments. The only import library which did not have a significant increase in
FNR at 100% injection was “msvcrt.dll”. The highest FNR achieved in a manual selection
“msvcrt.dll” attack was 4.346% at 100% of the benign training files containing the library being
injected with the adversarial features.
The hypotheses being tested in random import function selection stages of the preliminary
experiments were H2, H3, and H4 which are stated below. The results from the testing the hypotheses
are shown in Table 36.
H2. A random selection of features can be used for a successful adversarial poisoning attack.
H3. No more than 5% of the benign feature space is required to be poisoned to reduce the
general efficacy of the model.
H4. No more than 10% of the training data is required to be poisoned to reduce the general
efficacy of the model.
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Table 36 - H2, H3 and, H4 Experiment Relationship and Results

Hypothesis

Related Experiments

Supported

H2

All

Yes

H3

All

Yes

H4

All

No

The only hypothesis which was not supported by the results from any of the experiments was H4. As it
was with the preliminary experiments using a manual selection of features, none of the experiments
were able to reduce the general efficacy of the model at an injection rate of 10% benign training files
containing the targeted import library.
It was shown that it is possible to reduce the overall availability of the model from a random selection
of adversarial features which supports H2, the overall amount of training files which needed to be
injected when using the chosen sample set of adversarial features was significantly large. The results
from the random selection of adversarial features were similar to the experiment results from the
manual selection of adversarial features.
H3 was supported from the experiments as 5% of the benign feature space of the training data being
injected with adversarial features was never achieved using the target random selection of adversarial
features. In the benign feature space experiments, it was found that every instance of benign training
files which contained the target import library were injected with the adversarial features, the same as
the 100% injection attack performed in the other set of preliminary experiments.

4.5 Main Experiments
As stated in Section 3.2.2, the fifth phase was the development of a targeted adversarial poisoning
attack which allows for the targeted Zero-day malware file to bypass detection, while the general
efficacy of the model is not significantly affected. The targeted adversarial poisoning attacks followed
the process from the preliminary experiments, in that the imports section of benign files were injected
with adversarial features and the selection of import libraries chosen for the targeted adversarial
poisoning attacks is from the five libraries tested in the preliminary experiments.
The targeted adversarial poisoning attacks were performed on both the GBDT model architecture
supplied with the EMBER dataset and on MLP model’s which were trained using a subset of the data
from the EMBER dataset. Two methods of injection were performed in the targeted adversarial
poisoning attacks. The first method, which was called the individual poisoning attack, took a selection
of randomly chosen import functions from the four chosen import libraries of the target Zero-day file
(‘shell32.dll’, ‘user32.dll’, ‘kernerl32.dll’ and ‘advapi32.dl’), and injected them into the benign
training files. The injection of adversarial features was performed as a separate process for each target
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import library. This means that the poisoning process was performed four times, once for each of the
chosen target import libraries, and that the selection of benign training files injected with the
adversarial features was different for each poisoning process. Of course, it was possible for a benign
training file to be injected with adversarial features from multiple import libraries if it happened to
contain two or more of the target import libraries and was chosen for injection more than once.
The individual poisoning attack was developed to identify how well the targeted poisoning attack
would perform if the adversarial features chosen for injection were spread out throughout the benign
training data files, instead of being clustered together.
The second method, called the combined poisoning attack, was developed to test the inverse of the
individual poisoning attack. In the combined poisoning attack, only benign training files which
contained all four target import libraries were injected with the adversarial features. The adversarial
features used in the individual poisoning attack were the same in the combined poisoning attack.

4.5.1 Individual and Combined Attack Tests
As stated in 3.2.2, the fifth phase was to test the targeted Zero-day adversarial attack. The premise
behind the targeted Zero-day adversarial poisoning attack was influenced from how poisoning attacks
had been performed on image recognition models. In the targeted image recognition poisoning attack
performed by Gu, Liu, Dolan-Gavitt, and Garg (2019), a trigger mark was appended to images which
were mislabelled by the attacker as their desired label. For example, a stop sign with a trigger mark
would be incorrectly labelled as a speed limit sign, as shown in Figure 4.1. The ML model was trained
with the mislabelled images in the training dataset which resulted in the model classifying the images
as the target adversarial label instead of the correct label.

Figure 4.1 - Example of a BadNet Trigger Image Adapted from (Gu et al., 2019)
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The classification model used in the targeted Zero-day poisoning attack is binary and not multiclass
i.e., the model classifies Windows PE32 files as either benign or malicious, and not into a malware
family or some other multiclass category. Other ML malware classification poisoning attacks have
been performed by researchers by mislabelling malicious files as benign files during training, which
causes the targeted malicious file to be misclassified as benign. This type of attack would likely be
identified during pre-processing of the data through either dynamic or static analysis of the training
samples.
The targeted Zero-day adversarial poisoning attack injects adversarial features into a subset of the
benign training samples. The adversarial features are from the Zero-day malware file, with the aim of
the attack being to misclassify the Zero-day file as benign if enough of the adversarial features are
spread into the benign feature space to shift the classification from malicious to benign. The selected
adversarial features are import functions from unique import libraries. Import functions were selected
for injection as they would not break the structure of the file and by themselves would not appear to
be malicious.
The poisoning attack was performed by randomly selecting import features from four unique libraries
‘shell32.dll’, ‘user32.dll’, ‘kernerl32.dll’ and ‘advapi32.dl’ of a selection of Windows PE32 malware
files obtained from VirusShare. The “msvcrt.dll” import library which was examined in the
preliminary experiments was not chosen for the targeted adversarial poisoning attacks, as it was
shown to have poor performance as a target poisoning library. The set of adversarial features were
randomly selected using Python’s in-built random module instead of manual, as the exploratory
results from the preliminary experiments had shown that there was no significant difference between
the two approaches, and the random approach is more suitable for a black-box attack scenario. The
submission date of each malware is from 2019, to simulate a Zero-day malware file. Each malware
file was originally classified as malicious by the clean EMBER model, with an EMBER score of over
0.9, with the threshold of the original clean EMBER model being 0.529.
Up to ten features from each library was randomly selected using the secure random python function
for the poisoning attack. Not every library contained ten features, with the total and average number
of functions from the four libraries shown in Table 37.
.
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Table 37 - Import Functions - Targeted Attack

Library Name

Total Import Functions

Average Import Functions

Advapi32.dll

3352

6

Kernel32.dll

5162

9

User32.dll

4970

9

Shell32.dll

1669

3

4.5.1.1

Decision Tree Model Attacks

As stated in 3.2.2, the sixth phase was the testing of the targeted Zero-day adversarial attack on
different ML algorithms. The two chosen ML algorithms were Gradient Boosted Decision Tree
(GBDT), which was used in the original EMBER framework, and a Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP)
model.
Two types of adversarial poisoning attacks were performed on the GBDT EMBER model, they
differed by how the benign files were selected for injection. In the first experiment, the import
functions from each target import library were injected into a random selection of benign training files
that contained the target import library. The injection of adversarial files was done separately, so the
benign files which were injected with adversarial features from “advapi32.dll” may or may not also
contain adversarial features from the other import libraries, this experiment was called the individual
poisoning attack. The aim of the individual attack was not to generate a clear pattern for the
adversarial example to belong to, but instead test if enough adversarial features injected sporadically
throughout the test data, would be sufficient in inducing a targeted false negative at a significant rate.
The second experiment, which was called the combined poisoning attack, only injected the adversarial
features into benign training files which contained all four target import libraries. The combined
attack experiment reduced the amount of available target benign training files for poisoning but was
designed to create a pattern within the benign class which when triggered by the Zero-day malware
test file, would shift the files classification from benign to malicious.
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4.5.1.2

Individual Poisoning Attack Approach (GBDT)

Before running the experiments on each of the 543 target Zero-day files obtained from VirusShare, a
selection of 50 files was used to test both the individual and combined attacks at different percentages
of the benign training file set. The experiments were performed in steps of 5%, starting at 5% and
finishing at 25%. Unlike the exploratory preliminary experiments, where the percentage of injection
went to 100% to test the different levels of poisoning, the targeted attacks are under more realistic
constraints of a practical attack, and as such do not go to an excessive level of poisoning.
For the first set of experiments undertaking the individual poisoning attack approach, the first
experiment at 5% injection rate resulted in no successful attacks, with 0.724 being the lowest score
achieved, which was over the threshold (0.536) by nearly 20 points. The 25% injection experiment
had 19 out of 50 successful attacks (38%), but the median threshold of the attacks was 0.664, which is
13.5 points higher than the original clean threshold of 0.529. Using a threshold boundary of 10%
when retraining the model would show that something wrong, or something suspicious has occurred
during training. The first ten results from the 5% poisoning attack are shown in Table 38 and the first
ten results from the 25% injection attack are shown in Table 39.
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Table 38 - 5% Poison Attack - First Ten Results
Virus_SHA256

Score

Threshold

Below

FPR

FNR

Threshold
2bdc0256a49b00d768296fa96ab8cb69

0.774

0.550

No

0.997

1.891

0.949

0.532

No

1.000

1.711

0.956

0.539

No

0.999

1.825

0.964

0.530

No

0.997

1.793

0.911

0.534

No

0.999

1.740

0.964

0.526

No

1.000

1.857

0.827

0.551

No

1.000

1.855

0.834

0.532

No

0.997

1.710

0.882

0.528

No

0.999

1.648

0.864

0.541

No

0.997

1.871

5c55c0d888d9ca0f55e00db259d8e533
25267e28e177491b26c1926d5a3592e
60623fb870d6d984ff76db01ebfd6b08e
0a0ae6dbd8b19d0f4b3c9fd0d8e7d933
f3af14f0e28716d171f35b3e2e83c268
474dc611d96cab3d86cac6b07a0c0c4c
39a365a578e07c9a150b8a20c91f5ec4
4c7cdc1d141088c3eb9af66592c7da7f
e3457a2e1862880d3d000805ffc32d6b
f61da4b8755d64742aa0517f7606dbd5
293efc7df498eb21d0493b52b85fa586
589cbfbca739ce9f99594b75356d5d3f
3920c37c3e2bda8681f6cbccc992c38e
9415462530a30caf7340aca71173a64c
a5eaedafbb0d298835851f9cf42622cb
6bf29d8d7afc35f5ecf3ac1531158288
09487812392ef6bd82706c9c4422ef74
00c3f291834ed9f5bfeb52e9bd0ce78a
d1fdc7bd106ab5e3024cf7e62700b034
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Table 39 - 25% Poison Attack - First Ten Results

Virus_SHA256

Score

Threshold

Below

FPR

FNR

Threshold
2bdc0256a49b00d768296fa96ab8cb69

0.417

0.659

Yes

0.996

2.375

0.659

0.670

Yes

1.000

2.336

0.713

0.659

No

0.995

2.196

0.818

0.672

No

0.999

2.489

0.907

0.681

No

0.999

2.457

0.834

0.666

No

1.000

2.312

0.352

0.660

Yes

0.997

2.332

0.358

0.644

Yes

1.000

2.227

0.212

0.676

Yes

0.998

2.389

0.293

0.659

Yes

0.999

2.345

5c55c0d888d9ca0f55e00db259d8e533
25267e28e177491b26c1926d5a3592e
60623fb870d6d984ff76db01ebfd6b08e
0a0ae6dbd8b19d0f4b3c9fd0d8e7d933
f3af14f0e28716d171f35b3e2e83c268
474dc611d96cab3d86cac6b07a0c0c4c
39a365a578e07c9a150b8a20c91f5ec4
4c7cdc1d141088c3eb9af66592c7da7f
e3457a2e1862880d3d000805ffc32d6b
f61da4b8755d64742aa0517f7606dbd5
293efc7df498eb21d0493b52b85fa586
589cbfbca739ce9f99594b75356d5d3f
3920c37c3e2bda8681f6cbccc992c38e
9415462530a30caf7340aca71173a64c
a5eaedafbb0d298835851f9cf42622cb
6bf29d8d7afc35f5ecf3ac1531158288
09487812392ef6bd82706c9c4422ef74
00c3f291834ed9f5bfeb52e9bd0ce78a
d1fdc7bd106ab5e3024cf7e62700b034
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The targeted Zero-day poisoning experiments are related to research question one and hypotheses five
and six, which are restated below.
RQ1: Can adversarial attacks against machine learning based malware detectors increase the
likelihood of unknown-unknown malware samples bypassing detection?
H5. No more than 10% of the benign training data files are required to be poisoned for a
targeted adversarial attack to succeed.
As shown in Table 40 neither the 5% attack or the 10% attack had any significant number of
successful targeted Zero-day poisoning attacks, the 5% test had no successful attacks and the 10%
attack only had two. The individual attack approach was not expected to have any significant number
of successful attacks from how the attack was performed but it was assumed that there would be more
successful attacks than was shown. Neither of the hypotheses were supported by the results obtained
from the first individual attack experiments.
Table 40 - Individual Library Poison Attack Results

Test

Total

Successful Average

Median

Average

Median

Attacks

Score

Score

Threshold

Threshold

5%

0/50

0.901

0.918

0.539

0.538

10%

2/50

0.813

0.851

0.560

0.561

15%

9/50

0.748

0.832

0.586

0.589

20%

14/50

0.696

0.765

0.619

0.624

25%

19/50

0.645

0.713

0.657

0.664

4.5.1.3

Combined Poisoning Attack Approach (GBDT)

In the combined attack approach, the entire set of 543 Zero-day malware files were used in two sets of
experiments. In the first set of experiments, the same benign training files were injected with the
adversarial features for each targeted Zero-day poisoning attack. In the second set of experiments, a
random seed was used for each Zero-day poisoning attack. The two sets of experiments were
performed to see if there was a difference in the outcome of the attacks which could be related to the
importance of the files injected with the adversarial features. In the combined attack approach, unlike
the individual attack approach, only one percentage of the total benign training files was used for
injection, which was 7.5% of the benign training files and 2.5% of the total training files.
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There was a total of 40,551 benign files which contained each of the unique import libraries, as shown
in Table 41.
Table 41 - Benign Train Data Containing All Target Import Libraries

Train Data

Benign Count

Four Library
Count

Train_0

50,000

6174

Train_1

50,000

5144

Train_2

50,000

6046

Train_3

50,000

8306

Train_4

50,000

10299

Train_5

50,000

4582

The first experiment used the same seed for each adversarial injection and achieved a 60% success
rate in misclassifying malicious files as benign, while keeping the threshold from exceeding 10% of
the original clean model. The second experiment achieved a success rate of 58% while also keeping
the threshold within 10% of the original clean model. There was a difference of 60 malware files
which succeeded in bypassing classification in one test but not the other, with 38 malware files
bypassing detection in the first experiment and 28 bypassing detection in the second. The overall
results for both experiments are shown in Table 42. The results of the first ten tests in the first
experiment are shown in Table 43 and the results of the first ten tests in the second experiment are
shown in Table 44.
Table 42 - Combined Attack Results GBDT

Test

First

Total

Successful Average

Median

Average

Median

Attacks

Score

Score

Threshold

Threshold

328/543

0.519

0.538

0.607

0.608

312/543

0.531

0.551

0.606

0.606

Experiment
Second
Experiment
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Table 43 - Combined Attack GBDT - First Ten Results - Same Seed

Virus_SHA256

Score

Threshold

Below

FPR

FNR

Threshold
2bdc0256a49b00d768296fa96ab8cb69

0.568

0.619

Yes

0.998

2.158

0.677

0.592

No

1.000

2.044

0.452

0.614

Yes

1.000

2.135

0.599

0.611

Yes

0.999

2.089

0.618

0.605

No

0.999

2.259

0.599

0.606

Yes

0.992

2.074

0.287

0.609

Yes

0.996

2.005

0.149

0.608

Yes

0.993

1.972

0.265

0.612

Yes

0.996

2.038

0.211

0.615

Yes

0.998

2.155

5c55c0d888d9ca0f55e00db259d8e533
25267e28e177491b26c1926d5a3592e
60623fb870d6d984ff76db01ebfd6b08e
0a0ae6dbd8b19d0f4b3c9fd0d8e7d933
f3af14f0e28716d171f35b3e2e83c268
474dc611d96cab3d86cac6b07a0c0c4c
39a365a578e07c9a150b8a20c91f5ec4
4c7cdc1d141088c3eb9af66592c7da7f
e3457a2e1862880d3d000805ffc32d6b
f61da4b8755d64742aa0517f7606dbd5
293efc7df498eb21d0493b52b85fa586
589cbfbca739ce9f99594b75356d5d3f
3920c37c3e2bda8681f6cbccc992c38e
9415462530a30caf7340aca71173a64c
a5eaedafbb0d298835851f9cf42622cb
6bf29d8d7afc35f5ecf3ac1531158288
09487812392ef6bd82706c9c4422ef74
00c3f291834ed9f5bfeb52e9bd0ce78a
d1fdc7bd106ab5e3024cf7e62700b034
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Table 44 - Combined Attack GBDT - First Ten Results - Random Seed

Virus_SHA256

Score

Threshold

Below

FPR

FNR

Threshold
2bdc0256a49b00d768296fa96ab8cb69

0.345

0.620

Yes

0.997

2.511

0.600

0.603

Yes

0.999

2.251

0.650

0.607

No

1.000

2.071

0.596

0.599

Yes

0.999

2.020

0.712

0.608

No

0.997

2.038

0.704

0.615

No

0.999

2.159

0.266

0.608

Yes

1.000

2.099

0.237

0.612

Yes

0.993

2.113

0.475

0.614

Yes

0.999

2.040

0.251

0.615

Yes

0.999

2.198

5c55c0d888d9ca0f55e00db259d8e533
25267e28e177491b26c1926d5a3592e
60623fb870d6d984ff76db01ebfd6b08e
0a0ae6dbd8b19d0f4b3c9fd0d8e7d933
f3af14f0e28716d171f35b3e2e83c268
474dc611d96cab3d86cac6b07a0c0c4c
39a365a578e07c9a150b8a20c91f5ec4
4c7cdc1d141088c3eb9af66592c7da7f
e3457a2e1862880d3d000805ffc32d6b
f61da4b8755d64742aa0517f7606dbd5
293efc7df498eb21d0493b52b85fa586
589cbfbca739ce9f99594b75356d5d3f
3920c37c3e2bda8681f6cbccc992c38e
9415462530a30caf7340aca71173a64c
a5eaedafbb0d298835851f9cf42622cb
6bf29d8d7afc35f5ecf3ac1531158288
09487812392ef6bd82706c9c4422ef74
00c3f291834ed9f5bfeb52e9bd0ce78a
d1fdc7bd106ab5e3024cf7e62700b034
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The targeted Zero-day poisoning experiments are related to research question one and hypotheses five
and six, which are restated below.
RQ1: Can adversarial attacks against machine learning based malware detectors increase the
likelihood of unknown-unknown malware samples bypassing detection?
H5. No more than 10% of the benign training data files are required to be poisoned for a
targeted adversarial attack to succeed.
The experiment results obtained from the combined attack approach were used using 7.5% of the
benign training files which is related to H5. From the results it was shown that performing the targeted
Zero-day adversarial attack with less than 10% of the benign train data did produce successful results
and over 60% of the Zero-day files which were previously classified correctly by the original clean
EMBER2017 model were misclassified as malicious in their targeted poisoned ML model. The results
from the experiments support the hypothesis H5 that no more than 10% of the benign training data
files are required to be poisoned for a targeted adversarial attack to succeed.
4.5.1.4

Multi-Layer Perceptron Attack

As was stated in section 3.2.2, more than one ML algorithm was to be tested in the targeted Zero-day
adversarial poisoning attacks. The first attack used the GBDT algorithm which was the default
algorithm used in the EMBER framework. The additional ML algorithm chosen for use was an
Artificial Neural Network (ANN). The type of ANN chosen is the basic multi-layer perceptron
(MLP), which contains an input layer, one or more hidden layers, and a final output layer. The MLP
was trained using the parameters shown below. The MLP network parameters were also adapted from
a model which was also built by Endgame Inc, the same company responsible for EMBER. Using an
MLP from Endgame instead of creating a new network architecture was done to assure uniformity
between the experiments. The only changes made in the MLP parameters were to the hidden layers,
an additional layer of ten neurons was included to provide a smaller layer for examination in the
defence stage. The MLP model had the following parameters:
•

Dense Model

•

RELU Activation at hidden layers

•

Sigmoid Activation at output layer

•

Five hidden layers of [2048, 1024, 512, 256, 10] neurons

•

Input_dropout=0.05

•

Hidden_dropout=0.1

•

Batch_size=128

•

Epochs=100
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The training data was comprised of 50,000 samples (25,000 benign and 25,000 malicious) which were
extracted from the EMBER2017 dataset. The benign files were extracted to contain enough files to
generate the adversarial examples containing the four chosen import libraries. These adversarial
example files were extracted on a first-come basis and were not selected from a list of successful
poisoning attacks from the GBDT experiments.
The dataset size of 50,000 was chosen to reduce the time it took to complete each experiment. The
original dataset size was too big for the computer running the experiments to complete, and the GPU
in the computer (AMD RX5700) was unable to support Keras. Performing the test on a selection of
the original dataset also allowed for future tests to be performed using a different selection of training
data. Out of the 543 Zero-day files, which were all detect as malicious by the GBDT model, two files
were not detected by the MLP model, so they were not included in the experiment results.
The results from the clean model which are used as a baseline for the poisoning attacks are the
following:
•

ROC = 0.997

•

Threshold = 0.725

•

TPR = .963

•

Accuracy @ Threshold = 0.976

The structure of the MLP poisoning experiments are as follows:
For the first set of experiments, a repeat of the individual poisoning attack at 25% of the benign
training data was performed to provide some comparison data for the individual attack in the GBDT
experiments. The 25% injection rate was chosen as it was the most successful percentage from the
GBDT experiments. Even though 25% poisoning exceeds the 10% cut-off chosen inH4, the
experiments were still performed as they may produce valuable information.
The second, third and fourth set of experiments were to test the combined poisoning attack at 7.5%,
7.5% randomised and 15% of the benign training data. These values were chosen as the training
dataset was curated with 15% of the files containing the four target import libraries. As the previous
code used percentages of benign files which contained the target library, it was simple to change the
code to select 50% and 100% of the training files which contained the target four import libraries. The
third experiment was a repeat of the second experiment (7.5% poisoning), but in this instance the
training data was randomly shuffled after poisoning using the shuffle function in python. The random
shuffling was performed to remove clusters of the target benign files which existed in the curation of
the training dataset. The second and third experiments were performed to compare the efficacy of the
chosen adversarial features. If the second set of experiments, without the randomisation, had a
significant increase in the number of successful attacks, then it is more than likely that the position of
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the target training files influences the success of the poisoning attack more than the selection of
features. If the third set of experiments has a similar number of successful attacks, then it is likely the
selection of features played a more important role than if the target poisoned data clustered together.
When performing the second, third and fourth experiments, a line of code from the individual
poisoning experiments was accidently left in place which altered how the poisoning attack was
performed. For training datasets train_1.jsonl, train_2.jsonl, train_3.jsonl, train_4.jsonl, and
train_5.jsonl, the combined poisoning attack process was performed successfully. For the train_0.jsonl
dataset, the combined poisoning process was followed when poisoning 'advapi32.dll', 'shell32.dll', and
'kernel32.dll', but for 'user32.dll' the code to generate the list of target files in the individual attack was
accidently left in place. As a result, the combined attack process succeeded for 'advapi32.dll',
'shell32.dll', and 'kernel32.dll', but for 'user32.dll' a new list was generated which included every
benign file in train_0.jsonl that contained ‘user32.dll’ (1,327 files), and then a percentage of that total
(which is greater than the total of benign training files that contained the target four import libraries)
was poisoned instead, which lead to approximately 8.6% of the benign training files benign poisoned
for each attack. As experiment two, three and four contained both the combined and individual
approach, they will be referred to as the hybrid attack.
An additional experiment was undertaken which performed the combined poisoning attack as it was
originally intended. In this experiment 10% of the benign training data was selected to be poisoned,
which reflects (hypothesis number). This experiment was also performed by randomly shuffling the
training data, unlike the third set of experiments, which poisoned the same benign training files as the
second set of experiments, then randomly shuffled afterwards to compare the results. The final set of
experiments randomly shuffled the training data before poisoning the benign training data.
4.5.1.5

Individual Poisoning Attack (MLP)

The first set of experiments was performed as an individual injection attack following the same
process in section 4.5.1.1, but only at an injection rate of 25%. As the dataset was generated with at
least 15% of the benign files containing a combination of the four chosen import libraries (shell32.dll,
user32.dll, advapi32.dll and kernel32.dll), the poisoned benign files should cluster more significantly
compared to the GBDT individual poisoning attack.
The first ten results are shown in Table 45. In comparison to the results from the GBDT attack shown
in Table 40, the threshold from the MLP attacks is much higher, which is understandable as the clean
GBDT model had a threshold of 0.529 and the clean MLP model had a threshold value of 0.725. In
the first test, the poisoned training data generated were not randomised before training the ML model.
The attack had 211/541 Zero-day files misclassified as benign, a success rate of 39.00% while not
negatively influencing the general efficacy of the model.
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Table 45 - MLP Combined Attack Approach - First Ten Results - Same Seed

Virus_SHA256

Score

Threshold

Below

FPR

FNR

Threshold
2bdc0256a49b00d768296fa96ab8cb69

0.271

0.861

Yes

1.000

4.36

0.995

0.883

No

1.000

4.480

0.996

0.79 0

No

1.000

3.200

0.994

0.861

No

1.000

3.880

0.993

0.873

No

1.000

3.880

0.995

0.850

No

1.000

4.200

0.127

0.865

Yes

1.000

4.760

0.173

0.827

Yes

1.000

3.320

0.639

0.901

Yes

0.960

3.840

0.217

0.862

Yes

1.000

4.360

5c55c0d888d9ca0f55e00db259d8e533
25267e28e177491b26c1926d5a3592e6
0623fb870d6d984ff76db01ebfd6b08e
0a0ae6dbd8b19d0f4b3c9fd0d8e7d933f
3af14f0e28716d171f35b3e2e83c268
474dc611d96cab3d86cac6b07a0c0c4c
39a365a578e07c9a150b8a20c91f5ec4
4c7cdc1d141088c3eb9af66592c7da7fe
3457a2e1862880d3d000805ffc32d6b
f61da4b8755d64742aa0517f7606dbd5
293efc7df498eb21d0493b52b85fa586
589cbfbca739ce9f99594b75356d5d3f3
920c37c3e2bda8681f6cbccc992c38e
9415462530a30caf7340aca71173a64c
a5eaedafbb0d298835851f9cf42622cb
6bf29d8d7afc35f5ecf3ac15311582880
9487812392ef6bd82706c9c4422ef74
00c3f291834ed9f5bfeb52e9bd0ce78ad
1fdc7bd106ab5e3024cf7e62700b034

4.5.1.6

Hybrid Poisoning Attacks (MLP)

There was a total of three sets of hybrid experiments performed. Each set of experiments tested 541
Zero-day poisoning attacks by using a combination of the combined and individual poisoning process.
The hybrid attacks were initially designed to follow the combined poisoning approach, but a typo left
in the code randomised the poisoning of the adversarial ‘user32.dll’ features in the train_0.jsonl
dataset. In the first set of hybrid attack experiments, approximately 8.6% of the benign training data
was injected with adversarial features for each experiment. The Training data at this stage had not
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been randomised, so the target benign files for the combined attack clustered towards the beginning
for each training dataset (train_0.jsonl – train_5.jsonl). The first set of hybrid attack experiments
achieved a success rate of 37.33%, with 202 out of 541 successful Zero-day poisoning attacks.
In the second set of hybrid attack experiments, the same format from the previous set of experiments
was followed, with the difference being that the training data had been randomly shuffled to reduce
the number of clusters which existed due to the first come format used to generate the original training
dataset. Each attack injected the same adversarial features into the same benign training file as the
previous attack, once the entire training dataset was poisoned, it was randomly shuffled, and the
model was trained. The attacks were performed that way to provide insight into the efficacy of the
poisoning attack method. If the attacks achieved a similar success rate as the previous attack, it would
likely mean that the percentage of files and chosen features were responsible for the attacks success. If
on the other hand the previous attack contained more successful attacks while using the same
adversarial features and which were injected into the same benign training files, then the position of
the poisoned files influenced the success of the attacks, more so than the adversarial features. The
second set of hybrid poisoning attack experiments achieved a success rate of 33.27%, with 184 out of
541 successful Zero-day poisoning attacks.
The third set of hybrid attack experiments, approximately 17.2% of the benign training data was
injected with adversarial features. The aim of the second set of hybrid experiments was originally to
see what would happen if 100% of the benign training files which contained the four target import
libraries (15% of the benign training data) was injected with the adversarial features. As the typo
existed in the set of experiments, there was an increase of benign training files which contained
‘user32.dll’ that were injected with adversarial features. The third set of hybrid attack experiments
achieved a success rate of 80.59%, with 436 out of 541 successful Zero-day poisoning attacks. Unlike
the previous sets of experiments, the success of the second set of experiments was due to the
significant increase in the threshold, which is shown in Table 46.
4.5.1.7

Combined Poisoning Attack (MLP)

The combined poisoning attack injected adversarial features into 10% of the benign training data.
Each benign training file which was poisoned contained the four import libraries ‘kernel32.dll’,
‘user32.dll’, ‘shell32.dll’, and ‘advapi32.dll’. A selection of import functions from the four import
libraries were randomly selected from each target Zero-day file and injected into the target benign
files. The training data was randomly shuffled before being poisoned to prevent the target benign files
from clustering together. The combined attack experiments achieved a success rate of 24.95%, with
135 out of 541 successful attacks. The combined attack experiments had fewer successful attacks
compared to both hybrid attacks which injected adversarial features into a smaller number of benign
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training files. It is likely that the increased number of training files poisoned with adversarial features
from ‘user32.dll’ influenced the success of the hybrid poisoning attacks.
Table 46 - Targeted Adversarial Poisoning Attack Results - MLP

Test Name

Total

Average

Median

Average

Median

Average

Successful

Score

Score

Threshold

Threshold

FNR

211/541

0.683

0.986

0.856

0.858

4.040

202/541

0.751

0.998

0.834

0.835

3.994

184/541

0.823

0.997

0.811

0.813

3.358

436/541

0.866

0.963

0.984

0.988

18.569

135/541

0.914

0.993

0.837

0.836

4.049

Attacks
Individual
Attack
(23%)
Hybrid
Attack
(8.6%)
Hybrid
Attack
Randomised
(8.6%)
Hybrid
Attack
(17%)
Combined
Attack
(10%)

When comparing the results from the randomised hybrid and combined set of experiments, it is clear
that the hybrid attack experiments reduced the score of the Zero-day files significantly more so than
the combined attack experiments. The difference in results from the successful Zero-day attacks is
shown in Table 47, where the hybrid attacks on average are 0.317 points below the threshold
compared to the combined attacks 0.090 points below. These results indicate that the extra number of
adversarial features in the ‘user32.dll’ import library significantly influence the impact of the
poisoning attack.
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Table 47 - Randomised Hybrid and Combined Results Comparison

Experiment

Average

Score Min Difference Max Difference Average

Difference from from Threshold

from Threshold

Threshold

Successful
Adversarial
Score

Combined

0.090

0.00007

0.834

0.746

Hybrid

0.317

0.00279

0.835

0.449

The targeted Zero-day poisoning experiments are related to research question one and hypotheses five
and six, which are restated below.
RQ1: Can adversarial attacks against machine learning based malware detectors increase the
likelihood of unknown-unknown malware samples bypassing detection?
H5. No more than 10% of the benign training data files are required to be poisoned for a
targeted adversarial attack to succeed.
The results from the targeted Zero-day poisoning experiments show that it is possible to increase the
likelihood of Zero-day malware samples bypassing detection from ML trained malware detection
models. In both the GBDT and MLP trained models, successful attempts to bypass classification
through poisoning of the benign training set was achieved. The experiments did require up to ten
percent of the benign training data samples to be infected with adversarial features, which supports
H5. The process of poisoning the model was performed in a black-box scenario, which reduced the
ability to identify which features would contribute the most to the model’s classification and to target
those features specifically. If feature importance was to be performed before the poisoning attack, it is
likely that the percentage of poisoned data required for a successful attack would be reduced. In the
feature analysis paper by Saxe and Berlin (2015) it was found that the imports section when used by
itself to identify patterns and correctly classify malicious files, performed the worst compared to the
four other areas that were tested. In the experiments the imports section was chosen as it compromised
the majority of the input feature vectors and in a practical sense, adding an import function to a binary
PE32 file is a simple way to perform an adversarial poisoning attack. In future work other areas of the
binary PE32 file would be tested to identify which area is best suited for manipulation to generate a
successful targeted adversarial poisoning attack.

4.6

Defensive Strategies

As stated in Section 3.2.2, the seventh phase was the development and testing of defensive strategies
to mitigate the Zero-day malware poisoning attack. Three different defences were explored to identify
if it was possible to prevent the Zero-day malware poisoning attack at test time. A variety of defences

Page | 114

have been developed which identify poisoning attacks at the training stage, which was covered in
2.7.2, but defences at the testing stage has been ignored. This is likely due to the fact that it is
preferable for a supposedly clean ML model to go live, than a potentially poisoned model. As it is not
possible to be absolutely certain that a trained ML model is clean, even after applying a defensive
strategy and removing identified poisoned data, the defences introduced in the following sections
explore the possibility of identifying targeted poisoning attacks as they occur at test time, while
keeping the model live.

4.6.1 Heatmaps
As stated in section 3.2.2, the seventh phase was the development of an adversarial defensive strategy
to defend against the targeted Zero-day adversarial attack. The first approach for defending against the
MLP poisoning attack was to analyse the activation weights in a heat map at the different layers, in
the same way image recognition models are analysed to show on which section of an image the model
is concentrating. The idea behind the heat map was to see if it is possible to distinguish a targeted
Zero-day file from an actual benign file by how the weights are activated. An assumption was made
that the Zero-day file, which had not been modified in any way, should contain a significant amount
of activation weights which would lead the classifier correctly towards the malicious class, but are
overwhelmed by a smaller, but stronger group of activation weights which belong to the injected
adversarial features.
The tool keract is used to generate heatmaps of MLP activation weights for image recognition models
which was selected to produce the heatmap of the Zero-day activation weights. As shown in Figure
4.2 1D representations of activation weights in a heatmap do not provide adequate information
compared to a 2D image.
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Figure 4.2 – Single Dimension Heatmap Representation of Activation Weights

4.6.2 Feature Importance
Another defensive approach was to identify the importance of features in determining the
classification of data at test time. The approach was to use some form of permutation importance to
identify which features contribute the most to the decision making. Permutation importance works by
replacing or removing a feature or set of features in the test file and retesting the file for each set of
changes. If the loss increases without the feature(s) being present, it is assumed that they positively
contribute to the classification.
The defensive approach of feature importance was examined to see if it is possible to identify features
within an adversarial example that belong to the trigger set and contribute to the misclassification of
the file. That is to say, if removing certain features from a file changes the classification from benign
to malicious, would that indicate that a targeted poisoning attack has been successfully performed?
This is under the assumption that when running feature permutation on a clean model, removing
features would only show the contribution to their classification, and that the class would not change
from removing features. The class would only change in the targeted poisoning attack samples due to
the trigger features being removed. As this defence would require removing each feature or set of
features from a file and analysing the file for each permutation, it is not a defence which could be
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reasonable performed at test time, and is best left identifying adversarial data within the training
dataset.

4.6.3 Activation Clustering
4.6.3.1

At training

B. Chen et al. (2018) developed a defence for adversarial poisoning attacks which works by
examining clusters of the activation weights from the last hidden layer. The defensive strategy
assumes that the adversarial example’s weights will cluster towards both the target adversarial class
and the original source class, which is being attacked, compared to clean examples which will cluster
towards their true target class. The defence was built for image recognition models, where a trigger
mask is overlaid on target images to shift the classification towards the attackers desired class e.g., a
stop sign being misclassified as a speed limit sign. In the case of the Zero-day poisoning attack, the
adversarial features injected into the benign test data are features which can be found in both
malicious and benign files. The cluster of the training data activation weights would likely show a
strong benign cluster.
The poisoning defence has been integrated into the IBM Adversarial Robustness Toolbox. The
defence was attempted on the MLP poisoned EMBER dataset but did not work due to a bounds limit
on the dataset. The poisoning defence has a set limit of 5,000 and the MLP EMBER dataset contains
50,000 samples.
It is assumed that the activation clustering defence would not succeed in detecting the adversarial
examples in the benign training dataset, as the adversarial examples are not mislabelled data e.g. a
stop sign labelled as a speed limit sign, but genuine benign files injected with additional import
functions. The injected import functions represent a small portion of the benign file's feature space,
and do not alter the functionality of the benign file into a malicious file. A modified version of the
activation clustering defence was performed by Severi et al. (2020) and it was found that the defence
was unable to detect the watermark attack when using their combined approach (detailed in 2.7.1.8),
as the adversarial features were too well camouflaged and became indistinguishable from genuine
features.
An extension of the defence to be applied at test has been proposed to defend against targeted
adversarial poisoning attacks for Zero-day malware files. Using the same premise as the activation
clustering defence, the activation weight values from the neurons in the last hidden layer are to be
examined at test time for anomalous behaviour. If the activation weight values of files classified as
benign differ significantly from the average activation weight values of the benign class, and lean
more towards the malicious class for a majority of the neurons, then the files are flagged as suspicious
and to be quarantined for further examination.
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4.6.3.2

At test time

A proposed idea is to first examine the average and normal distribution of each individual weight
from the last hidden layer to find the norm to which a benign file should belong, and then to compare
each of the individual weights for outliers and if they are significant enough to warrant further
examination of the file (e.g., quarantine for further dynamic analysis). The assumption of why outliers
in the activation weights would exist is due to how the targeted poisoning attack was performed. In
the attack only the benign training data was injected with the adversarial features obtained from the
Zero-day file, the Zero-day file has not been modified in any way, and originally was correctly
classified as malicious. Since the Zero-day file has not been modified, the majority of the features
present within the file should contribute towards a correct classification of malicious, with the trigger
features overwhelming the correct classification due to their significant presence in the benign
training data.

Figure 4.3 - Zero-day Activation Weights

Figure 4.3 illustrates the activation weights of the Zero-day files from the last hidden layer from the
clean model overlayed on the average activation weight values from the training data. As the figure
shows, the weights cluster towards the average malicious activation weight values.
Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 illustrate the activation weights of two Zero-day files which were accurately
classified as malicious after 8.6% of the benign training files were injected with adversarial features
from the Zero-day files.
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Figure 4.4 - Activation Weights of Zero-day Correct Classification - Example 1

Figure 4.5 - Activation Weights of Zero-day Correct Classification - Example 2

Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 illustrate the activation weights of two Zero-day files which were
misclassified as malicious after 8.6% of the benign training files were injected with adversarial
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features from the Zero-day files. The Zero-day weights appear to centre between the benign and
malicious activation weight averages.

Figure 4.6 - Activation Weights of Zero-day Successful Mis-Classification - Example 1

Figure 4.7 - Activation Weights of Zero-day Successful Mis-Classification - Example 2

After visually examining the activation weights from the successful Zero-day attacks, the weights
were analysed to determine if they were within one standard deviation from the mean of the benign
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activation weights. From the 184 successful attacks from experiment set three (hybrid poisoning
attack randomised), 180 (97.82%) of the Zero-day files had eight or more activations weights outside
of one standard deviation from their corresponding benign neuron activation weight value. Using the
first successful attack as an example, the benign activation weights from the training dataset were
examined and a total of 1,553 from 25,000 (6.21%), which is near the percentage of adversarial
examples in the benign training data, were outside the specified range. To determine if the activation
weights were outside the range in the benign training data was due to the poisoning attack, the
activation weights of the benign training files from the clean model were examined, and 1,817 files
(7.26%) had eight or more activation weights outside of the range, which is larger than the poison
example.
After using the benign activation weights of the 25,000 files used to train the model, additional
experiments were performed using the 100,000 benign test data files from the original EMBER2017
dataset. When calculating the averages and standard deviation of the activation weights from the
100,000 benign test files for each poisoned model, it was found that the averages of the activation
weights were similar across each experiment, but the standard deviation was significantly different.
From using a larger dataset, a greater amount of variance was introduced which included a significant
number of outliers which prevented the previously successful defensive technique from working.
To remove the issue of the outliers in the dataset rendering the defensive technique unusable, another
method was examined to identify if it was possible to detect suspicious benign classifications from
examining the activation weights at the last hidden layer during test time. The method which was
chosen for use is known as Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD). The MAD was chosen as it is another
technique for identifying anomalies in data without the deviation being influenced by the present
outliers in the dataset to such a significant degree. The MAD is the average of the distance between
each value and the mean, the formula for calculating the MAD is shown below:
̅|
∑|𝒙 − 𝒙
𝒏
An example of the calculated MAD and standard deviations for the 100,000 activation weights of
benign test files from a sample of successful targeted Zero-day poisoning attacks is shown in Table
48.
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Table 48 - MAD Neuron Defence Examples
Virus

2bdc0256a49b00d768296fa96ab8cb695c55c0d888d9ca0f55e00db259d8e533

Average

-2.54389

-2.69337

-2.25676

2.211975

-2.19205

-2.7541

2.063792

2.002713

2.146433

2.556544

Stdev

2.364112

3.772115

2.929054

2.082663

1.03714

4.643837

6.225784

1.360692

1.749687

3.87158

MAD

0.799923

0.805531

0.80593

0.802687

0.787503

0.805705

0.812789

0.808571

0.808331

0.814831

Average

-2.37618

-2.60961

-2.03221

2.224023

-2.02518

-2.67347

2.008859

1.888502

2.038259

2.526909

Stdev

3.005188

3.813322

2.956617

2.318878

1.067834

4.091844

6.345914

1.208832

1.727433

3.234396

MAD

0.761926

0.776917

0.788561

0.781026

0.767752

0.786423

0.79369

0.789182

0.788709

0.797184

Average

-2.50684

-2.70737

-2.25143

2.207822

-2.21875

-2.75663

2.09072

1.994289

2.150688

2.562616

Stdev

2.199961

4.158785

2.197226

1.837669

1.046023

4.373703

6.720578

1.173849

2.204602

3.847392

MAD

0.78988

0.80404

0.802507

0.801294

0.787647

0.805115

0.812704

0.80945

0.810126

0.816471

Virus

589cbfbca739ce9f99594b75356d5d3f3920c37c3e2bda8681f6cbccc992c38e

Virus

9415462530a30caf7340aca71173a64ca5eaedafbb0d298835851f9cf42622cb

Virus

00c3f291834ed9f5bfeb52e9bd0ce78ad1fdc7bd106ab5e3024cf7e62700b034

Average

-2.42045

-2.64427

-2.07855

2.260539

-2.06865

-2.72758

2.003464

1.92851

2.085095

2.582588

Stdev

2.62585

4.061219

2.479173

2.221951

1.056772

4.717379

6.073107

1.706256

1.684715

3.196454

MAD

0.763034

0.779633

0.793342

0.785683

0.772798

0.793936

0.80351

0.79448

0.795314

0.805225

Virus

96ff3db9c22d16065a8f8e842d896508ae8bd7622e94330215912befbd7adf66

Average

-2.5851

-2.71763

-2.2806

2.250088

-2.22894

-2.77706

2.041697

1.992896

2.12833

2.564581

Stdev

1.791967

4.034525

2.387503

1.17517

1.129382

4.813237

6.994591

1.137338

2.683498

4.163978

MAD

0.792863

0.801257

0.796823

0.799749

0.784861

0.801088

0.817177

0.816006

0.81796

0.823385

For each of the four sets of experiments performed on the MLP model, two defensive strategies were
tested using the MAD. The defensive strategies followed the same formula as the original defence i.e.,
examining the activation weights from the last hidden layer of the target Zero-day file, but the MAD
defence also tested to see if the activation weights of the neurons were outside of two MADs, instead
of the single standard deviation which was originally used. The two MADs were also used as the
general rule for identifying outliers is if they are two standard deviations away from the mean.
From examining the activation weights of the Zero-day files from Experiment 1 - Individual Attack
(25%), which had 211 successful attacks out of 541 attempts, it was found that 105 of the successful
Zero-day poisoning attacks could be identified by examining six neurons outside of both one and two
MADs from the benign activation weights average. The results are shown in Table 49.
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Table 49 - Individual Attack (25%) Defence Results

Successful

Success

Defence

Percent

Neurons

Mean

Benign Test

Benign Test

Absolute

Average FP

FPR

Deviations
120/211

56.872%

6

One

16306

16.306%

105/211

49.763%

6

Two

5436

5.436%

112/211

53.080%

8

One

10969

10.969%

104/211

49.289%

8

Two

3512

3.512%

108/211

51.185%

10

One

5773

5.773%

100/211

47.393%

10

Two

1555

1.555%

From examining the activation weights of the Zero-day files from Experiment 2 - Hybrid Attack
(8.6%), which had 202 successful attacks out of 541 attempts, it was found that 172 of the successful
attacks had six neurons outside two MADs and 10 successful attacks had eight neurons outside two
MADs from the benign activation weights average. The results are shown in Table 50
Table 50 – Hybrid Attack (8.6%) Defence Results

Successful

Success

Defence

Percent

Neurons

Mean

Benign File

Suspicious

Absolute

Average

Benign FPR

Deviations
200/202

99.090%

6

One

16225

16.225%

172/202

85.149%

6

Two

5191

5.191%

199/202

98.515%

8

One

10394

10.394%

10/202

4.950%

8

Two

3375

3.375%

7/202

3.465%

10

One

5446

5.446%

2/202

0.990%

10

Two

1516

1.516%

From examining the activation weights of the Zero-day files from Experiment 3 - Hybrid Attack
Randomised (8.6%), which had 184 successful attacks out of 541 attempts, it was found that 155
successful attacks had six neurons outside two MADs and 145 successful attacks had eight neurons
outside two MADs from the benign activation weights average. The results are shown in Table 51.
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Table 51 - Hybrid Attack Randomised (8.6%) Defence Results

Successful

Success

Defence

Percent

Neurons

Mean

Benign File

Suspicious

Absolute

Average

Benign FPR

Deviations
175/184

95.109%

6

One

15973

15.973%

155/184

84.240%

6

Two

5267

5.267%

170/184

92.391%

8

One

10568

10.568%

145/184

78.804%

8

Two

3394

3.394%

142/184

77.174%

10

One

5445

5.445%

113/184

61.413%

10

Two

1517

1.517%

From examining the activation weights of the Zero-day files from Experiment 4 - Combined Attack
Randomised (15%), which had 436 successful attacks out of 541 attempts, it was found that 376
successful attacks had six neurons outside two MADs and 258 successful attacks had eight neurons
outside two MADs from the benign activation weights average. The results are shown in Table 52.
Table 52 - Hybrid Attack Randomised (15%) Defence Results

Successful

Success

Defence

Percent

Neurons

Mean

Benign File

Suspicious

Absolute

Average

Benign FPR

Deviations
422/436

96.789%

6

One

15618

15.618%

376/436

86.239%

6

Two

6539

6.539%

408/436

93.578%

8

One

10919

10.919%

258/436

59.174%

8

Two

4613

4.613%

211/436

48.394%

10

One

6478

6.748%

33/436

7.569%

10

Two

2776

2.776%

From examining the activation weights of the Zero-day files from Experiment 5 - Combined Attack
Randomised (10%), which had 135 successful attacks out of 531 attempts, it was found that 127
successful attacks had six neurons outside two MADs and 104 successful attacks had eight neurons
outside two MADs from the benign activation weights average. The results are shown in Table 53.
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Table 53 - Combined Attack Randomised (10%) Defence Results

Successful

Success

Defence

Percent

Neurons

Mean

Benign File

Suspicious

Absolute

Average

Benign FPR

Deviations
131/135

97.037%

6

One

15618

15.618%

127/135

94.074%

6

Two

5383

5.383%

131/135

97.037%

8

One

10601

10.601%

104/135

77.037%

8

Two

3360

3.360%

126/135

93.333%

10

One

5474

5.474%

1/135

0.741%

10

Two

1181

1.181%

For each of the tested defences, the clean test dataset from EMBER was used to calculate the average
activation weights of each neuron from the last hidden layer. It was not expected that the average
activation weights would be influenced in any way if the test dataset happened to also be poisoned
with the adversarial features. To verify that the MAD defence can be performed using either a clean
or poisoned dataset, 10% of the clean test dataset was injected with the adversarial features and the
defence was repeated. Out of the 100,000 benign files in the clean test dataset, only 1,818 files
contained all four target import libraries. As there was not enough test files to inject with adversarial
features following the process from the combined poisoning attack, the injection process was
modified to inject the import library and import functions into a random selection of 10,000 benign
test files. The results from the defence experiments are shown in Table 54 with the results being very
similar to the MAD defence on the clean dataset. The results from the experiment indicate that a
known clean dataset is not required for the MAD defence, which is beneficial as it is not possible to
know for certain if a dataset has been poisoned or not.
Table 54 - MAD Defence Experiment - Poisoned Test Data

Successful

Success

Defence

Percent

Neurons

Mean

Benign File

Suspicious

Absolute

Average

Benign FPR

Deviations
133/135

98.519%

6

One

15981

15.981%

127/135

94.074%

6

Two

4789

4.789%

133/135

98.519%

8

One

10864

10.864%

102/135

75.556%

8

Two

2896

2.896%

126/135

93.333%

10

One

5614

5.614%

1/135

0.741%

10

Two

967

0.967%
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The examination of the Zero-day activation weights was compared to the average benign and
malicious test files from the poisoned model. The defence does not require a clean model for use in
any type of comparison, which is beneficial for mitigating the poisoning attacks as it is not possible to
know for certain if any model was trained on clean data.
The tested defensive strategies are related to RQ2 and hypothesis nine which are restated below:
RQ2: Can adversarial attacks against machine learning based malware detection be mitigated?
a. Can targeted adversarial attacks be detected at test time?
H9. The targeted adversarial attack can be prevented at test time.
It was possible to identify misclassified Zero-day files by examining the activation weights from the
last hidden layer of the poisoned model. Each poisoned model from every test in the set of MLP
experiments was analysed to see if it was possible to identify a misclassified Zero-day malicious file
by examining outliers in 6, 8 and 10 neurons. The outliers were first examined by using one standard
deviation from the mean of the benign activation weights from the training set. After examining the
activation weights from the poisoned training dataset (50,000 samples), the test dataset set of 200,000
samples was evaluated to compare the results of the defence from both a poisoned and clean dataset.
When performing the additional examination of the 200,000 file test dataset, it was found that the
variance of the activation weights in the 200,000 file data set was greater than the variance in the
smaller data set which prevented the original defence method from working. To identify outliers
within the test dataset, the mean absolute deviation (MAD) was used instead of the standard deviation.
The MAD was calculated from the absolute values of the neuron’s activation weights as half of the
neurons were negative values.
The MAD examinations tested to see if the activation weights of the Zero-day neurons were outside
of one and two MADs for 6, 8, and 10 neurons. In every set of experiments, it was possible to identify
misclassified Zero-day malicious files with varying degrees of accuracy. In Experiment 5 Combined
Attack Randomised (10%) Defence, the two MAD outliers for ten neurons had the worst performance
with only one successful identification of a Zero-day malicious file.
The 100,000 benign test data files were also examined in each defence experiment to identify how
many legitimate benign files would be categorised as suspicious. Unsurprisingly, the two MAD 10
neuron examination had the least number of false positives in the benign test data, the stricter the
parameters for identifying suspicious files the less accurate the defence becomes. From all of the
experiments performed, Experiment 5 Combined Attack Randomised (10%) would be the most
practical to perform in a live environment, which had the best defence results (high detection success
with low FPR) from 6 and 8 neurons outside of two MADs from the benign activation weight
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average. The results from the defence experiments support H9, in that it is possible to detect a targeted
adversarial poisoning attack at test time, an approach which has not been explored in past research.
An in-depth analysis of the results from the experiments undertaken in this thesis is discussed in the
following chapter.

4.7 Summary
In this chapter, a set of preliminary experiments were undertaken to identify the malware files which
could represent Zero-day malware in the targeted adversarial poisoning attack experiments, and what
level of efficacy was identified from selecting the imports section of Windows PE32 files as the target
feature space of the adversarial poisoning attacks. In the main experiment section, targeted adversarial
poisoning attacks were tested on both GBDT and ANN trained ML models. The aim of the targeted
adversarial poisoning attacks was to allow for a Zero-day malware file, which was correctly identified
as malicious using the clean ML models, to bypass detection which the general efficacy of the ML
model was maintained. The poisoning attacks were followed by exploring different strategies for
defending against the targeted Zero-day poisoning attacks.
The first two strategies, heatmaps and feature importance, failed in preventing the targeted adversarial
attacks from succeeding, but they did provide insight for how the third, successful defence, was to be
developed. In the final defence strategy, the activation weights of each Zero-day file from each
successful attack were examined, and if found to be outside a normal range, the Zero-day file was
flagged as suspicious. The normal range was defined as being within two mean absolute deviations of
the average benign activation weights, which were calculated from the last hidden layer of the benign
files from the 200,000 file test dataset. The average benign activation weights from the last hidden
layer were selected as the last hidden layer contains the encoded data from the previous layers, and as
the target attack is aiming to misclassify the Zero-day file into the benign class, if it falls outside the
normal range, it is to be considered as suspicious.
From the defence experiments, it was found that a targeted Zero-day poisoning attack can be defended
against at test time by examining the activation weights from the last hidden layer. The MAD defence
had the least success in defending against the individual attack experiments with the greatest success
rate of 56.872% but resulting in a 16.306% FPR when tested on the clean benign files from the test
dataset. The best method for detecting suspicious files was if six or more neurons had activation
weights outside two MADs from the benign average, which for experiments two, three, four and five
achieved success rates of 84.313%, 84.946%, 86.073% and 97.810% with FPRs of 5.191%, 5.267%,
6.539% and 4.629%.
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5 Results
This chapter discusses the results obtained from the experiments in chapter 4, the preliminary
experiments that explored reducing the general efficacy of the ML model, the different targeted
adversarial Zero-day poisoning attacks which were performed on both GBDT and MLP models, and
finally the results obtained from the developed defensive technique to detect the Zero-day malware
file at test time.

5.1

Preliminary Results

The preliminary experiments in 1.1 were performed to identify if the imported features of the training
dataset were a suitable target for performing the Zero-day poisoning attack and if so, what parameters
were to be selected for performing the attack. In the preliminary experiments, it was found that using
the total feature space of the benign import features as a baseline for injecting the adversarial features
was not a suitable approach for performing the adversarial poisoning attack. When selecting for 5% of
the benign feature space of the import features, it was found that that amount of injection was never
achieved with the selected features. In each experiment the total amount of benign files which
contained the targeted adversarial feature were injected with the adversarial features. It would not be
possible in a targeted black-box attack scenario to inject every benign training file with adversarial
features, so this approach was not selected for use in the targeted Zero-day adversarial attack
experiments.
The second stage of the preliminary experiments (section 4.4.2), used varying percentages of the
benign training files which contained the targeted import library. The attacks were performed in steps
of 5%, starting at 5% and finishing at 100%. The results from the majority of the experiments did not
significantly change the FNR of the model until the last experiment which injected poison features
into every instance of a benign training file that contained the target import library. The threshold did
increase throughout the majority of the experiments, indicating that the presence of adversarial
features influenced the training of the model, but not at a significant level until the final stages of the
experiments, as shown in Table 55.
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Table 55 - Kernel32.dll - Last Three Attack Results from each Preliminary Experiment

Attack Name
manual_kernel32_5_90
manual_kernel32_5_95
manual_kernel32_5_100
manual_kernel32_10_90
manual_kernel32_10_95
manual_kernel32_10_100

FPR 1%
0.999

FNR 1%
2.826

Threshold 1%
0.761

ROC %
99.847

Detection Rate
1%
97.174

0.994
0.986
0.997
1.000
0.992
0.992

4.389
13.379
3.370
4.786
17.118
3.219

0.854
0.980
0.804
0.881
0.989
0.877

99.768
99.291
99.815
99.754
99.188
99.838

95.611
86.621
96.630
95.214
82.882
96.781

0.989
0.000
0.989
0.990
0.000

5.344
100.000
3.513
4.681
100.000

0.941
1.000
0.892
0.945
1.000

99.753
98.143
99.821
99.766
97.867

94.656
0.000
96.487
95.319
0.000

random_kernel32_5_90
random_kernel32_5_95
random_kernel32_5_100
random_kernel32_10_90
random_kernel32_10_95
random_kernel32_10_100

The hypotheses tested in the preliminary experiments were H1, H2, H3, and H4 which are stated below
and shown in Table 56.
H1. A manual selection of features can be used for a successful adversarial poisoning attack.
H2. A random selection of features can be used for a successful adversarial poisoning attack.
H3. No more than 5% of the benign feature space is required to be poisoned to reduce the
general efficacy of the model.
H4. No more than 10% of the training data is required to be poisoned to reduce the general
efficacy of the model.
Table 56 - H1 - H4 Experiment relationship and Results

Hypothesis

Related Experiments

Supported

H1

First Preliminary Set

Yes

H2

Second Preliminary Set

Yes

H3

All

Yes

H4

All

No

The only hypothesis which was not supported by the results from any of the preliminary experiments
was H4. None of the experiments were able to reduce the general efficacy of the model at an injection
rate of 10% benign training files containing the targeted import library.
It was shown that it is possible to reduce the overall availability of the model from both a manual and
random selection of adversarial features which supports H1 and H2, the overall amount of training files
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which needed to be injected when using the chosen sample set of adversarial features was
significantly large (100% of the target benign files). The high percentage of poisoning was likely due
to the small number of features chosen for injection, as the imports section of Windows PE32 files in
EMBER comprises the majority of the feature vectors used for training the model.
H3 was supported from the experiments as 5% of the benign feature space of the training data being
injected with adversarial features was never achieved using the target manual selection of adversarial
features. In the benign feature space experiments, it was found that every instance of benign training
files which contained the target import library were injected with the adversarial features, the same as
the 100% injection attack performed in the other set of preliminary experiments. The target import
library “msvcrt.dll” was the only experiment to not reduce the overall availability of the model after
injecting the adversarial features into every benign training file. The import library “msvcrt.dll” was
not very common in the EMBER dataset, therefore, the results from the general efficacy attack
experiments were as expected.

5.2

Targeted Attack Results (GBDT)

The GBDT model which is supplied in the EMBER framework was the first model tested in the
targeted adversarial poisoning experiments. The first set of experiments performed used a subset of 50
Zero-day files out of the chosen 541 Zero-day files obtained from VirusShare. These experiments
tested different percentages of injection of the total benign training files. The selected percentages
were 5%, 10%, 15%, 20% and 25%. Unlike the preceding preliminary experiments which continued
to a maximum of 100% injection, it was not intended that the targeted adversarial poisoning attacks
should affect the overall availability of the model or increase the threshold for detecting malicious
files too far from the original clean model. The aim of the experiments was to see how well the
poisoning attacks would perform, without going too far beyond a reasonable level of poisoning. The
results from the experiments are shown in Table 57.
Table 57 - Targeted Adversarial Poisoning Attack (Individual Approach) - GBDT Results

Test

Total Successful Attacks

Average

Median

Average

Median

Score

Score

Threshold

Threshold

5%

0

0.901

0.918

0.539

0.538

10%

2

0.813

0.851

0.560

0.561

15%

9

0.748

0.832

0.586

0.589

20%

14

0.696

0.765

0.619

0.624

25%

19

0.645

0.713

0.657

0.664
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The second experiment, which was called the combined attack, only injected the adversarial features
into benign training files which contained all four target import libraries. The combined attack
experiment reduced the amount of available target benign training files for poisoning but was
designed to create a pattern within the benign class, which when triggered by the Zero-day malware
test file, would shift the file’s classification from benign to malicious. The results from the combined
attack experiments are shown in Table 58. The difference between the two experiments is that in the
first experiment, adversarial features were injected on a first come basis, which would lead to larger
clusters of poisoned data in the benign training set, while the second attack randomised the selection
of target benign files to poison. In the second experiment, the same random seed was used in each
attack to provide a uniform way of comparing the efficacy of each attack.
Table 58 - Targeted Adversarial Poisoning Attack (Combined Approach) - GBDT Results

Test

Total

Average

Median

Average

Median

Successful

Score

Score

Threshold

Threshold

328/543

0.519

0.538

0.607

0.608

312/543

0.531

0.551

0.606

0.606

Attacks
First
Experiment
Second
Experiment

The targeted Zero-day poisoning experiments are related to research question one and hypotheses five
and six, which are restated below.
RQ1: Can adversarial attacks against machine learning based malware detectors increase the
likelihood of unknown-unknown malware samples bypassing detection?
H5. No more than 10% of the benign training data files are required to be poisoned for a
targeted adversarial attack to succeed.
As it was shown in Table 57, neither the 5% attack or the 10% attack had any significant number of
successful targeted Zero-day poisoning attacks, the 5% test had zero successful attacks and the 10%
attack only had two. The individual attack approach was not expected to have any significant number
of successful attacks from how the attack was performed but it was assumed that there would be more
successful attacks than was shown. Neither of the hypotheses were supported by the results obtained
from the first individual attack experiments.
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As it was shown in Table 58, the hybrid attack experiments, which used an 8.6% injection of the total
benign training files, achieved a success rate of 60.40% (326/541 successful attacks) for the first set of
experiments, while the second set of experiments had a success rate of 57.45% (310/541 successful
attacks). The results from both sets of experiments support H5, in that successful targeted adversarial
poisoning attacks can be achieved with poisoning less than 10% of the total benign training files.

5.3

Targeted Attack Results (MLP)

The second ML algorithm used to test the targeted Zero-day adversarial poisoning attack was a basic
Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP). The architecture of the MLP was adapted from an example used by
Endgame, the creators of EMBER, to keep a level of consistency between the tests instead of creating
and calibrating a new MLP model. The hidden layers of the MLP were modified from the original
Endgame example, with the main addition being an extra layer of ten neurons. The ten-neuron layer
was the last hidden layer of the model and was included as the idea of examining the last hidden layer
to identify the targeted Zero-day poisoning attack had already been considered as a possible approach
for developing a defence.
The training data was comprised of 50,000 samples (25,000 benign and 25,000 malicious) which were
extracted from the EMBER2017 dataset. The dataset was split evenly between malicious and benign
files to follow the format of the original EMBER2017 dataset, which contained 300,000 malicious
and 300,000 benign files. The benign files were extracted to contain enough files to generate the
adversarial examples containing the four chosen import libraries. These adversarial example files
were extracted on a first come basis and were deliberately not selected from a list of successful
poisoning attacks from the GBDT experiments described in section 4.5.1.1, so as to not directly
influence the following experiments.
Five sets of experiments were carried out to examine how the poisoning attack influenced the
classification of the MLP model. In the first experiment, the adversarial features were injected
separately into benign files in the same way as the individual attack mentioned in the GBDT
experiments. The injection was performed at a rate of 25% of the total benign files in the training data
set. For each of the experiments in the individual attack, the poisoned training data generated were not
randomised before training the ML model. The attack had 213/541 Zero-day files misclassified as
benign, a success rate of 39.22% while not negatively influencing the general efficacy of the model.
In the second set of experiments, a hybrid injection attack was performed at 8.6% of the total benign
files. The dataset was generated to contain 15% of the benign files available for injection (they
contained all four chosen import libraries). The second experiment also did not randomise the
poisoned training data, which may influence the way the attack performs as the original generation of
the training set created some clusters of benign files which were available for injection. The attack
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had 202/541 Zero-day files misclassified as benign, a success rate of 37.338%, which is less than the
individual attack and contrary to the results from the individual and combined GBDT attacks.
The third and fourth sets of experiments both randomised the poisoned training data before generating
the model. The randomisation of training data was only performed to reduce the clusters of benign
data which exist from the original dataset, the seed was held constant across these experiments for
reproducibility. The third test was performed at 8.6% and the fourth test at 16.5% of the benign file
space. The third test had 184/541 (34.011%) Zero-day files misclassified as benign while the fourth
test had 436/541 (80.591%).
The general efficacy of the model (as measured by the accuracy and threshold) in the third set of
experiments was the same as the previous two sets of experiments. In contrast, in the fourth set of
experiments the false negative rate and the threshold drastically increased. The increase in successful
attacks in the fourth set of experiments was due to the degradation of the general efficacy, as shown in
Table 59, the average adversarial score was 0.863 while the average threshold was 0.984, which
shows that the poisoning attack did not reduce the overall score of the Zero-day files in a significant
way, instead the overall threshold was increased, which allowed for the Zero-day files to be
misclassified as benign.
The combined attack experiments achieved a success rate of 24.954%, with 135 out of 541 successful
attacks. The combined attack experiments had fewer successful attacks compared to both hybrid
attacks which injected adversarial features into a smaller amount of benign training files. It is likely
that the increased number of training files poisoned with adversarial features from ‘user32.dll’
influenced the success of the hybrid poisoning attacks.
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Table 59 - MLP Targeted Adversarial Attack Results

Test Name

Total

Average

Median

Average

Median

Average

Successful

Score

Score

Threshold

Threshold

FNR

211/541

0.683

0.986

0.856

0.858

4.040

202/541

0.751

0.998

0.834

0.835

3.994

184/541

0.823

0.997

0.811

0.813

3.358

436/541

0.866

0.963

0.984

0.988

18.569

135/541

0.914

0.993

0.837

0.836

4.049

Attacks
Individual
Attack
(23%)
Hybrid
Attack
(8.6%)
Hybrid
Attack
Randomised
(8.6%)
Hybrid
Attack
(17%)
Combined
Attack
(10%)

The results from the targeted Zero-day poisoning experiments show that it is possible to increase the
likelihood of unknown-unknown malware samples bypassing detection from ML trained malware
detection models. In both the GBDT and MLP trained models’ successful attempts to bypass
classification through poisoning of the benign training set was achieved. The experiments did require
up to ten percent of the benign training data samples to be infected with adversarial features but the
process of poisoning the model was performed in a black-box scenario, which reduced the ability to
identify which features would contribute the most to the model’s classification and to target those
features specifically. From the feature analysis paper by Saxe and Berlin (2015), it was found that the
imports section when used by itself to identify patterns and correctly classify malicious files,
performed the worst compared to the four other areas that were tested. In the experiments the imports
section was chosen as it compromised the majority of the input feature vectors and in a practical
sense, adding an import function to a binary PE32 file is a simple way to perform an adversarial
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poisoning attack. In future work other areas of the binary PE32 file would be tested to identify which
area is best suited for manipulation to generate a successful targeted adversarial poisoning attack.

5.4 Defence Results
The defensive method developed in this thesis examines the activation weights of files at test time
from the last hidden layer of the MLP ML model to identify anomalous behaviour in the weights. In a
successfully trained model, it would be expected that the activation weights would be clustered
around the average of a correct class for each of the neurons in the last hidden layer. Only the last
hidden layer needs to be examined as all the previous data is encoded in this layer. As normal files
which are either benign or malicious sit close to the average activation weight when examining a
clean model, it would be obvious that something has gone awry when a tested file sits between the
activation weights of both classes for the majority of the neurons, as shown in the example below:

Figure 5.1 - ZeroDay False Negative Example 1

In Figure 5.1 - ZeroDay False Negative Example 1, the red and blue dots represent the average
activation weights of the malicious and benign test files from EMBER’s 200,000 file test dataset,
respectively. The green dots are the activation weights of the target Zero-day file which was used as
the basis for extracting import functions and injecting them throughout the benign training dataset. In
a clean (non-poisoned) model, the green dots would be closer to the red dots (because Zero-day is a
sub-class of Malicious), but due to the adversarial poisoning, the activation weights have shifted away
from their original malicious class and moved closer towards the benign class. The activation weights
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have not shifted enough to the benign class to make the Zero-day file appear as the legitimate benign
files do, but the shift in the activation weights has been significant enough for the malicious Zero-day
file to be misclassified as benign. To defend against targeted Zero-day poisoning attacks, a test was
proposed to evaluate the activation weights at test time. The heuristic used in this test was if it was
found that a file which was classified as benign, had eight or more activation weights that were further
than one standard deviation away from the average activation weight of the neuron, then the file
would be considered to be suspicious and should be quarantined for further examination which could
be performed by dynamic analysis or any other methods for malware detection. Three sets of
experiments analysing six, eight, and ten neurons of the activation weights at test time were
performed, and the eight neuron experiment was found to have the most successful results.
From the 184 successful attacks from Experiment 3 shown in Table 59, 182 (97.85%) of the Zero-day
files had eight or more activations weights outside of one standard deviation from their corresponding
benign neuron activation weight value. Using the first successful attack as an example, the benign
activation weights from the training dataset were examined and a total of 1,553 from 25,000 (6.21%),
which is near the percentage of adversarial examples in the benign training data, were outside the
range, and would be regarded as suspicious. To determine if the activation weights were outside the
range in the benign training data was due to the poisoning attack, the activation weights of the benign
training files from the clean model were examined, and 1,817 files (7.26%) had eight or more
activation weights outside of the range, which is larger than the poison example. Which indicates that
it is not the poisoning which is responsible for genuine benign files to appear as suspicious in
accordance with the defence, but that legitimate variance in benign files exists which will generate
false positives for the defensive strategy.
After using the benign activation weights of the 25,000 files used to train the model, additional
examinations were performed using the 100,000 benign data files from the original EMBER2017
dataset. When calculating the averages and standard deviation of the activation weights from the
100,000 benign test files for each poisoned model, it was found that the average of the activation
weights were similar across each experiment but the standard deviation was significantly different.
From using a larger dataset, a greater amount of variance was introduced which included a significant
number of outliers which prevented the previously successful defensive technique from functioning
correctly.
To remove the issue of the outliers in the dataset rendering the defensive technique unusable, another
method was examined to identify if it was possible to detect suspicious benign classifications from
examining the activation weights at the last hidden layer during test time. The method which was
chosen for use is known as Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD), which is another technique for
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identifying anomalies in data without the present outliers in the dataset influencing the standard
deviations to such a significant degree.
For each of the five sets of experiments performed on the MLP model, two defensive strategies were
tested using the MAD. The defensive strategies followed the same formula as the original defence i.e.,
examining the activation weights from the last hidden layer of the target Zero-day file, but the MAD
defence also tested to see if the activation weights of the neurons were outside of two MADs, instead
of the single standard deviation which was originally used. The two MADs were also used as the
general rule for identifying outliers is if they are two standard deviations away from the mean. For the
fifth set of experiments, an additional set of defensive sets was performed using activation weights
obtained from a poisoned version of the test dataset. In the poisoned set, ten percent of the benign
files were injected with the adversarial features. The defence using the poisoned weights was
performed to verify that the MAD defence does not require a clean dataset to generate the average
benign activation weights. The results from each MAD defence are shown in Table 60, Table 61, and
Table 62.
Table 60 – MAD Defence Results Six Neurons

Mean

Successful

Success

Defence

Percent

120/211

56.87%

6

One

16.306%

105/211

49.76%

6

Two

5.436%

200/202

99.09%

6

One

16.225%

172/202

85.15%

6

Two

5.191%

175/184

95.11%

6

One

15.973%

155/184

84.24%

6

Two

5.267%

422/436

96.79%

6

One

15.618%

376/436

86.24%

6

Two

6.539%

131/135

97.04%

6

One

15.618%

127/135

94.07%

6

Two

5.383%

Five (Poisoned

133/135

98.52%

6

One

15.981%

Test Data)

127/135

94.07%

6

Two

4.789%

Experiment

One

Two

Three

Four

Five

Neurons

Absolute
Deviations

Suspicious
Benign FPR
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Table 61 - MAD Defence Results Eight Neurons

Mean

Successful

Success

Defence

Percent

112/211

53.08%

8

One

10.969%

104/211

49.29%

8

Two

3.512%

199/202

98.52%

8

One

10.394%

10/202

4.95%

8

Two

3.375%

170/184

92.39%

8

One

10.568%

145/184

78.80%

8

Two

3.394%

408/436

93.58%

8

One

10.919%

258/436

59.17%

8

Two

4.613%

131/135

97.04%

8

One

10.601%

104/135

77.04%

8

Two

3.360%

Five (Poisoned

133/135

98.52%

8

One

10.864%

Test Data)

102/135

75.56%

8

Two

2.896%

Experiment

One

Two

Three

Four

Five

Neurons

Absolute
Deviations

Suspicious
Benign FPR

Table 62 - MAD Defence Results Ten Neurons

Mean

Successful

Success

Defence

Percent

108/211

51.19%

10

One

5.773%

100/211

47.39%

10

Two

1.555%

7/202

3.47%

10

One

5.446%

2/202

0.99%

10

Two

1.516%

142/184

77.17%

10

One

5.445%

113/184

61.41%

10

Two

1.517%

211/436

48.39%

10

One

6.478%

33/436

7.57%

10

Two

2.776%

126/135

93.33%

10

One

5.474%

1/135

0.74%

10

Two

1.181%

Five (Poisoned

126/135

93.33%

10

One

5.614%

Test Data)

1/135

0.74%

10

Two

0.967%

Experiment

One

Two

Three

Four

Five

Neurons

Absolute
Deviations

Suspicious
Benign FPR
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The tested defensive strategies are related to RQ2 and hypothesis nine which are restated below:
RQ2: Can adversarial attacks against machine learning based malware detection be mitigated?
a. Can targeted adversarial attacks be detected at test time?
H6. The targeted adversarial attack can be prevented at test time.
It was possible to identify misclassified Zero-day files by examining the activation weights from the
last hidden layer of the poisoned model. Each poisoned model from every experiment in the set of
MLP experiments was tested to see if it was possible to identify a misclassified Zero-day malicious
file by examining outliers in 6, 8 and 10 neurons. The outliers were first examined by using one
standard deviation from the mean of the benign activation weights from the training set. An additional
examination was performed using the 200,000 file test dataset from EMBER2017, as the training
dataset contained poisoned samples whereas the test dataset was clean. When performing an
additional examination on the 200,000 file test dataset, it was found that the variance of the activation
weights in the 200,000 file data set was greater than the variance in the smaller data set variation of
the activation weights from the larger dataset increased the standard deviation spread which prevented
the original defence method from functioning correctly. As an alternative measure to identify outliers
within the test dataset, the mean absolute deviation (described in section 4.6.3.2) was used instead of
the standard deviation. The mean absolute deviation was calculated from the absolute values of the
neuron’s activation weights as half of the neurons were negative values.
The MAD examinations tested to see if the activation weights of the Zero-day neurons were outside
of one and two MADs for 6, 8, and 10 neurons. In every set of experiments, it was possible to identify
misclassified Zero-day malicious files with varying degrees of accuracy. In Experiment 5 Combined
Attack (10%) Defence, the two MAD outliers for ten neurons had the worst performance with only
one successful identification of a Zero-day malicious file.
The 100,000 benign test data files were also examined in each defence experiment to identify how
many legitimate benign files would be categorised as suspicious. Unsurprisingly, the two MAD 10
neuron examination had the least number of false positives in the benign test data, as the stricter the
parameters for identifying suspicious files, the less accurate the defence becomes. From all of the
experiments performed, Experiment 5 Combined Attack Randomised (10%) would be the most
practical to perform in a live environment, from examining Experiments 5 defence results, the tests
for 6 and 8 neurons outside of two MADs from the benign activation weight average provided the best
defence success (94.07% and 77.04%) along with low percentages of false positives (5.383% and
3.360%). The results from the defence experiments support H9, in that it is possible to detect a
targeted adversarial poisoning attack at test time, an approach which had not been explored in past
research.
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5.5 Defence Contribution
The MAD defence proposed and tested in this thesis differs from the current adversarial poisoning
defences in that it does not aim to use some form of outlier detection to detect the poisoned samples
within the training dataset and remove them, but instead aims to detect suspicious files at test time by
their activation weight values and quarantine the file for further analysis. Unlike most existing
training defences which require a clean dataset to compare against the poisoned dataset to identify
anomalous clusters, the MAD defence can be performed successfully using either clean or poisoned
data to generate the activation weight values. Being able to defend against poisoning attacks without
having a confirmed clean dataset to use for comparison is beneficial as it is not possible to know for
certain if a dataset is clean or poisoned. The novelty of defending against adversarial attacks at test
time provides an extra layer of security to defend against poisoning attacks. The adversarial defences
which remove poisoned data from the training set should be utilised to protect against poisoning
attacks in conjunction with the test time MAD defence to provide the optimal level of defence.

5.6 Summary
In this chapter, an overview of the different poisoning experiments was provided along with an
analysis of the results and how they relate to the research questions and hypotheses. From the
preliminary poisoning experiments, it was found that the results support that both a manual and
random selection of adversarial features can be used in a successful poisoning attack (H1 and H2) and
that no more than 5% of the benign feature space is required to be poisoned for a successful attack to
occur (H3). The results from the preliminary experiment did not support H4, as more than 10% of the
benign training files were required to be poisoned for the attacks to succeed.
From the main set of experiments, it was found that it was possible for a targeted adversarial
poisoning attack to succeed without poisoning more than 10% of the benign training data (H5). The
main experiments were performed using different poisoning methods to identify the importance of
adversarial features and data positioning in relation to attack success. It was found that if the poisoned
training files clustered closer together, more attacks would succeed.
In addition to the poisoning experiments, an analysis of the results from the MAD defence strategy
was provided and it was found that the overall most successful defence was six or more neurons
outside of two MADs from the target benign average, which for experiments two, three, four and five
achieved success rates of 84.313%, 84.946%, 86.073% and 97.810% with FPRs of 5.191%, 5.267%,
6.539% and 4.629%.
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6 Discussion
In this chapter, a discussion of the attacks, defences and their relation to the proposed research
questions is provided. The chapter starts with a review of the preliminary experiments, which
provided the basis for the targeted adversarial attacks, as the preliminary experiments identified what
type of features to be used in the poisoning attacks and that they could be randomly selected without
the need to perform any feature importance analysis. The chapter continues with a discussion of the
targeted poisoning attack, and how the attack differed from the watermark attack which also used the
EMBER dataset. The next section covers the types of defences which have been developed to prevent
adversarial poisoning attacks and how the proposed MAD defence in this thesis differs from the other
defences and provides a new way to defend against targeted adversarial poisoning attacks. The final
section outlines each research question and hypothesis and examines the results from their related
experiments which either support or reject the hypothesis.

6.1

Adversarial Attack Discussion

A selection of different types of attacks were performed during the experimentation stage of the
thesis. The first attacks were executed to identify if using the import library section as the basis of the
poisoning attack would be successful. The second set of attacks were performed to see if it was
possible for a targeted Zero-day malware file, which was originally classified correctly, to be
misclassified as a benign file after injecting features from the import section of the targeted Zero-day
into the benign training files import section. For the targeted adversarial poisoning attacks, CNN and
RNN models were also evaluated to provide a comparison between CNN, RNN, and MLP models.
All the trained CNN models produced a no-skill model which did not exceed 50% accuracy. None of
the RNN models completed training stage, due to the hardware limitations of the workstation. As
restrictions in were in place to prevent the spread of covid-19, it was not possible to gain access to
more powerful equipment which could train the RNN model, and as such, only MLP models were
used throughout the rest of the experimentation stage.
The general efficacy attack performed in the preliminary experiments is similar to the various
adversarial poisoning attacks which have performed on a variety of ML models, such as the SPAM
poisoning attack performed by Nelson et al. (2008). The purpose of the preliminary experiments was
to first validate existing research and second, to identify possible parameters for performing the
targeted Zero-day poisoning attack. The primary aim of the preliminary experiments was to identify if
injecting adversarial features into the import section of the benign training data files would influence
the classification of the trained model, and the secondary aim of the preliminary experiments was to
identify if there was any significant difference from using either a manual or random selection of
features. The manual selections of features were chosen by analysing the feature count from the
benign training file import library functions, and from the malicious Zero-day files obtained from
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VirusShare. The random selections of features were randomly taken from the total pool of import
library functions in both the benign EMBER set and malicious VirusShare set.
In the general efficacy attack experiments, each chosen import library (‘kernel32.dll’, ‘advapi32.dll’,
‘user32.dll’, ‘shell32.dll’, and ‘msvcrt.dll’) was used separately when performing the adversarial
poisoning attacks. The adversarial poisoning attacks were performed at different percentages of the
total benign train data files. The first set of experiments were performed using the feature space of the
import library functions as the basis of the poisoning attack, with the first and only set of experiments
using 5% of the total feature space as the maximum injection percentage. The feature space injection
attacks were only performed at 5% as that percentage was not achieved with every instance of benign
training files which contained the target import library being injected with the adversarial features.
The other set of preliminary experiments used the percentage of benign training files which contained
the target import function as the basis of the attacks. The first experiment started at 5% and continued
in steps of five until 100% of the available benign training files were injected with the adversarial
features, the last attack at 100% being the same as the feature space attack.
The results from the experiments indicated that using the import section of the binary PE32 files as
the target for the adversarial poisoning attacks would be suitable for influencing the classification of
the model when performed the targeted Zero-day adversarial poisoning attack. The import section of
binary PE32 files was found to be the least important when identifying patterns to distinguish between
malicious and benign files in the paper by Saxe and Berlin (2015). The results from the paper were
used by the developers of EMBER when performing the feature engineering stage of their framework.
It is interesting to see that the field with the least contribution to the classification of malicious and
benign files can be manipulated to allow for a targeted Zero-day file to bypass detection by being
misclassified as benign, when it would otherwise be classified correctly from the same but clean
dataset. In future work it would interesting to see how well the targeted adversarial poisoning attack
would work when manipulating other sections of the binary PE32 file.
A similar attack to the targeted Zero-day poisoning attack was performed by Severi et al. (2020)
which also used EMBER as the dataset for their attack which they called a watermark attack. The
watermark attack was performed by manipulating a portion of the non-hashed input vectors of the
benign files in the EMBER dataset to create a pattern that would classify any tested with the same
watermark as benign.
The watermark attack used SHAP values (see section 2.7.1.8) to identify the contribution of each
vector in the 2351-dimensional input vector and then selected the vectors with the greatest
contribution as the target values for the attack. The watermark attack only selected features which
were not hashed in the feature engineering phase of generating the EMBER model. Features in
EMBER which are hashed are a harder target for creating a watermark as the majority of the hashed
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features are generated from a series of features, which would mean that the majority of features which
contribute to the hash would need to be manipulated to create the watermark. Only using features
which are not hashed reduces the difficulty in creating the watermark. It would be interesting to see
how well the watermark attack would work if the features which were manipulated were computed
into several hashes.
The targeted Zero-day adversarial poisoning attacks performed in this thesis did not rely on feature
analysis from a surrogate model to identify which features contributed the most to the classification as
the watermark attack did. Instead, the targeted Zero-day adversarial poisoning attacks manipulated the
imports section of the benign training files, which unlike the watermark attack, was a section which
was computed into a hash digest of 1280-bits. The imports section was chosen as it was used to
compute the majority of the input feature vectors used in EMBER, and it provided a straightforward
avenue for manipulating the benign training files and performing the adversarial poisoning attacks.

6.2 Adversarial Defence Discussion
As stated in 3.2.2, the eighth project phase was the evaluation and discussion of the adversarial
defensive strategy. The defensive strategies outlined in the papers by B. Chen et al. (2018) and Wang
et al. (2019) follow a similar approach in that they both examine the activation weights from the last
hidden layer of the neural network model. This is not surprising, as the last hidden layer contains all
the encoded data from the previous layers during training. The previous defences were developed on
multiclass image classification models, with the activation clustering defence also being used by
Severi et al. (2020) for their backdoor watermark attack on EMBER. The MAD defence proposed in
this thesis differs from the activation clustering defence in that it identifies poisoning attacks at test
time, in contrast to identifying adversarial samples at the training stage and removing them.

6.2.1 Neuron Pruning
The neuron pruning defence proposed by Wang et al. (2019) identifies adversarial examples by
examining the neurons at the last hidden layer for outliers in the top 1%. In the experiments
performed by the authors, the multiclass classification models would have a small percentage of
neurons which were 3-7 times as active for adversarial examples compared to clean examples. The
poisoning attacks performed seem to overfit for the trigger in the adversarial examples, allowing for
the target example to be misclassified in accordance with the attacker’s plan. After identifying that a
model has been compromised, the authors suggested pruning of neurons to remove the encoded
pattern which allows for the poisoning attack to succeed. This type of defence would not be
appropriate for the attacks performed in this thesis, as the targeted adversarial poisoning attacks
performed do not create a pattern of neurons with activation weights 3-7 times the average for the
target class, but instead shift the weights of the neurons to sit somewhere in the middle of both
classes, but still closer to the target benign class when the attacks succeed.
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6.2.2 Activation Clustering
In the activation clustering defence, B. Chen et al. (2018) were able to identify anomalous clusters
(the backdoor) due to the backdoored image retaining the majority of the features from the source
image. To fix the poisoned model, the authors relabel the identified adversarial examples as their
original source class and retrain the model. The poisoned models from the targeted adversarial
poisoning attacks in this thesis cannot be fixed by relabelling of the adversarial samples within the
benign training data as the files are not mislabelled, they instead contain import functions found
within both benign and malicious files which shift the classification of target Zero-day files.
Retraining the model after identifying the adversarial examples would not be a permanent fix if the
model is being updated periodically with new data obtained through the same vulnerable avenue
(online gathering). For malware detection applications trained using machine learning, it would be
beneficial to utilise a quarantine defence which isolates suspicious (adversarial) files for further
examination. The quarantine approach would allow for the malware detection application to operate
under the assumption that the model may have been poisoned by an attacker but can still function as
intended.
The targeted adversarial poisoning attacks performed in the early stages of this research Wood and
Johnstone (2020) has some similarities to the watermark poisoning attack subsequently reported by
Severi et al. (2020). In both this thesis and the watermark paper, EMBER was chosen as the target
dataset for testing the experiments and both a Gradient Boosted Decision Tree and Artificial Neural
Network model were tested. In the watermark paper, the authors performed both white-box and blackbox approaches, in this thesis, only a black-box approach performed. In the watermark paper, SHAP
values were calculated to identify which features from EMBER’s 2351 vector inputs contributed the
most to either the benign or malicious classification. The identification of import feature vectors
played a crucial part in identifying which features would be manipulated to create the target
watermark. The watermark paper did not modify any features which would be later hashed by
EMBER’s feature hashing function, this reduced the total amount of available features from 2351 to
2316. In the black-box approach of this thesis, no precursor work was performed to identify the
contribution of feature vectors to the model’s classification. It was assumed to be unlikely that an
attacker would have the underlying knowledge of the model’s architecture but could make a safe
assumption that the imports section of the file would be included in the feature space of the training
data, due to either the model being trained using some form of feature analysis or being trained using
the complete byte sequence of the file.
It would be interesting to test the watermark attack on a modified version of EMBER which converts
the un-hashed values into a hash digest and see if there is any significant difference, first in the quality
of the EMBER model and second in the efficacy of the watermark attack. If feature hashing prevents
the use of SHAP values to determine which feature vectors contribute the most towards the model’s
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classification, would performing feature hashing on every feature prevent attackers from building
substitute models to determine which features should be poisoned?
An experiment which has been left for future work, is to test the watermark attack against the test time
activation weight defence produced in this thesis. It is possible that the defence would not be
successful in identifying the watermark attack if the watermark is successful in shifting the activation
weights closer to the benign average than the experiments in this thesis. As the experiments in this
thesis did not use any precursor information for identifying which features of EMBER contributed the
most to the model’s classification, the attack succeeded instead by injecting enough adversarial
features to shift the classification towards the benign classification, but not enough to appear as a
legitimate benign file. The watermark attack however did use SHAP values, so it may be possible that
the attack does in fact shift the activation weights of the target malicious file to be effectively
camouflaged within the benign activation weights.

6.3 Adversarial Attack and Defence Comparison
From the discussion in the previous sections, an explicit comparison of the work undertaken in this
thesis and the other adversarial attacks and defences discussed above can not be provided due to the
clear differences in the experiment approaches. The adversarial attack which was most similar to the
targeted adversarial poisoning attack conducted in this thesis was the watermark attack performed by
Severi et al. (2020), as it also used the EMBER dataset and injected adversarial features into the
benign feature space of the training data. The clear difference between the watermark attack and the
targeted poisoning attack in this thesis was the pre-processing stage to identify salient information in
the EMBER feature space performed in the watermark attack. The pre-processing stage in the
watermark attack identified which features contributed the most to the model’s classification, which
provided the researchers with a direct avenue for attack. In comparison, no pre-processing was
performed when undertaking the targeted adversarial poisoning attack in this thesis, and as such, a
clear comparison of the results cannot be performed.
In the defensive approaches discussed in the previous sections, the adversarial examples in the
training datasets were identified by evaluating the activation weights of the neurons at the last hidden
layer of the poisoned model in comparison to a trusted clean model and removing the training files
which were significantly outside of the normal distribution from the clean dataset. This type of
defence works under two assumptions, first, a trusted clean dataset is available to generate a baseline
for acceptable neuron activation weight values, and second, that the neuron activation weight values
are easily distinguishable from the trusted clean dataset’s normal distribution. The defence in this
thesis operates under the opposite of the aforementioned assumptions, in that a trusted clean dataset is
not required and that the neuron activation weights of poisoned data are not always easily
distinguishable from clean data in the training dataset.

Page | 145

6.4 Research Question Discussion
In this thesis, two research questions were proposed, and a series of experiments were undertaken to
gather the required information to answer the questions. In this section, the results gathered from the
experiment stage are examined along with their corresponding research questions and hypotheses. The
two research questions examining the attack and defence of machine learning models are restated
below:
RQ1: Can adversarial attacks against machine learning based malware detectors increase the
likelihood of unknown-unknown malware samples bypassing detection?
a. What features are required to perform a successful poisoning attack?
b. What percentage of poisoning is required to reduce the overall availability?
c. What percentage of poisoning is required for a targeted attack to succeed?
RQ2: Can adversarial attacks against machine learning based malware detection be mitigated?
a. Can targeted adversarial attacks be detected at test time?
From the two research questions, nine hypotheses were generated and tested throughout the
experimentation stage. Each of the hypotheses is listed below, with an explanation from the
information gathered during the experiments to either support or reject the hypothesis.
H1. A manual selection of features can be used for a successful adversarial poisoning attack.
H2. A random selection of features can be used for a successful adversarial poisoning attack.
The first set of experiments performed provided the building blocks for the later targeted backdoor
attack. The experiments set out to perform a general efficacy attack against the machine learning
model with different approaches to the feature selection used in the poisoning attack. The experiments
in this thesis operated under the assumption that an attacker would not be able to identify the
importance of features and would instead have to operate under the assumption that after poisoning
enough of the training data, the model would shift classification towards the attacker’s desired
outcome. Therefore, this work is unlike the targeted backdoor watermark attack performed by Severi
et al. (2020), in which precursor examination of the model was performed using both a white-box
approach, and a black-box approach using a surrogate model to identify which features had the most
significant influence on the models classification.
A manual selection of import library features was identified by analysing the training data and a
selection of virus data to identify which features were more common among the virus set than the
training set. This approach, if chosen for the targeted adversarial attack, would fall under the whitebox category as the attacker would have complete access to the training data. The manual selection
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approach was not intended to be used in the targeted adversarial attack but was used in the
preliminary experiments to compare against the results obtained from the random selection attack.
After performing both the manual selection and random selection set of poisoning experiments, the
results indicated that, EMBER is vulnerable to adversarial poisoning attacks targeting the general
efficacy of the model. Further, there is no clear difference from using a manual selection of features or
a random selection as the basis of the attack. From the results of both sets of experiments, it appeared
that a random selection of adversarial features could be used in the future targeted attack.
H3. No more than 5% of the benign training data feature space is required to be poisoned to reduce
the general efficacy of the model.
H4. No more than 10% of the benign training data files are required to be poisoned to reduce the
general efficacy of the model.
In the general efficacy attacks, different percentages of poisoned training data were tested to gauge
what level of injection would be required to succeed in performing a targeted adversarial attack. Only
H4 was not supported from the experiments, as for the majority of the experiments, the general
efficacy of the model was only significantly affected when the adversarial poisoning had reached
100% of the benign training files which could be targeted in the attack.
H5. No more than 10% of the benign training data files are required to be poisoned for a targeted
adversarial attack to succeed.
The targeted adversarial poisoning attacks which succeeded used 8.6% of the benign training data and
2.5% of the total training data. Both the GBDT and MLP models were vulnerable to the targeted
adversarial poisoning attack, with the MLP models being more resilient. Less data was used to train
the MLP models which may have been the reason behind the increased resilience. It is possible that
training files which had a significant influence over the classification of the model and would have
been targeted in the adversarial poisoning attack may not have been included in the MLP dataset. The
MLP attacks may be replicated in the future using a more powerful machine which can support the
entire EMBER2017 dataset.
H6. The targeted adversarial attack can be prevented at test time.
From a visual inspection of the activation weights of test files against the average activation weights
from the test data in the benign and malicious classes, it was clear that the Zero-day test files which
succeeded in being misclassified as benign had an obvious pairwise separation from both the benign
and malicious class. From analysing the activation weights at the pairwise level, it became apparent
that for the majority of Zero-day files in Experiment 3 (180 out of 184), eight out of the ten neurons of
the last hidden layer sat outside of one standard deviation from the benign class towards the malicious
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class. While in the clean benign test data, an average of 6% contained the same activation weight
pattern. After analysing the activation weights using a standard deviation derived from a larger
(100,000) dataset, it became apparent that another method for calculating the deviation was required,
as the larger dataset increased the standard deviation spread which prevented the original defence
from functioning correctly. The Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD) was chosen, and an additional test
was performed to identify if the activation weights existed outside of two MADs. The MAD defence
was successful in identifying the majority of Zero-day files as suspicious for each of the adversarial
poisoning attacks. The results are shown in Table 60, Table 61, and Table 62.
From the activation weight analysis, the evidence supports the hypothesis that it is possible to identify
the targeted Zero-day file trying to bypass detection at test time. In a practical sense, a quarantine
approach for files which meet the criteria of having suspicious activation weights should be
implemented to mitigate the targeted adversarial poisoning attack.

6.5 Summary
In this chapter, a discussion of the adversarial attacks and defences was provided, along with an
examination of the research questions and hypotheses and the results from their related experiments
which either supported or rejected the hypothesis being tested. The adversarial attack section explored
the results from the preliminary experiments, which provided the basis for how the targeted
adversarial poisoning attacks where to be performed. The preliminary experiments identified that
randomly selecting adversarial features performed just as well as manually selecting adversarial
features, which benefited the targeted poisoning attack development for a black-box scenario. The
targeted adversarial poisoning attack was examined with a focus on performing a compare and
contrast the watermark poisoning attack which also used the EMBER dataset. The main difference
between the two attacks is that the watermark attack performed feature analysis using SHAP values to
identify which features should be modified for the attack to succeed, whereas the attack performed in
this thesis did not perform any feature analysis, and instead randomly selected features from the
imports section of the target Zero-day file to be used in the poisoning attack.
The adversarial defence section covered the defences developed to prevent targeted adversarial
poisoning attacks by other researchers and the proposed MAD defence which was tested in this thesis.
The previous defences which have been implemented to prevent targeted poisoning attacks from
succeeding work by identifying outliers within the training data and removing them from the training
set. Whereas the MAD defence identifies suspicious files at test time and quarantines the file for
further analysis. The MAD defence works where it is assumed that the adversarial features used to
poison the dataset blend in within the other clusters of benign features and cannot be easily removed
through the use of anomaly analysis.
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7 Conclusion
The final chapter concludes the work performed throughout this thesis. An overview of the research
process and aims is provided, along with a summary of the contributions made throughout the
research and, finally a discussion of future work which was considered but found to be out of scope
for this thesis is stated.

7.1

Research Overview

This research had two aims. The first was to develop a targeted adversarial poisoning attack which
would allow for Zero-day malware files to bypass detection. The second aim was to develop a defence
which can mitigate the targeted adversarial poisoning attack. The research area was introduced in
Chapter 1, which identified the uses of ML in the cyber security field and the associated known
security issues in using ML. The domain of ML was examined for its contribution in defending
against cyber security threats and general use applications. The significance of the field was
quantified through an examination of the cyber security threat reports available. From identifying the
significance of ML in the cyber security domain, two research questions were put forward to focus on
one of the key areas of ML, cyber security.
A literature review was performed which covered three main areas, malware, machine learning, and
adversarial machine learning. The malware section covered a variety of malware families and
methods used for malware detection. At the beginning it was not known if the adversarial attack was
going to concentrate on a ML model which could detect a particular malware family or a general
malware detection application. A general malware detection application was chosen, and different
malware files were used when experimenting on the adversarial poisoning attack. The machine
learning section covered a variety of algorithms which are often used and the domains they are used
in. The adversarial machine learning section covered the attacks and defences which have been
developed, with a focus on the field of malware detection.
The research was completed in eight phases. The first two phases covered the acquisition and
examination of datasets for the adversarial poisoning attacks and defences. The datasets acquired for
use were the EMBER dataset, which belongs to a research framework for performing machine
learning malware detection research, and from VirusShare, which contained the malware files used as
the targets for the adversarial poisoning attacks. The feature engineering process of EMBER was
evaluated to identify which area should be used as the target for the adversarial poisoning attacks. The
imports feature section was chosen as it provided a large target feature space. No evaluation of the
EMBER feature vectors was performed to identify which features contributed the most to the target
model’s classification. The poisoning attacks which were performed were done so under a strict
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black-box scenario. Knowing the import section of the binary file would more than likely play a role
in training the ML model was enough.
The third phase was the training of machine learning models. The EMBER framework provided a
Gradient Boosted Decision Tree (GBDT) model and the required code to train additional GBDT
models. The other type of model which was used for testing was a Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP).
The code for the MLP was adapted from another project that the EMBER creators had developed. The
fourth, fifth, and sixth phases were all related to the testing of adversarial poisoning attacks. The
fourth phase experimented with testing a general efficacy attack by injecting varying levels of
adversarial features into the benign training data of the EMBER dataset. The general efficacy attacks
were performed to identify if using the imports section as the basis of the targeted adversarial could be
successful and if it were needed to manually select the features for poisoning. If the adversarial
poisoning attacks in the general efficacy experiments failed to influence the trained model, then
another set of features would have needed to be tested. The general efficacy experiments were
successful in identifying the import section as an adequate attack vector.
The fifth and sixth phases involved the testing of the targeted adversarial poisoning attacks using both
the GBDT and MLP models. Different percentages and methods of injection of adversarial features
were performed in both the GBDT and MLP poisoning experiments. There were successful targeted
adversarial poisoning attacks from both the GBDT and MLP experiments. MLP models were found to
be more resilient than the GBDT models for targeted adversarial poisoning attacks. The eighth and
ninth phases were about the defensive strategies to prevent the targeted adversarial poisoning attacks
from succeeding. The MLP model was chosen as the target for the defence, as it is a more popular ML
algorithm. The defensive technique developed is not model agnostic, it evaluates the activation
weights of the neurons from the last hidden layer at test time for anomalies.
Current defences are performed on the training data to identify adversarial examples and remove them
from the dataset. The identification of the adversarial examples requires a clean dataset to use for
comparison, but it is not always possible to know if the dataset being used is in fact clean from
adversarial poisoning, especially if the data is obtained online. The developed defence works under
the assumption that the training dataset is poisoned since it is not possible to know for certain if it is
not. The defence for the targeted adversarial poisoning attack examines the activation weights of the
test file from the last hidden layer to see if there is an anomaly in a majority of the neurons. The
anomaly being that the target file was classified as benign, but a majority of the activation weights
were outside two MADs from the average benign activation weight.
Several hypotheses were developed and tested throughout this thesis to answer the proposed research
questions. Their relationship with the proposed research questions and their results are shown in Table
63.
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Table 63 - Research Question Relationships

Research

Related Hypotheses

Result

Question

RQ1

H1: A manual selection of features can be used for a Accepted
successful adversarial poisoning attack

H2: A random selection of features can be used for a Accepted
successful adversarial poisoning attack
H3. No more than 5% of the benign training data feature
space is required to be poisoned to reduce the general

Rejected

efficacy of the model.
H4. No more than 10% of the benign training data files
are required to be poisoned to reduce the general

Rejected

efficacy of the model.
H5. No more than 10% of the benign training data files
are required to be poisoned for a targeted adversarial

Accepted

attack to succeed.
H6. The targeted adversarial attack can be prevented at
RQ2

7.2

test time.

Accepted

Summary of Contributions

The aim of the research was twofold. First, to develop a targeted poisoning attack which allows for a
certain Zero-day malware file to bypass detection, while not reducing the overall general efficacy of
the malware detection model. Second, develop a defensive strategy to mitigate the adversarial attack.
To achieve the end goal, a set of prerequisites were required to be completed first, which lead to the
development of an adversarial attack and defence strategy.
The targeted adversarial poisoning attack was performed in a black-box scenario using a random
selection of import library functions injected into different percentages of the benign training data.
The import features were selected as the poisoning features after performing successful preliminary
experiments which identified them as being a suitable feature set for reducing the efficacy of the
target model. The targeted adversarial poisoning attack was performed in a black-box scenario, the
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only information the attacker had of the ML architecture was that the model was trained to detect
malicious PE32 files and that the import section of the PE32 files were used in the training of the
model. No exploratory work was performed to identify what level of contribution the features of the
PE32 file contributed to the models classification, unlike what was performed by Severi et al. (2020),
where SHAP values were calculated to identify which features contributed the most to the model’s
classification.
The targeted adversarial attack was successful in allowing for previously detected Zero-day malware
files to bypass detection by being misclassified as benign in both GBDT and MLP models. The results
from the targeted adversarial poisoning attack have shown that it is possible to perform a targeted
adversarial poisoning attack when the target feature area is comprised of a feature hash. In the
watermark attack, Severi et al. (2020) avoided the vector dimensions of the EMBER training files
which were a computed feature hash, which removed 2,316 of 2,351 of the input vectors. The authors
only used values which were not computed into a feature hash as they needed to identify the
contribution of the features before creating their watermark trigger. As feature hashing generates an
irreversible hash digest, the authors would not have been able to identify which features contributed to
the model’s classification if they were to use any of the computed feature hash areas. The results from
the experiments in this thesis show that it is possible to perform successful targeted adversarial attacks
in a black-box scenario without computing any feature importance and the experiments show that
targeted adversarial attacks can succeed if the input vectors are of a computed feature hash.
The first defensive strategy was to try and identify anomalous data at test time through the use of
heatmaps. The intuition behind the defence was that as the target malicious Zero-day file was not
modified in anyway, the majority of the file’s features should lean towards malicious with the
adversarial trigger features overwhelming the classification and misclassifying the file as benign. The
idea was that the heatmap could be used to identify the features which contribute to the
misclassification, and if there was an obvious anomaly within the feature importance (majority lean
towards malicious but a small amount overwhelmingly pulls toward benign), the file would be
quarantined for further examination. Unfortunately, the heatmap approach did not work visually for
examining a one-dimensional plot.
The defence was modified from examining feature importance to evaluating the activation weights of
the neurons from the penultimate layer of the model. The activation weights from the penultimate
layer were examined as they contain all of the encoded data from the previous layers. The intuition
behind the approach was that the activation weights of the target Zero-day file would differ
significantly from the target benign activation weights from the test files, as the Zero-day file had not
been modified and should lean more towards the activation weight values of the malicious class. It
was found to be possible to identify on average ~80% of the target Zero-day files from the combined
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targeted poisoning attacks by examining the activation weights of the neurons from the penultimate
layer. The formula for detecting suspicious files was if six or more neurons were outside two MADs
from the average activation weights of the test dataset, that file is suspicious and should be
quarantined for further examination. A benefit of the MAD defence over other defences which
remove poisoned data from the training set by identifying outliers is that the MAD defence does not
require a clean dataset to generate the average activation weight values to perform the defence. The
defence was shown to be successful when the average activation weights were generated on both
clean and poisoned datasets.

7.3

Future Work

The proposed defensive technique which evaluated the activation weights from the last hidden layer is
not able to identify targeted poisoning attacks when the attack succeeds with such a high proficiency
to mask itself completely within the chosen target class. Future work for this research would
concentrate on preventing the targeted adversarial attacks, which are successfully camouflaged within
the target class and cannot be detected at test time by examining the activation weights.
Some additional experiments which were not performed as they were out of scope for this research
include testing the training time defensive strategies utilised in the watermark attack paper on the
targeted adversarial attacks performed in this research. It would be interesting to see if they can be
detected at the training stage without removing a significant amount of genuine benign training data.
Another experiment would be to see if the watermark attack can be detected at test time using the two
MAD defence proposed in this thesis. Another defence for the watermark attack may be performed
pre-emptively by hashing all the data vectors used for training. If the attacker is not able to distinguish
which features contribute to the model’s detection as the hash cannot be reversed, would it still be
possible for the watermark attack to succeed?
The poisoning defence which has been integrated into the IBM Adversarial Robustness Toolbox did
not function correctly when trying to identify poisoned samples in the MLP EMBER dataset. The
poisoning defence has a set limit of 5,000 and the MLP EMBER dataset contains 50,000 samples. In
the future, additional experiments which compare the efficacy of the poisoning defence in the IBM
Toolbox and the MAD defence will be compared once a workaround for the 5,000 data limit has been
developed.
Other areas of interest include investigating adversarial attacks and defences for ML software utilised
in critical infrastructure and the defence industry. Defence and critical infrastructure are pivotal in for
the well-being and safety of a nation. ML is being utilised in these areas in a variety of ways, from
utilising ML security systems (e.g., malware detection, intrusion detection systems) to protect critical
infrastructure or in the development of weapons, drones, and other military applications.
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9 Appendix A – Machine Learning Model Code
EMBER GBDT Code
def optimize_model(data_dir):
"""
Run a grid search to find the best LightGBM parameters
"""
# Read data
X_train, y_train = read_vectorized_features(data_dir, subset="train")
# Filter unlabeled data
train_rows = (y_train != -1)
# read training dataset
X_train = X_train[train_rows]
y_train = y_train[train_rows]
# score by roc auc
# we're interested in low FPR rates, so we'll consider only the AUC for FPRs in [0,5e-3]
score = make_scorer(roc_auc_score, max_fpr=5e-3)
# define search grid
param_grid = {
'boosting_type': ['gbdt'],
'objective': ['binary'],
'num_iterations': [500, 1000],
'learning_rate': [0.005, 0.05],
'num_leaves': [512, 1024, 2048],
'feature_fraction': [0.5, 0.8, 1.0],
'bagging_fraction': [0.5, 0.8, 1.0]
}
model = lgb.LGBMClassifier(boosting_type="gbdt", n_jobs=-1, silent=True)
# each row in X_train appears in chronological order of "appeared"
# so this works for progrssive time series splitting
progressive_cv = TimeSeriesSplit(n_splits=3).split(X_train)
grid
=
GridSearchCV(estimator=model,
scoring=score, n_jobs=1, verbose=3)
grid.fit(X_train, y_train)

cv=progressive_cv,

param_grid=param_grid,

return grid.best_params_

def train_model(data_dir, params={}):
"""
Train the LightGBM model from the EMBER dataset from the vectorized features
"""
# update params
params.update({"application": "binary"})
# Read data
X_train, y_train = read_vectorized_features(data_dir, "train")
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# Filter unlabeled data
train_rows = (y_train != -1)
# Train
lgbm_dataset = lgb.Dataset(X_train[train_rows], y_train[train_rows])
lgbm_model = lgb.train(params, lgbm_dataset)
#lgbm_model = lgb.fit(params, lgbm_dataset)
return lgbm_model
EMBER MLP Code
def train_model(X_train, X_test, y_train, y_test, virus_sha256):
model = simple_multilayer.create_model(
input_shape=(X_train.shape[1], ),
input_dropout=0.05,
hidden_dropout=0.1,
hidden_layers=[2048, 1024, 512, 256, 10]
)
model.fit(X_train, y_train,
batch_size=128,
epochs=100,
verbose=1,
callbacks=[
EarlyStopping( patience=20 ),
ModelCheckpoint( '/media/me/My Passport/Models/'+virus_sha256+'_multilayer.h5',
save_best_only=True),
ReduceLROnPlateau( patience=5, verbose=1)],
validation_data=(X_test, y_test))

model = load_model('/media/me/My Passport/Models/'+virus_sha256+'_multilayer.h5')
y_pred = model.predict(X_test)
roc = roc_auc_score(y_test, y_pred)
a,b,c,d,e,f = common.summarize_performance(y_pred, y_test, "Multilayer perceptron")

return b,e,f,model,roc

10 Appendix B – Experiment Result Tables
Manually Selected Functions
“user32.dll” Import Functions
Five Functions – user32.dll
‘SetRect’, ‘GetSubMenu’, ‘GetDCEx’, ‘GetMessageTime’, ‘SetWindowRgn’
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Training file

Library

Function Injection

Count

Function Count

Count

train_features_0.JSONl

12,824

654,156

54,533

8.336%

train_features_1.JSONl

11,664

590,103

49,572

8.4%

train_features_2.JSONl

13,655

694,225

57,636

8.302%

train_features_3.JSONl

16,678

835,414

70,558

8.445%

train_features_4.JSONl

17,940

1,313,214

64,583

4.917%

train_features_5.JSONl

11,772

511,952

51,396

10.039%

Total

84,533

4,599,064

348,278

7.572%

Attack Name

Unique

Library

FPR 1%

FNR 1%

Threshold 1%

ROC

Injection Percentage

Detection Rate 1%

manual_user32_5_5

0.991

1.764

0.537

99.90235814

98.236

manual_user32_5_10

0.999

1.952

0.55

99.90298298

98.048

manual_user32_5_15

0.997

1.883

0.543

99.90653725

98.117

manual_user32_5_20

0.995

1.914

0.557

99.90367065

98.086

manual_user32_5_25

0.997

1.946

0.558

99.89786455

98.054

manual_user32_5_30

1

1.961

0.578

99.90072732

98.039

manual_user32_5_35

1

2.155

0.6

99.89211274

97.845

manual_user32_5_40

0.999

1.981

0.596

99.89589024

98.019

manual_user32_5_45

1

2.152

0.622

99.8941914

97.848

manual_user32_5_50

0.997

2.111

0.628

99.8889534

97.889

manual_user32_5_55

0.999

2.182

0.64

99.88439924

97.818

manual_user32_5_60

1

2.319

0.663

99.88538346

97.681

manual_user32_5_65

0.998

2.347

0.692

99.88158333

97.653

manual_user32_5_70

1

2.395

0.705

99.88058659

97.605

manual_user32_5_75

0.991

2.559

0.749

99.86732209

97.441

manual_user32_5_80

0.998

2.698

0.769

99.86417246

97.302

manual_user32_5_85

0.998

3.28

0.833

99.83772575

96.72

manual_user32_5_90

0.995

3.612

0.874

99.81581328

96.388

manual_user32_5_95

0.991

5.376

0.931

99.75475833

94.624

manual_user32_5_100

0.571

58.177

0.999

97.7141671

41.823

Ten Functions – user32.dll
'SetRect', 'GetSubMenu', 'GetDCEx', 'GetMessageTime', 'SetWindowRgn', 'SetScrollPos',
'IntersectRect', 'CallNextHookEx', 'GetDlgItem', 'ReleaseDC'
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Training file

Library

Function Injection

Count

Function Count

Count

train_features_0.JSONl

12,824

654,156

101,528

15.52%

train_features_1.JSONl

11,664

590,103

92,857

15.735%

train_features_2.JSONl

13,655

694,225

108,299

15.599%

train_features_3.JSONl

16,678

835,414

131,789

15.775%

train_features_4.JSONl

17,940

1,313,214

117,992

8.984%

train_features_5.JSONl

11,772

511,952

97,274

19%

Total

84,533

4,599,064

649,739

14.127%

Attack Name

Unique

Library

FPR 1%

FNR 1%

Threshold 1%

ROC

Injection Percentage

Detection Rate 1%

manual_user32_10_5

0.999

1.695

0.531

99.91032533

98.305

manual_user32_10_10

0.988

1.813

0.542

99.90556271

98.187

manual_user32_10_15

1

1.803

0.544

99.90885283

98.197

manual_user32_10_20

0.999

1.856

0.555

99.90716998

98.144

manual_user32_10_25

0.998

1.909

0.572

99.89671515

98.091

manual_user32_10_30

0.999

1.944

0.579

99.89477113

98.056

manual_user32_10_35

0.997

1.958

0.582

99.90150219

98.042

manual_user32_10_40

1

1.946

0.599

99.89737914

98.054

manual_user32_10_45

0.999

2.076

0.624

99.88338406

97.924

manual_user32_10_50

0.997

2.072

0.634

99.88944858

97.928

manual_user32_10_55

0.996

2.014

0.65

99.89016454

97.986

manual_user32_10_60

0.996

2.123

0.672

99.88576935

97.877

manual_user32_10_65

1

2.349

0.703

99.8737667

97.651

manual_user32_10_70

0.992

2.21

0.704

99.87626327

97.79

manual_user32_10_75

0.993

2.452

0.75

99.86222377

97.548

manual_user32_10_80

0.998

2.684

0.783

99.85117525

97.316

manual_user32_10_85

0.997

2.93

0.832

99.84456597

97.07

manual_user32_10_90

0.992

3.439

0.877

99.81800112

96.561

manual_user32_10_95

0.992

5.349

0.935

99.7390699

94.651

0

100

1

97.49084004

0

manual_user32_10_100
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“shell32.dll” Import Functions
Five Functions – shell32.dll
‘ShellExecuteA’,

‘SHGetFolderPathA’,

‘ShellExecuteExA’,

‘SHFileOperationA’,

‘ShellMessageBoxW’
Training file

Library

Function Injection

Count

Function Count

Count

train_features_0.JSONl

7,187

33,299

31,351

94.149%

train_features_1.JSONl

6,304

28,970

27,989

96.613%

train_features_2.JSONl

7,447

34,450

32,645

94.760%

train_features_3.JSONl

9,537

40,372

41,885

103.747%

train_features_4.JSONl

11,584

78,278

52,666

67.280%

train_features_5.JSONl

5,691

26,453

25,257

95.478%

Total

47,750

241,822

211,793

87.582%

Attack Name

FPR 1%

manual_shell32_5_5

Unique

Library

FNR 1%

Threshold 1%

ROC

Injection Percentage

Detection Rate 1%

1

1.791

0.526

99.90990048

98.209

manual_shell32_5_10

0.998

1.795

0.539

99.90831316

98.205

manual_shell32_5_15

1

1.789

0.537

99.91043297

98.211

manual_shell32_5_20

1

1.864

0.544

99.9071337

98.136

manual_shell32_5_25

0.997

1.917

0.56

99.90339206

98.083

manual_shell32_5_30

0.994

1.959

0.56

99.89858747

98.041

manual_shell32_5_35

0.998

2.001

0.571

99.90563369

97.999

manual_shell32_5_40

0.997

1.873

0.576

99.90451775

98.127

manual_shell32_5_45

1

2.031

0.596

99.90170271

97.969

manual_shell32_5_50

1

2.059

0.6

99.89913858

97.941

manual_shell32_5_55

0.996

2.138

0.622

99.89766369

97.862

manual_shell32_5_60

0.999

2.106

0.628

99.89214973

97.894

manual_shell32_5_65

0.998

2.391

0.657

99.88851385

97.609

manual_shell32_5_70

0.996

2.288

0.665

99.88793105

97.712

manual_shell32_5_75

0.999

2.431

0.683

99.88038944

97.569

manual_shell32_5_80

0.994

2.974

0.728

99.85943153

97.026

manual_shell32_5_85

0.997

2.919

0.766

99.85234237

97.081

manual_shell32_5_90

0.993

3.661

0.818

99.82451533

96.339

manual_shell32_5_95

0.991

5.045

0.895

99.75306615

94.955

manual_shell32_5_100

0.965

34.63

0.992

98.95937595

65.37
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Ten Functions – shell32.dll
'ShellExecuteA',

'SHGetFolderPathA',

'ShellMessageBoxW',

'FindExecutableA',

'ShellExecuteExA',
'ShellAboutA',

'SHFileOperationA',

'SHGetDataFromIDListA',

'SHGetDiskFreeSpaceA', 'SHCreateShellItem'
Training file

Library

Function Injection

Count

Function Count

Count

train_features_0.JSONl

7,187

33,299

66,988

201.171%

train_features_1.JSONl

6,304

28,970

59,308

204.722%

train_features_2.JSONl

7,447

34,450

69,552

201.892%

train_features_3.JSONl

9,537

40,372

89,093

220.680%

train_features_4.JSONl

11,584

78,278

110,061

140.602%

train_features_5.JSONl

5,691

26,453

53,497

202.234%

Total

47,750

241,822

448,499

185.466%

Attack Name
manual_shell32_10_5

Unique

Library

FPR 1%

FNR 1%

Threshold 1%

ROC

Injection Percentage

Detection Rate 1%

1

1.914

0.528

99.90698587

98.086

manual_shell32_10_10

0.998

1.938

0.543

99.90482298

98.062

manual_shell32_10_15

1

1.867

0.545

99.90235401

98.133

manual_shell32_10_20

0.999

1.982

0.553

99.90067669

98.018

manual_shell32_10_25

0.999

1.91

0.566

99.9027826

98.09

manual_shell32_10_30

0.999

1.924

0.576

99.89568811

98.076

manual_shell32_10_35

0.994

2.174

0.594

99.89542627

97.826

manual_shell32_10_40

0.999

2.016

0.586

99.89464113

97.984

manual_shell32_10_45

0.998

2.064

0.605

99.89176835

97.936

manual_shell32_10_50

0.995

2.18

0.612

99.89388337

97.82

manual_shell32_10_55

1

2.238

0.627

99.88926653

97.762

manual_shell32_10_60

1

2.351

0.647

99.88536494

97.649

manual_shell32_10_65

1

2.325

0.666

99.88691268

97.675

manual_shell32_10_70

0.999

2.46

0.683

99.88018014

97.54

manual_shell32_10_75

0.997

2.512

0.712

99.87590608

97.488

manual_shell32_10_80

0.999

2.759

0.741

99.86618962

97.241

manual_shell32_10_85

0.99

3.164

0.78

99.8480135

96.836

manual_shell32_10_90

0.997

3.619

0.833

99.82736403

96.381

manual_shell32_10_95

0.991

6.251

0.917

99.73005722

93.749

manual_shell32_10_100

0.81

53.969

0.997

98.30671245

46.031
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“advapi32.dll” Import Functions
Five Functions – advapi32.dll
‘GetUserNameA’, CloseServiceHandle’, CryptHashData’, ‘RegDeleteKeyA’, ‘RegFlushKey’
Training file

Library

Function Injection

Count

Function Count

Count

train_features_0.JSONl

12,576

159,639

57,040

35.73%

train_features_1.JSONl

15,956

237,016

74,859

31.583%

train_features_2.JSONl

16,272

227,814

75,675

33.217%

train_features_3.JSONl

14,039

159,156

62,642

39.358%

train_features_4.JSONl

15,801

217,846

72,561

33.308%

train_features_5.JSONl

9,910

116,957

45,195

38.642%

Total

84,554

1,118,428

387,972

34.689%

Attack Name
manual_advapi32_5_5

Unique

Library

FPR 1%

FNR 1%

Threshold 1%

0.997

1.842

0.538

manual_advapi32_5_10

1

1.819

manual_advapi32_5_15

1

1.87

manual_advapi32_5_20

0.999

manual_advapi32_5_25
manual_advapi32_5_30
manual_advapi32_5_35

ROC

Injection Percentage

Detection Rate 1%

99.90636527

98.158

0.537

99.9080867

98.181

0.56

99.90581686

98.13

1.867

0.552

99.91025671

98.133

1

1.969

0.574

99.89481628

98.031

0.994

1.9

0.571

99.90211657

98.1

0.999

1.871

0.578

99.90620146

98.129

manual_advapi32_5_40

0.995

1.791

0.583

99.90244471

98.209

manual_advapi32_5_45

0.999

2.008

0.601

99.90469535

97.992

manual_advapi32_5_50

0.995

1.959

0.612

99.90514259

98.041

manual_advapi32_5_55

0.997

2.047

0.638

99.89600354

97.953

manual_advapi32_5_60

0.996

2.203

0.659

99.89161551

97.797

manual_advapi32_5_65

0.996

2.137

0.661

99.89306434

97.863

manual_advapi32_5_70

0.997

2.3

0.689

99.88887363

97.7

manual_advapi32_5_75

0.999

2.463

0.727

99.88226514

97.537

manual_advapi32_5_80

1

2.648

0.762

99.87081377

97.352

manual_advapi32_5_85

0.994

2.898

0.792

99.86369187

97.102

manual_advapi32_5_90

0.998

3.404

0.853

99.83717186

96.596

manual_advapi32_5_95

0.989

5.364

0.918

99.77490468

94.636

manual_advapi32_5_100

0.419

56.358

0.998

98.14491437

43.642
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Ten Functions – advapi32.dll
'GetUserNameA', 'CloseServiceHandle', 'CryptHashData', 'RegDeleteKeyA', 'RegFlushKey',
'StartServiceA', 'ControlService', 'AddAce', 'RegConnectRegistryW', 'CreateProcessAsUserW'
Training file

Library

Function Injection

Count

Function Count

Count

train_features_0.JSONl

12,576

159,639

118,403

74.169%

train_features_1.JSONl

15,956

237,016

153,272

64.667%

train_features_2.JSONl

16,272

227,814

155,620

68.310%

train_features_3.JSONl

14,039

159,156

131,162

82.410%

train_features_4.JSONl

15,801

217,846

150,030

68.869%

train_features_5.JSONl

9,910

116,957

93,456

79.906%

Total

84,554

1,118,428

801,943

71.702%

Attack Name
manual_advapi32_10_5

Unique

Library

FPR 1%

FNR 1%

Threshold 1%

ROC

Injection Percentage

Detection Rate 1%

0.996

1.797

0.534

99.90283649

98.203

manual_advapi32_10_10

1

1.773

0.551

99.90875651

98.227

manual_advapi32_10_15

0.999

1.813

0.555

99.90870546

98.187

manual_advapi32_10_20

0.997

1.928

0.555

99.90637989

98.072

manual_advapi32_10_25

0.996

1.841

0.569

99.91028406

98.159

manual_advapi32_10_30

0.998

1.951

0.586

99.9029045

98.049

manual_advapi32_10_35

0.999

1.935

0.585

99.89508652

98.065

manual_advapi32_10_40

0.994

2.08

0.594

99.90153695

97.92

manual_advapi32_10_45

0.998

1.945

0.606

99.89935235

98.055

manual_advapi32_10_50

0.993

2.118

0.618

99.89860348

97.882

manual_advapi32_10_55

0.999

1.982

0.643

99.89675165

98.018

manual_advapi32_10_60

0.997

2.301

0.663

99.89119558

97.699

manual_advapi32_10_65

0.996

2.456

0.678

99.88695771

97.544

manual_advapi32_10_70

1

2.51

0.706

99.88131724

97.49

manual_advapi32_10_75

1

2.801

0.74

99.87840738

97.199

manual_advapi32_10_80

0.997

2.756

0.764

99.87405457

97.244

manual_advapi32_10_85

0.999

3.047

0.81

99.85872836

96.953

manual_advapi32_10_90

0.995

3.68

0.856

99.8236588

96.32

manual_advapi32_10_95

0.993

4.564

0.923

99.78234111

95.436

manual_advapi32_10_100

0.993

51.452

0.998

97.57522374

48.548
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“msvcrt.dll” Import Functions
Five Functions – msvcrt.dll
‘strcmp’, ‘__P__environ’, ‘_read’, ‘isctype’, and ‘memchr’
Training file

Library

Function Injection

Count

Function Count

Count

train_features_0.JSONl

5,231

159,937

24,350

15.22%

train_features_1.JSONl

4,202

130,416

18,684

14.326%

train_features_2.JSONl

5,778

183,830

25,890

14.083%

train_features_3.JSONl

5,777

192,425

25,667

13.338%

train_features_4.JSONl

5,230

176,556

23,237

13.161%

train_features_5.JSONl

7,138

225,072

31,917

14.18%

Total

33,356

1,068,236

149,745

14.017%

Attack Name

Unique

Library

FPR 1%

FNR 1%

Threshold 1%

ROC

Injection Percentage

Detection Rate 1%

manual_msvcrt_5_5

1

1.812

0.533

99.90669428

98.188

manual_msvcrt_5_10

1

1.8

0.544

99.90637742

98.2

manual_msvcrt_5_15

0.999

1.736

0.528

99.90444305

98.264

manual_msvcrt_5_20

0.998

1.784

0.53

99.90882077

98.216

manual_msvcrt_5_25

0.998

1.836

0.541

99.90876486

98.164

manual_msvcrt_5_30

0.993

1.793

0.547

99.90714237

98.207

manual_msvcrt_5_35

0.998

1.841

0.549

99.90493044

98.159

manual_msvcrt_5_40

0.997

1.831

0.546

99.9060563

98.169

manual_msvcrt_5_45

0.996

1.858

0.541

99.90589833

98.142

manual_msvcrt_5_50

0.994

1.818

0.546

99.90607513

98.182

manual_msvcrt_5_55

0.994

1.82

0.552

99.89533784

98.18

manual_msvcrt_5_60

1

1.813

0.564

99.90433013

98.187

manual_msvcrt_5_65

0.998

1.888

0.561

99.89730125

98.112

manual_msvcrt_5_70

0.998

1.948

0.574

99.89955739

98.052

manual_msvcrt_5_75

0.997

1.842

0.571

99.89618596

98.158

manual_msvcrt_5_80

0.997

2.044

0.591

99.89331908

97.956

manual_msvcrt_5_85

0.997

1.927

0.602

99.88853725

98.073

manual_msvcrt_5_90

0.998

2.262

0.638

99.87940372

97.738

manual_msvcrt_5_95

1

2.8

0.691

99.85315427

97.2

0.997

4.114

0.802

99.75700525

95.886

manual_msvcrt_5_100

Page | 170

Ten Functions – msvcrt.dll
'strcmp', '__p__environ', '_read', '_isctype', 'memchr', '__p__fmode', '__getmainargs', '_cexit',
'atexit', and '_assert’
Training file

Library

Function Injection

Count

Function Count

Count

train_features_0.JSONl

5,231

159,937

46,412

29.018%

train_features_1.JSONl

4,202

130,416

36,373

27.889%

train_features_2.JSONl

5,778

183,830

50,169

27.29%

train_features_3.JSONl

5,777

192,425

48,871

25.397%

train_features_4.JSONl

5,230

176,556

45,193

25.596%

train_features_5.JSONl

7,138

225,072

64,476

28.646%

Total

33,356

1,068,236

291,494

27.287%

Attack Name

Unique

Library

FPR 1%

FNR 1%

Threshold 1%

ROC

Injection Percentage

Detection Rate 1%

manual_msvcrt_10_5

0.998

1.864

0.542

99.90674445

98.136

manual_msvcrt_10_10

0.996

1.832

0.538

99.90611006

98.168

manual_msvcrt_10_15

0.996

1.814

0.528

99.90828948

98.186

manual_msvcrt_10_20

0.999

1.784

0.54

99.9072734

98.216

manual_msvcrt_10_25

0.997

1.804

0.535

99.90921441

98.196

manual_msvcrt_10_30

0.997

1.798

0.538

99.90191497

98.202

manual_msvcrt_10_35

0.998

1.847

0.545

99.89805365

98.153

manual_msvcrt_10_40

0.998

1.888

0.543

99.90330687

98.112

manual_msvcrt_10_45

1

1.782

0.534

99.90429628

98.218

manual_msvcrt_10_50

0.996

1.795

0.547

99.90214127

98.205

manual_msvcrt_10_55

1

1.867

0.551

99.9026623

98.133

manual_msvcrt_10_60

0.998

1.787

0.55

99.90680335

98.213

manual_msvcrt_10_65

0.999

1.886

0.558

99.90406463

98.114

manual_msvcrt_10_70

0.993

1.972

0.573

99.90437755

98.028

manual_msvcrt_10_75

0.997

1.86

0.568

99.89257589

98.14

manual_msvcrt_10_80

0.999

2.044

0.587

99.89521826

97.956

manual_msvcrt_10_85

0.998

2.123

0.611

99.88620192

97.877

manual_msvcrt_10_90

0.998

2.291

0.638

99.87449242

97.709

manual_msvcrt_10_95

0.997

2.649

0.68

99.84857023

97.351

manual_msvcrt_10_100

0.996

4.623

0.806

99.74560355

95.377
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Randomly Selected Functions
“user32.dll” Import Functions
Five Functions – user32.dll
'SetCursor', 'GetSystemMetrics', 'GetDesktopWindow', 'TrackPopupMenu', 'ClientToScreen'
Training file

Unique Library

Library

Count

Count

Count

Percentage

train_features_0.JSONl

12,824

654,156

42,939

6.564%

train_features_1.JSONl

11,664

590,103

39,515

6.696%

train_features_2.JSONl

13,655

694,225

46,239

6.660%

train_features_3.JSONl

16,678

835,414

56,176

6.724%

train_features_4.JSONl

17,940

1,313,214

48,533

3.695%

train_features_5.JSONl

11,772

511,952

42,643

8.329%

Total

84,533

4,599,064

276,045

6.002%

Attack Name

FPR 1%

FNR 1%

Function

Function

Threshold 1%

Injection

ROC

Injection

Detection Rate 1%

random_user32_5_5

0.993

1.927

0.549

99.90532528

98.073

random_user32_5_10

0.999

1.784

0.537

99.904929

98.216

random_user32_5_15

0.998

1.805

0.542

99.90532947

98.195

random_user32_5_20

1

1.915

0.561

99.89477319

98.085

random_user32_5_25

0.998

1.867

0.563

99.8972514

98.133

random_user32_5_30

0.999

1.95

0.569

99.8949143

98.05

random_user32_5_35

1

1.895

0.574

99.89260108

98.105

random_user32_5_40

0.997

2.065

0.601

99.88584482

97.935

random_user32_5_45

0.999

2.025

0.603

99.88949437

97.975

random_user32_5_50

0.997

2.052

0.621

99.87827024

97.948

random_user32_5_55

1

2.211

0.639

99.87199413

97.789

random_user32_5_60

0.997

2.308

0.659

99.87576517

97.692

random_user32_5_65

1

2.331

0.68

99.8701682

97.669

random_user32_5_70

0.999

2.413

0.691

99.8624431

97.587

random_user32_5_75

0.994

2.491

0.715

99.85279526

97.509

random_user32_5_80

1

2.747

0.764

99.83588854

97.253

random_user32_5_85

0.998

3.227

0.811

99.82681944

96.773

random_user32_5_90

0.998

3.631

0.857

99.79327915

96.369

random_user32_5_95

0.99

5.934

0.931

99.71186741

94.066

random_user32_5_100

0.569

48.914

0.998

98.41913879

51.086
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Ten Functions – user32.dll
'SetCursor', 'GetSystemMetrics', 'GetDesktopWindow', 'TrackPopupMenu', 'ClientToScreen',
'CloseClipboard', 'PeekMessageA', 'GetDlgItem', 'BeginPaint', 'EmptyClipboard'
Training file

Unique

Library

Library

Function

Function Injection

Injection Percentage

Count

Count

Count

train_features_0.JSONl

12,824

654,156

87,294

13.344%

train_features_1.JSONl

11,664

590,103

81,266

13.771%

train_features_2.JSONl

13,655

694,225

95,805

13.800%

train_features_3.JSONl

16,678

835,414

115,694

13.848%

train_features_4.JSONl

17,940

1,313,214

110,488

8.413%

train_features_5.JSONl

11,772

511,952

87,960

17.181%

Total

84,533

4,599,064

578,507

12.578%

Attack Name
random_user32_10_5

FPR 1%

FNR 1%
1

1.735

random_user32_10_10

0.996

random_user32_10_15

1

random_user32_10_20

Threshold 1%

ROC

Detection Rate 1%

0.53

99.91302554

98.265

1.785

0.54

99.90602313

98.215

1.96

0.549

99.89885751

98.04

1

1.891

0.546

99.89833258

98.109

random_user32_10_25

0.999

1.854

0.557

99.89558585

98.146

random_user32_10_30

0.996

2.028

0.573

99.88481099

97.972

random_user32_10_35

1

1.973

0.59

99.88033077

98.027

random_user32_10_40

0.998

2.001

0.602

99.88344186

97.999

random_user32_10_45

0.997

2.013

0.614

99.87800445

97.987

random_user32_10_50

0.995

2.131

0.627

99.8757583

97.869

random_user32_10_55

0.996

2.152

0.645

99.86890763

97.848

random_user32_10_60

0.997

2.221

0.664

99.87108499

97.779

random_user32_10_65

1

2.268

0.68

99.86566299

97.732

random_user32_10_70

0.995

2.396

0.71

99.85938025

97.604

random_user32_10_75

1

2.593

0.748

99.84678703

97.407

random_user32_10_80

0.994

2.946

0.788

99.83933104

97.054

random_user32_10_85

0.998

3.018

0.815

99.8203463

96.982

random_user32_10_90

1

3.905

0.878

99.78895287

96.095

random_user32_10_95

0.983

5.9

0.936

99.71879549

94.1

random_user32_10_100

0.264

60.938

0.999

98.03389002

39.062
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“shell32.dll” Import Functions
Five Functions – shell32.dll
'ExtractIconW',

'SHGetDesktopFolder',

'FreeIconList',

'ExtractAssociatedIconExW',

'DllRegisterServer'
Training file

Unique Library

Library

Count

Count

Injection Count

train_features_0.JSONl

7,187

33,299

35,044

105.240%

train_features_1.JSONl

6,304

28,970

30,545

105.436%

train_features_2.JSONl

7,447

34,450

36,046

104.632%

train_features_3.JSONl

9,537

40,372

46,617

115.468%

train_features_4.JSONl

11,584

78,278

50,252

64.196%

train_features_5.JSONl

5,691

26,453

27,576

104.245%

Total

47,750

241,822

226,080

93.490%

Attack Name

FPR 1%

FNR 1%

Function

Threshold 1%

Function

ROC

Injection Percentage

Detection Rate 1%

random_shell32_5_5

0.999

1.782

0.531

99.91016627

98.218

random_shell32_5_10

0.995

1.875

0.54

99.90711866

98.125

random_shell32_5_15

0.998

1.805

0.543

99.90723896

98.195

random_shell32_5_20

1

1.86

0.543

99.91042568

98.14

random_shell32_5_25

0.996

1.797

0.551

99.90494492

98.203

random_shell32_5_30

1

1.87

0.557

99.90508319

98.13

random_shell32_5_35

0.998

1.907

0.575

99.90237536

98.093

random_shell32_5_40

0.997

1.99

0.579

99.90400275

98.01

random_shell32_5_45

0.999

1.977

0.592

99.90038427

98.023

random_shell32_5_50

0.997

1.999

0.603

99.89790463

98.001

random_shell32_5_55

0.998

2.055

0.614

99.89354255

97.945

random_shell32_5_60

0.997

2.049

0.628

99.89605343

97.951

random_shell32_5_65

0.996

2.283

0.646

99.88918586

97.717

random_shell32_5_70

0.997

2.455

0.674

99.88255586

97.545

random_shell32_5_75

0.998

2.668

0.698

99.87591172

97.332

random_shell32_5_80

1

2.641

0.72

99.87056884

97.359

random_shell32_5_85

1

3.12

0.761

99.8526714

96.88

random_shell32_5_90

0.999

3.308

0.803

99.83860904

96.692

random_shell32_5_95

0.999

5.068

0.896

99.77321202

94.932

random_shell32_5_100

0.944

21.954

0.991

99.15268717

78.046
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Ten Functions – shell32.dll
'ExtractIconW',

'SHGetDesktopFolder',

'DllRegisterServer',

'FreeIconList',

'ShellMessageBoxA',

'ExtractAssociatedIconExW',

'ShellAboutW',

'ExtractIconExW',

'SHBrowseForFolderA', 'SHCreateProcessAsUserW'
Training file

Unique

Library

Library

Function

Function

Injection Percentage

Count

Count

Injection Count

train_features_0.JSONl

7,187

33,299

68,775

206.537%

train_features_1.JSONl

6,304

28,970

60,872

210.120%

train_features_2.JSONl

7,447

34,450

71,714

208.168%

train_features_3.JSONl

9,537

40,372

92,215

228.413%

train_features_4.JSONl

11,584

78,278

106,198

135.667%

train_features_5.JSONl

5,691

26,453

54,884

207.477%

Total

47,750

241,822

454,658

188.013%

Attack Name

FPR 1%

FNR 1%

Threshold 1%

ROC

Detection Rate 1%

random_shell32_10_5

1

1.734

0.53

99.90545204

98.266

random_shell32_10_10

1

1.849

0.545

99.90021741

98.151

random_shell32_10_15

0.998

1.795

0.549

99.9145051

98.205

random_shell32_10_20

0.997

1.867

0.54

99.90825568

98.133

random_shell32_10_25

1

1.832

0.554

99.90514235

98.168

random_shell32_10_30

0.999

1.862

0.559

99.89999392

98.138

random_shell32_10_35

1

1.924

0.57

99.90513604

98.076

random_shell32_10_40

0.999

1.871

0.578

99.90597338

98.129

random_shell32_10_45

1

2.026

0.593

99.89424616

97.974

random_shell32_10_50

0.995

2.08

0.614

99.89824944

97.92

random_shell32_10_55

0.997

2.122

0.609

99.89443564

97.878

random_shell32_10_60

0.996

2.232

0.635

99.88967818

97.768

random_shell32_10_65

1

2.327

0.644

99.88521883

97.673

random_shell32_10_70

0.996

2.388

0.671

99.87998321

97.612

random_shell32_10_75

0.997

2.547

0.702

99.87900054

97.453

random_shell32_10_80

0.998

2.596

0.722

99.87299072

97.404

random_shell32_10_85

0.998

2.968

0.76

99.85894896

97.032

random_shell32_10_90

0.991

3.576

0.817

99.83345983

96.424

random_shell32_10_95

0.991

4.8

0.89

99.77162415

95.2

random_shell32_10_100

0.944

21.954

0.991

99.15268717

78.046
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“advapi32.dll” Import Functions
Five Functions – advapi32.dll
'CryptAcquireContextA',

'AdjustTokenPrivileges',

'SetSecurityDescriptorDacl',

'GetSecurityDescriptorDacl', 'UnlockServiceDatabase'
Training file

Library

Function Injection

Count

Function Count

Count

train_features_0.JSONl

12,576

159,639

56,433

35.350%

train_features_1.JSONl

15,956

237,016

68,782

29.019%

train_features_2.JSONl

16,272

227,814

70,998

31.164%

train_features_3.JSONl

14,039

159,156

64,071

40.256%

train_features_4.JSONl

15,801

217,846

73,433

33.708%

train_features_5.JSONl

9,910

116,957

44,959

38.440%

Total

84,554

1,118,428

378,676

33.857%

Attack Name

Unique

Library

FPR 1%

FNR 1%

Threshold 1%

ROC

Injection Percentage

Detection Rate 1%

random_advapi32_5_5

0.998

1.747

0.533

99.90913011

98.253

random_advapi32_5_10

0.998

1.781

0.544

99.90669201

98.219

random_advapi32_5_15

1

1.894

0.563

99.90528096

98.106

random_advapi32_5_20

1

1.917

0.555

99.90621429

98.083

random_advapi32_5_25

1

1.941

0.56

99.90894943

98.059

random_advapi32_5_30

0.995

1.879

0.581

99.90207243

98.121

random_advapi32_5_35

0.998

1.872

0.588

99.90633421

98.128

random_advapi32_5_40

0.999

1.994

0.598

99.90085319

98.006

random_advapi32_5_45

0.999

1.777

0.605

99.90421925

98.223

random_advapi32_5_50

1

1.971

0.626

99.90039098

98.029

random_advapi32_5_55

0.998

2.038

0.645

99.90303338

97.962

random_advapi32_5_60

0.999

1.977

0.644

99.89555245

98.023

random_advapi32_5_65

1

2.078

0.678

99.8968961

97.922

random_advapi32_5_70

0.993

2.202

0.704

99.89492523

97.798

random_advapi32_5_75

0.997

2.373

0.726

99.89142925

97.627

random_advapi32_5_80

0.997

2.757

0.769

99.87881958

97.243

random_advapi32_5_85

1

2.883

0.794

99.8619755

97.117

random_advapi32_5_90

0.99

3.542

0.866

99.83851064

96.458

random_advapi32_5_95

0.994

5.588

0.93

99.77036701

94.412

random_advapi32_5_100

0.539

63.209

0.999

96.91026982

36.791
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Ten Functions – advapi32.dll
'CryptAcquireContextA',

'AdjustTokenPrivileges',

'GetSecurityDescriptorDacl',

'UnlockServiceDatabase',

'SetSecurityDescriptorDacl',

'GetAce',

'EqualSid',

'InitializeAcl',

'CloseServiceHandle', 'CryptAcquireContextW'
Training file

Unique Library

Library

Count

Count

Injection Count

train_features_0.JSONl

12,576

159,639

114,085

71.464%

train_features_1.JSONl

15,956

237,016

139,051

58.667%

train_features_2.JSONl

16,272

227,814

143,771

63.108%

train_features_3.JSONl

14,039

159,156

129,613

81.437%

train_features_4.JSONl

15,801

217,846

145,436

66.760%

train_features_5.JSONl

9,910

116,957

91,261

78.029%

Total

84,554

1,118,428

763,217

68.240%

Attack Name

FPR 1%

FNR 1%

Function

Function

Threshold 1%

ROC

Injection Percentage

Detection Rate 1%

random_advapi32_10_5

0.999

1.809

0.538

99.90965663

98.191

random_advapi32_10_10

0.998

1.807

0.544

99.90645946

98.193

random_advapi32_10_15

0.997

1.837

0.552

99.90745487

98.163

random_advapi32_10_20

0.997

1.805

0.562

99.91021818

98.195

random_advapi32_10_25

0.997

1.925

0.576

99.90211576

98.075

random_advapi32_10_30

0.995

1.834

0.565

99.90755966

98.166

random_advapi32_10_35

0.999

1.988

0.586

99.89921748

98.012

random_advapi32_10_40

0.998

1.863

0.595

99.908428

98.137

random_advapi32_10_45

1

1.887

0.607

99.90483515

98.113

random_advapi32_10_50

0.998

1.987

0.62

99.90047496

98.013

random_advapi32_10_55

0.995

1.833

0.632

99.89978298

98.167

random_advapi32_10_60

0.998

1.84

0.645

99.90276438

98.16

random_advapi32_10_65

0.997

2.127

0.671

99.89205745

97.873

random_advapi32_10_70

1

2.411

0.69

99.89050188

97.589

random_advapi32_10_75

0.992

2.286

0.726

99.88938385

97.714

random_advapi32_10_80

0.994

2.485

0.765

99.88257789

97.515

random_advapi32_10_85

0.993

3.015

0.804

99.8610278

96.985

random_advapi32_10_90

0.994

3.284

0.851

99.84825922

96.716

random_advapi32_10_95

0.986

5.378

0.927

99.77633088

94.622

random_advapi32_10_100

0.353

65.769

0.999

97.22543733

34.231

Page | 177

“msvcrt.dll” Import Functions
Five Functions – msvcrt.dll
'strftime', '_iob', '_assert', '__dllonexit', 'memcmp'
Training file

Library

Function Injection

Count

Function Count

Count

train_features_0.JSONl

5,231

159,937

20,883

13.057%

train_features_1.JSONl

4,202

130,416

15,103

11.580%

train_features_2.JSONl

5,778

183,830

21,254

11.561%

train_features_3.JSONl

5,777

192,425

21,331

11.085%

train_features_4.JSONl

5,230

176,556

18,981

10.750%

train_features_5.JSONl

7,138

225,072

24,429

10.853%

Total

33,356

1,068,236

121,981

11.418%

Attack Name

Unique

Library

FPR 1%

FNR 1%

Threshold 1%

ROC

Injection Percentage

Detection Rate 1%

random_msvcrt_5_5

0.998

1.763

0.525

99.90527376

98.237

random_msvcrt_5_10

0.998

1.763

0.525

99.90527342

98.237

random_msvcrt_5_15

0.998

1.755

0.528

99.9073185

98.245

random_msvcrt_5_20

1

1.811

0.529

99.90563236

98.189

random_msvcrt_5_25

0.997

1.854

0.534

99.9070214

98.146

random_msvcrt_5_30

1

1.807

0.529

99.90367091

98.193

random_msvcrt_5_35

0.997

1.695

0.533

99.91055077

98.305

random_msvcrt_5_40

0.994

1.844

0.538

99.90713388

98.156

random_msvcrt_5_45

1

1.774

0.536

99.90566008

98.226

random_msvcrt_5_50

0.999

1.782

0.54

99.90566768

98.218

random_msvcrt_5_55

0.998

1.838

0.543

99.90597869

98.162

random_msvcrt_5_60

0.995

1.888

0.545

99.90630827

98.112

random_msvcrt_5_65

0.996

1.8

0.55

99.90256226

98.2

random_msvcrt_5_70

1

1.961

0.553

99.8986999

98.039

random_msvcrt_5_75

0.998

1.885

0.548

99.903245

98.115

random_msvcrt_5_80

0.998

1.896

0.565

99.90174819

98.104

random_msvcrt_5_85

1

1.988

0.578

99.89862215

98.012

random_msvcrt_5_90

1

2.069

0.594

99.88850946

97.931

random_msvcrt_5_95

1

2.426

0.625

99.87477996

97.574

0.998

2.876

0.689

99.84286116

97.124

random_msvcrt_5_100
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Ten Functions – msvcrt.dll
'strftime', '_iob', '_assert', '__dllonexit', 'memcmp', '_controlfp', 'localeconv', 'memchr',
'malloc', '??1type_info@@UAE@XZ'
Training file

Unique Library

Library

Count

Count

Injection Count

train_features_0.JSONl

5,231

159,937

40,027

25.026%

train_features_1.JSONl

4,202

130,416

30,581

23.448%

train_features_2.JSONl

5,778

183,830

42,601

23.174%

train_features_3.JSONl

5,777

192,425

42,096

21.876%

train_features_4.JSONl

5,230

176,556

37,674

21.338%

train_features_5.JSONl

7,138

225,072

50,678

22.516%

Total

33,356

1,068,236

243,657

22.809%

Attack Name

FPR 1%

FNR 1%

Function

Function

Threshold 1%

ROC

Injection Percentage

Detection Rate 1%

random_msvcrt_10_5

0.998

1.854

0.53

99.90285945

98.146

random_msvcrt_10_10

0.998

1.772

0.532

99.90829745

98.228

random_msvcrt_10_15

1

1.73

0.518

99.90968703

98.27

random_msvcrt_10_20

0.996

1.684

0.523

99.90835256

98.316

random_msvcrt_10_25

0.993

1.737

0.524

99.90470328

98.263

random_msvcrt_10_30

1

1.773

0.528

99.90857437

98.227

random_msvcrt_10_35

0.999

1.764

0.532

99.90814562

98.236

random_msvcrt_10_40

0.998

1.798

0.551

99.89949646

98.202

random_msvcrt_10_45

0.996

1.888

0.543

99.90375495

98.112

random_msvcrt_10_50

0.999

1.816

0.552

99.90200585

98.184

random_msvcrt_10_55

0.995

1.897

0.553

99.8973074

98.103

random_msvcrt_10_60

0.999

1.877

0.555

99.90479969

98.123

random_msvcrt_10_65

0.999

1.935

0.558

99.90049668

98.065

random_msvcrt_10_70

0.997

1.839

0.56

99.9013925

98.161

random_msvcrt_10_75

0.995

1.947

0.585

99.89818232

98.053

random_msvcrt_10_80

0.998

1.844

0.578

99.89975858

98.156

random_msvcrt_10_85

0.999

2.242

0.615

99.88516363

97.758

random_msvcrt_10_90

1

2.34

0.63

99.87929476

97.66

random_msvcrt_10_95

0.999

2.766

0.677

99.85757581

97.234

random_msvcrt_10_100

0.998

4.346

0.786

99.76336991

95.654
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